

THE  
PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

---

No. V.

---

ART. I.—THE HISTORY OF EGYPT.

*Ægypten's Stelle in der Weltgeschichte* (Egypt's Place in the History of the World). By Christian Carl Josias Bunsen. In five books. B. I. II. III. 3 Vols. Hamburg: 1845.

THE solution of the problem which the title of this work contains would be a most important service rendered to Ancient History. The chronology of most of the nations of early antiquity hangs upon that of Egypt, and can become fixed and determinate only by its previous establishment upon some historical basis. The Babylonian chronology, though, from the 8th century before Christ, it has the certainty which astronomical evidence alone can give, cannot be relied upon in earlier ages. The Assyrian again owes its first fixed dates to synchronisms with the Jewish history, and can therefore claim no higher authority than that on which it depends. To readers of the Bible, accustomed to see in the margin the year before Christ regularly assigned, this authority may seem unquestionable; but the chronology of the Old Testament, when critically examined, appears to be in a very unsatisfactory state. Before the age of Solomon it is doubtful whether it rests on any connected series of public records; in the time of the Judges it is fragmentary and imperfect; from the Conquest of Canaan to the settlement in Goshen it loses all historical groundwork during the bondage and degra-

CHRISTIAN TEACHER.—No. 31.

B

dation of the people; while upwards, from the Call of Abraham, it vanishes altogether, in the darkness of primæval times. The civilization of Phœnicia, and, through its mediation, of Greece, is evidently the offspring of Egypt, but till we can fix some epochs of conquest, legislation and art in Egypt itself, we can have only the most vague conception of the time and manner of its influence upon surrounding nations. Could we but establish the chronology of the works of art, so wonderfully preserved in their freshness, and of the sovereigns who appear on the walls of palaces and temples, carrying their victorious arms over the surrounding countries, not only would Egyptian history become an instructive series of well-arranged facts, instead of a collection of splendid fragments, fantastically thrown together, but the history of humanity for at least fifteen centuries would be retrieved from the obscurity and confusion in which it has long been lost. Such are the brilliant results to be expected from a successful attempt to fix *Egypt's place in the History of the World*.

The Chevalier Bunsen is well known in this country, from the high diplomatic station which he holds among us; and no reader of Arnold's Life can have forgotten the affectionate veneration with which his name is repeatedly mentioned there. It may not be equally known that he is an accomplished archæologist. The Archæological Institute of Rome, which has so happily applied the spirit of modern criticism to the traditionary creed of Italian antiquaries, owes, we believe, its foundation to him; and he has contributed a valuable part to the best extant description and examination of the Topography of Rome. His present work has been the fruit of long preparatory labours in critically settling the text of the ancient authors to whom he has to appeal,\* in acquiring a knowledge of the hieroglyphical character, arranging the monuments of the kings of Egypt, and studying the remains of the ancient language, both as it exists in the Coptic books and in the hieroglyphical inscriptions. The intimate friendship of Lepsius, who is acknowledged, since the premature deaths of Champollion and Rosellini, to stand first among Egyptologists,

\* These texts are brought together and critically illustrated in the *Urkundenbuch* appended to the 3rd volume.

has enabled him to pursue his researches with the ablest guidance, and furnished him with some results, unknown to the world generally, of the investigations made by the expedition with which Lepsius has been entrusted by the Prussian government. His book is throughout, (to use a German word, for which we should probably have an English equivalent, if we had more of the quality,) *gründlich*, the reverse of superficial. He neither conceals nor evades any difficulty, nor satisfies himself without a thorough examination of every question. If he has not solved the great problem of Egyptian history, he has certainly done more towards its solution than any critical inquirer has yet accomplished.

It is indeed scarcely possible that any system of Egyptian chronology and history can even now be more than provisional. The ancient authorities remain nearly as they were in the sixteenth century, but the monuments are still receiving additions which make changes necessary, and overturn very plausible hypotheses. How often have we flattered ourselves since the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, that at length the obscurities of this subject were about to be dispelled, and how constantly has the cloud returned! We hardly know what to consider as certain. All travellers agreed in declaring that neither within nor without the Pyramids of Gizeh was any trace of hieroglyphics to be found. What inference could seem more safe, than that they were erected by a dynasty of foreigners, to whom the use of them was unknown, or at a period so remote as to precede their invention? But Colonel Howard Vyse forces his way into chambers never visited since they were closed up by the workmen, and finds the stones marked with hieroglyphics. All the researches of antiquaries had failed to bring to light any implement of iron of the Pharaonic times, and strange as it sounded, that granite and basalt should be engraved with the fineness of seal-cutting, by a people who had only tools of brass, the negative argument seemed conclusive, when the same discoverer brought forth from the same unopened chamber a piece of iron of the age of Cheops. We had not only been assured by ancient authorities that the Egyptians never buried in woollen, but among thousands of mummies not one had been found wrapped in anything but linen, when our en-

terprising countryman makes his way into the pyramid of Mycerinus, and brings out along with the fragments of his coffin, part of the woollen envelope in which the royal body had been wrapt. Sir Gardner Wilkinson has taken much pains to ascertain the rate of elevation of the soil of Egypt, from the deposits of the Nile, a point of great interest both to the historian and the geologist. The basis of his calculation is the rise at the foot of the obelisk of Heliopolis, which he assumed to have been erected by Osortasen, 1,700 years B.C. (M. & C. i. p. 9.) But Bunsen and Lepsius have carried back Osortasen, as we shall see, near 1,000 years; and if they are right, all calculations built on the later date must be groundless. Bunsen's own work exhibits a very striking proof how liable are our opinions respecting Egyptian history, to be upset by antiquarian discoveries. Perring, the able superintendent of the excavations for which Col. Vyse supplied the funds, had been unable, from the state of the Faïoum, to explore the Pyramid of the Labyrinth. Bunsen found in Strabo (17. p. 811) a statement that the king who built the Labyrinth and lay buried there, was called *Ismandes*; and in the tablet of Karnak, a king whose name he read *Smenteti*, and supposed to be the same, the last of the first dynasty of Manetho, where he is called Semempses, the Osymandyas of Diodorus. Lepsius succeeds in opening the sepulchral chamber, finds in it the shield of Amenemhe III. of the *twelfth* dynasty, and thus not only brings up the date of its erection many hundred years, but convicts Manetho of error, who says that Lachares constructed the labyrinth as a tomb for himself. The lesson which these things teach is not despondency but caution. We must take care that our hypotheses sit lightly about us, and be ready to acknowledge their fallacy as ingenuously as Bunsen does his mistake respecting King Smenteti.

The first volume of this work is devoted to matters preliminary to the attempt to re-establish the chronology of Egypt. Justly considering that nothing more conclusively proves that high antiquity which he claims for the Egyptians than the early existence of a cultivated language, a written character and a systematic mythology, he enters into the examination of these points, and shows that all these marks of an advanced civilization were possessed by



the Egyptians in the very commencement of their history. The subject of the written character naturally leads him to the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, and the steps by which Young, Champollion and Lepsius have brought the interpretation of hieroglyphics to its present point. We think that in this deduction he scarcely does justice to the merits of Young. It is true that he long wandered about in uncertainty and even error respecting the relations of the three modes of writing and the interpretation of the hieroglyphics; that much of what he wrote in the Supplement to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has since been corrected, and that he made a very confused and unsatisfactory vindication of himself in his pamphlet of 1823. Still the fact remains, that he was the first to establish the *phonetic* use of the hieroglyphic characters, in writing the names of Ptolemy and Berenice, and that previously to this, Champollion had had no glimpse of the phonetic principle, which is the key of the whole system. It is said that Sir Christopher Wren used to walk up and down between the roof of King's College Chapel and its wonderful ceiling, exclaiming, "If I could but fix one of these stones, I could soon put the whole together." Dr. Young had fixed two stones for M. Champollion. Having once caught sight of the true principle, the French *savant* rapidly improved upon and extended it. He showed that it was not only applied, as Young had supposed, to foreign proper names, but to the series of the Pharaohs, nor only to proper names, but to the words of the language generally, so as to be truly and properly an *alphabet*, though of a cumbrous form.

In the course of his history of the discovery of hieroglyphics, M. Bunsen has occasion to notice the passage of Clemens Alexandrinus, (*Strom.* 5, vol. 2. p. 657, ed. Pott.) in which he distinguishes the *epistolographic*, the *hieratic*, and the *hieroglyphic* writing, and very plainly describes, only that the eyes of critics were holden, and they could not recognise it, the alphabetical application of the last-mentioned mode. A portion of this passage has been a great stumbling-block to the translators, and we do not think that Bunsen has succeeded at all better than his predecessors. It is this: Clemens is speaking of the hieroglyphic method, and having noticed its alphabetical use (ἡ διὰ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων κυριολογική), he proceeds to distinguish three kinds of the *symbolic*, as he calls it—that in which the

figure stands for the *thing*, not for the *letter*; and of this again, subdistinguishes the *cyriologic* (what we should call the *pictorial*, in which the figures stand simply for the thing), the *tropic* (which we should call the *symbolical*), and the *enigmatic*. Of the tropic he says that τοὺς γοῦν τῶν βασιλέων ἐπαίνους θεολογουμένοις μύθοις παραδίδοντες, ἀναγράφουσι διὰ τῶν ἀναγλυφῶν. Bunsen's translation is, "*So nun schreiben sie, vermittelt der hieroglyphischen Bilderschrift, die Bücher, welche das Lob der Könige in theologischen Mythen darstellen.*"—"They write by means of the hieroglyphical character the books which set forth the praise of their kings in theological myths."—i. p. 396. There is really no mention of *books* in the original, which should have been rendered "handing down the praises of their kings in theological fables, they record them by means of the sculptured characters." Ἀναγλυφή in Greek has no other meaning than an engraved figure or character, for though we have learned to conceive of the *hieroglyphic* as a peculiar mode of *writing*, Herodotus, Strabo and Clemens viewed it as a *sculpture*. Strabo (17. p. 806), in his general description of the Egyptian pylones, says, ἀναγλυφὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ τοῖχοι μεγάλων εἰδώλων, nor can any instance be produced of its use for writing. Bunsen appears to lay some stress (i. 27) on the circumstance that ἀναγράφειν is the word used when the catalogues of the Egyptian kings are spoken of, which were certainly written on papyrus:\* but it is just as applicable to a sculptured as to a written record. Plut. Vit. Dec. Orat. p. 852 E. εἰς τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῶν στηλῶν δοῦναι τὸν ταμίαν πεντήκοντα δραχμάς. Every royal monument of Egypt affords proof of the custom of recording the praises of the king in theological fables by means of sculpture. We notice in passing, another instance in which M. Bunsen appears to have misunderstood an ancient author whom he quotes, i. 97, note. He renders κρυπτομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τῆς σελήνης "in eclipses of the moon," instead of "at the new moon." We have been surprised also to find him recurring to the old notion that the names which the Greeks applied to Egyptian objects are Egyptian, and deriving πυραμῖς from *pe-ram*, "the high," and ὀβελος from *uben-ra* or *la*, "ray of the sun." Is it then the essence of a pyramid to be high; or had the Greeks no name for a *spit*, before they saw an

\* Her. 2, 100.

obelisk? What increases the improbability is, that *pe-ram* has never been found in any Egyptian text, and there is absolutely another name, wholly dissimilar, for obelisk. *Labyrinth* from Ra-Ma-Ra, "grave of Mares," is an etymology of the same class.

To the history of the discovery of hieroglyphics succeeds a section full of curious matter on the formation of the Egyptian language. The progress of Coptic philology is traced from our countryman David Wilkins, who may be regarded as its founder, through La Croze, Woide, Jablonski, and Zoega, down to our contemporaries Tattam in England, Peyron at Turin, and Schwarze in Germany. The latter author, when he has completed his work *Das alte Ägypten*, of which *as yet* only 2183 quarto pages have appeared, will have raised a monument of learned industry, deserving to be placed beside the Great Pyramid itself. That the Coptic language, which continued to be spoken by the Jacobite Christians of Egypt in the 12th century, and was not absolutely extinct till the 17th,\* was in the main the native language of the people under the Ptolemies and the Pharaohs, has been generally admitted by philologists, especially since the appearance of M. Quatremère's *Recherches sur la langue et la littérature Copte*, 1808. We have an early evidence of identity in a passage of Herodotus, (2,143,) in which he virtually informs us that *Piromi* was Egyptian for *man*: now removing the definite article *pe*, there remains *rome*, the Coptic name for man. The water-plants of the Egyptian marshes were called, according to St. Jerome, *achi*, which is preserved in the Alexandrian version of Gen. xli. 2, 18, Isaiah xix. 7, and this word is Coptic. The Alexandrian poet Lycophron (Cass. 579) uses *ἔρπις* for *wine*; according to Tzetzes ad loc. and Eust. Com. ad Hom. 1633, 5, it was an Egyptian word; and not only is it found in the sense of wine in the Coptic, removing the Greek termination, but the same word written *erp* or *arp* appears in hieroglyphic inscriptions beside vases evidently containing wine. The name Canopus was interpreted by an Egyptian to Aristides, (ii. 260, ed. Jebb,) as signifying "golden land:" now *kahi* in Coptic is *land*, and *noub* gold. Eratosthenes subjoins a Greek interpretation to each of the

\* The last person who could speak it died in 1633. Adelung Mithridates, 3, 78.

names of the 38 Theban kings in his *Laterculus*; and when allowance is made for corruption of the text, these correspond very well with the Coptic. Champollion therefore was abundantly justified in assuming the Coptic to be the language into which the hieroglyphics must be read. It was soon found, however, that its existing remains, which comprised only translations of some books of scripture (their number has since been increased) and liturgical works, were far too scanty to supply the means of interpreting the hieroglyphical inscriptions and papyri; and Champollion and Rosellini ventured on the more hazardous step of assuming the existence of words in the old Egyptian language which were either not found at all in the Coptic, or only in their supposed roots. This proceeding has naturally been viewed with suspicion; for when a considerable part of what they exhibited as the Egyptian rendering of a hieroglyphic document could not be found in any Coptic dictionary, too free scope seemed to be given to the imagination. It cannot be denied that much of this conjectural translation is destitute of evidence; nor is there any one who can read with any certainty into the Egyptian language, a hieroglyphical document of considerable length.\* But the general fact of a correspondence is not only unshaken but confirmed, notwithstanding the doubts which these antiquaries have brought upon their system by their too great eagerness for its rapid extension. It was Lepsius, we believe, who first drew attention to a passage quoted by Josephus (c. Apion. 1, 14), from Manetho, in which that writer makes a distinction between the *sacred language* and the *common dialect*, and this distinction has been followed out by himself and Bunsen with great success. A sacred language, as we know from many other examples, is no artificial and arbitrary creation, but an obsolete form of a once living speech, preserved in religious books, from the reverence which mankind feel and priests

\* Dr. Edward Hincks, a great opponent of the Coptic system, has published a challenge to Bunsen, offering to read the *Todtenbuch*, the great funeral ritual, a feat to which the Chevalier confesses himself unequal. Unless we could unsphere the spirit of Manetho to act as umpire, it would be impossible to bring this trial to a satisfactory result; but we should rejoice to see Dr. H.'s version of the *Todtenbuch*, upon his own principle of interpretation. We must acknowledge, however, that extreme facility of performance is not with us a presumption of correctness; otherwise we must place Sir William Betham at the head of the Etruscan scholars of Europe.

inculcate for the very words in which religious history and doctrine have been conveyed. Such languages are Sanscrit, Zend, Hebrew; or the Latin of the Missal compared with modern Italian. The modern Coptic is derived from the time of the deepest degradation of the Egyptian people; it is, therefore, natural that it should have lost much of the ancient language of the Pharaohs, as well as have received some incongruous additions from the effects of Greek and Roman dominion, and that *colluvies* of all nations which flowed into Egypt from the time of Alexander. Bunsen has given a Lexicon of the old Egyptian language, comparing its words (which amount, as far as yet ascertained, to more than 400) with those of the Coptic. The coincidence is such as to remove all reasonable doubt, both of the substantial identity of the two languages, and the soundness of the mode of reading the hieroglyphics by which the words have been obtained.

The language thus laid open to us is as peculiar and independent as the people by whom it was spoken. The Coptic alphabet contains, besides the 24 Greek letters, five old Egyptian; but the Egyptian language appears to have had only fifteen sounds,—a remarkable circumstance when we recollect that according to Plutarch (Plat. Quæst. x. 1,) and Pliny (7, 56,) the primitive Greek alphabet consisted only of sixteen letters; and that according to Irenæus (L. 2, 24,) the original sacerdotal letters of the Hebrews were only fifteen. The simple vowel-sounds, and the consonants with an inherent vowel, formed of themselves words, so that the language abounded in monosyllables. Its derivatives have been formed by a very simple system of prefixing, inserting and affixing certain letters, which have undergone very little change, not having been incorporated with the root, nor melted down by crasis, nor softened by any euphonic process. Its poverty is manifest when we compare it with the Hebrew, which contains in the books of the Old Testament 1,200 roots, while the Coptic can show only 900, and the old Egyptian probably not much more than 500. From its monosyllabic structure and scantiness of vowel-sound we find the same root used in several wholly independent significations. Very few of the principal objects of nature and art are the same as in the Syro-Arabian languages, and the structure, though display-

ing some affinities, is characteristically different.\* We are promised by Bunsen, in one of the yet unpublished books of his history, an inquiry into the genius of the Egyptian language, in which he proposes to show how it illustrates the organic law of the development of speech, and preserves to us a specimen, such as no other language exhibits, of an æra in the course of this development. To the appearance of this inquiry we shall defer any further notice of it.

The sixth section of this work is occupied with an inquiry into the threefold series of the Egyptian gods. The basis of the whole is the passages† in which Herodotus says that Hercules was one of the twelve gods; that 17,000 years had elapsed since these twelve gods were produced (*ἐγένοντο*) from the eight; and that a third series had been produced from the twelve. Various have been the attempts to assign names to these series. That all which were made before the discovery of hieroglyphics, even the learned Pantheon of Jablonsky, are now unsatisfactory, will be readily understood. Champollion proceeded too hastily in the composition of his Pantheon, and did not sufficiently discriminate between the public worship of the temples and the mystical doctrines and rites which appear in the funeral papyri. Sir G. Wilkinson (*M. & C.* 2nd series, c. xiii.) has endeavoured to discriminate the eight and twelve, but evidently with little confidence in his own arrangement. M. Bunsen proceeds in this investigation with his usual care, discards all the loose and vague statements of the Greeks, from Diodorus to the Neoplatonists, and confines himself to Herodotus and the public monuments. This is the least satisfactory part of his work, owing no doubt in great measure to the necessary obscurity of the subject; and it would be impossible to enter into it without a constant reference to plates. He has, however, abundantly established the fact, that from a very early period of their existence the Egyptians possessed an elaborate and refined system of national religion. The fact also of revolutions in this system is proved from the decisive evidence of the monuments, the emblems of certain gods having been systematically effaced. To Bunsen's

\* See Benfey *Verhältniss der Egyptischen Sprache*, Leipz. 1844, p. vi.

† 2, 43. 145.



conclusion that the root of the religious belief of Egypt is to be found in primæval Asia, in Armenia and Caucasus,\* we cannot assent, without evidence of a very different force from any that he has yet produced. We cannot, however, take leave of this part of the subject without quoting one passage, which contains a very salutary warning to those who in all inquiries into mythology run wild after the traces of what they call Pagan Trinities. Were we to suggest to them, that the more extensively they show the doctrine to have prevailed among the heathens, the more suspicious they render it as a dogma of the Church, it might be thought prejudice; but M. Bunsen has the character of an orthodox believer. The Egyptian temples frequently unite the worship of three divinities standing in the relation of father, mother, and son, and these *triads* are supposed to have some analogy to the Trinity. On this M. Bunsen observes (i. p. 432):—

“In the name of philosophy we must guard ourselves against the abuse of the word *trias*. Three times one are three, no doubt, but not a trinity combined and concluded in itself; much less a trinity in unity. The truth which lies at the bottom of the seeking after triads is not to be found so on the surface of the phenomenon, especially when, as hitherto has been done, no distinction of epochs is observed, and representations from a period of 3,000 years are considered as forming one original system.”

We now proceed to the chronological investigations which occupy the second and third volumes. Three principal sources offer themselves; the *Greek and Latin writers*, the *Egyptian monuments*, and the *historical papyri*. From Herodotus and Diodorus, our principal authorities for the ethnography and history of Egypt, no aid can be derived for the establishment of chronology. The father of history does not appear to have gone deeper into this matter, than to reckon three generations to a century; Diodorus was devoid of every kind of criticism. It is with the dominion of the Ptolemies that the systematic chronology of Egypt begins. Manetho, (M-n-thoth, *given by Thoth*,) a native of Sebennytus, uniting Greek culture with the knowledge of the ancient records of his country, wrote, under Ptolemy the son of Lagus, besides some theological works, a History of Egypt in three books, derived from historical docu-

\* Vol. i. p. 515.



ments, and also from the popular traditions of Egypt. His theological works have entirely perished, if we except some information derived from them by Greek writers, especially by Plutarch in the Treatise *De Iside et Osiride*. Of the historical work, no continuous extract remains, but what we find in Josephus, c. Apion. 1, 14. 15. 26, relative to the invasion and conquest of Egypt by the Shepherd kings, and the expulsion of the Jews. If we may judge of the fulness of the history in other parts, by the space which these events occupy, it must have been written on an ample scale. But the chronological part was extracted by several Christian writers, and has come down to us, though much corrupted, tolerably entire. First of all, Julius Africanus, a learned ecclesiastic who lived early in the third century, composed a chronological work in five books, which has perished with the exception of a few fragments. His object was to establish synchronisms between the scriptural and profane histories, and as a foundation for these, as far as Jewish history was concerned, he extracted the succession of dynasties given by Manetho. Eusebius of Caesarea, in his great chronological work, builds his Egyptian dates on the lists of Manetho, from whom he occasionally departs, seldom with any critical judgment, and not always with good faith. George, the Syncellus (i. e. *chum* and assistant) of *Tarasius*, the Patriarch of Constantinople, about the year 800, published *Ἐκλογὴ χρονολογίας*, comprising the whole of ancient chronology from Adam to Diocletian, in which the dynasties of Manetho are again repeated.\* From Syncellus and Eusebius, the latter happily recovered in the Armenian version, we can form a pretty correct idea of what these dynasties were, as read by Africanus; for it is not probable that either Eusebius or Syncellus had seen the original. They were thirty in number, (besides the dynasties of gods and heroes,) beginning with Menes and ending with the younger Nectanebus. He reckoned for their duration, as it should seem, 3,555 years, including 113 generations. Added together, the years of his dynasties amount to upwards of 5,000 years.

\* What is called the Old Chronicle by Syncellus (*Chronogr.* p. 51. marg. ed. Bonn. *Anc. Un. Hist.* 2. p. 4) is rejected by Bunsen, we think with good reason, as a forgery. "Hominis sunt Christiani, parum docti, et impudentissimi."—*Urkundenbuch*, p. 54.

It seems *now* extraordinary that Manetho should have been considered as a mere impostor, who, without any warrant from documentary evidence, had produced to the world a list of fictitious sovereigns, arbitrarily distributed into dynasties, and furnished with dates for the lengths of their reigns. But no one then suspected how ample were the materials for history at the command of one, who, in the age of the first Ptolemy, could read and interpret the ancient memorials of Egypt. His name too had been brought into suspicion by later forgeries, the work of an age when the wisdom of Egypt, like that of Chaldaea, had sunk into jugglery.\* Besides, it was utterly impossible to allow 5,000 or 3,500 years to the time between Menes and Alexander, without entirely contradicting the chronology of the Bible, which was deemed the inspired Canon, to which all profane reckonings must somehow or other be brought down. Critical grounds of doubt were not wanting. Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the most eminent of the men whom Alexandria produced in the earliest and best age of the Ptolemies, the great improver of scientific geography and chronology, undertook, at the command of Euergetes, to draw out a list of the ancient kings of Egypt, which begins with the same Menes, and is carried down for 1,076 years, with the names of 38 successors, which certainly at first appears to be wholly irreconcilable with the dynasties of Manetho. Yet Eratosthenes, in high favour with his sovereign, and at the head of the Alexandrian library, cannot have wanted means to lay all existing sources of knowledge under contribution. He was, as Bunsen shrewdly observes, no *Wilford*, to be imposed upon by the forgeries of Egyptian *pundits*, and his own character forbids the supposition that he would give anything to the world, the evidence of which he had not submitted to the severest test. It is not, therefore, wonderful that Manetho, opposed to scripture on the one hand, and the most acute and learned of Greek chronologers on the other, should have been held to be unworthy of all confidence.

\* The *Ἀποτελεσματικά*, an astrological poem, has long passed for spurious with critics. The *περὶ Σάββατος*, being quoted by Syncellus, as a work of Manetho, has been received as genuine; yet it is convicted of spuriousness by the epithet *σεβαστός*, which the introductory epistle gives to Ptolemy—the translation of the Latin *Augustus*, and never found among the titles of the Ptolemies.

The first effect of the discoveries of Champollion and his school, and the researches of our English travellers, Burton, Wilkinson, and Major Felix, was a sudden revival of the credit of Manetho. King after king, to whose names a place had hardly been conceded in history, Amoses, Amenophis, a long succession of the Rameses, Sesonchis, Osorkon, Takellothis, were brought to light on monuments, and found in the lists of Manetho. If this portion of his dynasties was thus proved to rest on the most authentic evidence, could we reasonably suspect forgery in the earlier parts, though not yet confirmed by monuments? This confirmation, however, was not long wanting. The Pyramids were opened, and the names of Suphis and Menkeres were traced in them, in accordance with Manetho's lists. It was, however, found at the same time, that if the monumental evidence furnished in some points strong confirmation to his dynasties, in others, still more numerous, discrepancies apparently irreconcilable existed. To understand the difficulties of the problem which Bunsen has undertaken to solve, we must advert to some of these monumental documents.

In the year 1818, Mr. Wm. Bankes discovered on the wall of a temple at Abydos, a series of Egyptian kings, which became better known to antiquaries by the visit of M. Cailliaud, who published it inaccurately in his *Voyage a Meroe*. What remained of it (for even since its discovery it has been much mutilated) was taken away with further injury by the French Consul Mimaut, and, in 1837, publicly sold in Paris, and purchased by the Trustees of the British Museum. The building to which it belonged was built or repaired by Rameses the Great, and he is represented on the monument, sitting on his throne, and contemplating a double series each of 26 cartouches of his predecessors. The lowest line of the monument contains only a repetition of his own name and titles. Of the kings whose cartouches precede his, the titles only are given; but Champollion, in his *Lettre a M. le Duc de Blacas*, by a happy comparison of the tablet with other monuments, in which name and titles occur together, ascertained that the eleven cartouches which precede that of Rameses, are those of his predecessors, as far back as Ahmes or Amoses, the first, according to Africanus, of the

18th dynasty. These again are preceded by five cartouches, which, by means of inscriptions in the grottoes of Benihasan, were assigned to kings bearing the names of *Osortasen* and *Amunm*, with an unknown character. But beyond Amoses, all identification with the lists of Manetho, as given by Africanus, ceased; for from the 18th dynasty backward to the twelfth, no names have been preserved in these lists, except half a dozen of the Shepherd kings. Yet it seemed a natural conclusion, that a strictly *regnal* succession having been traced upwards from Rameses to Amoses, the preceding cartouches should also exhibit reigning sovereigns, either those of native dynasties contemporaneous with the Shepherds, or of the earlier times, prior to their irruption. Unfortunately for the comfort of the Egyptologists, neither of these suppositions was tenable.

Among the remains of the vast temple and palace of Karnak, in the Eastern part of the ruins of Thebes, is a small chamber, on the stuccoed walls of which Thothmes or Tethmosis III. is represented offering gifts to a series of sixty-one kings, disposed in four lines around the walls, seated each in his chair beneath his cartouche. Analogy leads to the conclusion that these must be the ancestors or predecessors of that king who is himself the 44th on the tablet of Abydos, and the hieroglyphical inscription declares that the "gifts are for the kings of the two Egypts." But do we find here the 43rd king of the tablet of Abydos, or any of the known predecessors of Thothmes III. in the 18th dynasty? Not one. Yet a certain connection with other monuments exists; for the king who sits immediately before him on the lowest row on the right hand is the first Osortasen, and on the second row the first Amunm; while the fifth cartouche in the second row is Amunm III., the immediate predecessor of Amoses on the tablet of Abydos. Here are glimpses of a relation sufficiently puzzling, and Mr. Birch might well say in his able work on the monuments of the British Museum, that the solution of the tablet of Karnak was yet to be desired.

There is another document of the chronological kind to be mentioned, the *hieratical canon of Turin*, as it is designated by Mr. Birch, who gave an account of it to the Royal Society of Literature, the *royal papyrus*, as

Bunsen calls it, from the nature of its contents. It was a part of the Drovetti collection, which was purchased for the Museum of Turin. In the state in which it was brought to Europe, it was a mass of fragments, to which it appeared hopeless to endeavour to restore their original connection. This, however, has been accomplished by the diligence of Seyffarth and Lepsius with more certainty than might at first seem practicable; for owing to the fibrous structure of the papyrus, the answering parts of the torn edges are more easily referred to each other than those of our paper. It is probably of the age of Rameses the Great, no later name occurring upon it; and it appears to have begun with dynasties of gods, to whom years are assigned by tens of thousands, and then comes down to Menes, the recognised founder of the monarchy. In its entire state it appears to have contained not fewer than 250 kings; but 119 are still preserved, and all it should seem prior to the commencement of the 18th dynasty. Altogether it strikingly recalls to the mind the papyrus of which Herodotus speaks, (2, 100,) out of which the priests read to him the names of 330 kings, nor can it be doubted that it is a document of the same class. But the perplexity of the inquirer is only increased by finding in it a multitude of names, neither in the lists of Manetho, nor that of Eratosthenes, nor the tablets of Karnak and Abydos. We have said enough, we believe, to make the reader understand, what a Herculean or rather *Ædipodean* task the Egyptologist undertakes, in endeavouring to explain and harmonise all these authorities.

As regards Manetho and Eratosthenes, harmony has generally been considered impossible, and one has been sacrificed to the other, according as inquirers leaned to a longer or a shorter chronology. Perizonius, while he admits Manetho to be correct through the later part of his dynasties, denies all credit to the earlier, which he treats as forgeries. Petavius, too, considers him as wholly unworthy of credit. Sir John Marsham suggested as a means of reconciliation that Egypt on the death of Menes was divided into four independent kingdoms, Thebes, This (Abydos), Memphis, and Lower Egypt, and that the years of their *contemporaneous* kings having been added together by chronologers, the duration of the monarchy

from Menes to the invasion of the Shepherds has been unduly lengthened. The same means of reducing the chronology is suggested by Eusebius.\* After endeavouring to bring the Egyptian reckoning into harmony with the Jewish, by making each year a month, he adds, "Quod si temporum copia adhuc exuberat, reputandum est plures fortasse Ægyptiorum reges una eademque ætate extitisse." To this it was an obvious objection that no ancient authority, sacred or profane, represented Egypt as divided, after Menes, into independent monarchies, and that Manetho himself gives no hint of their existence.

Yet there were not wanting indications that greatly as Eratosthenes and Manetho differed, they must, some how or other, have employed the same materials. They both begin with Menes and Athothis; the names of the builders of the Pyramids, given by Manetho, are found, without great variation, in Eratosthenes; Apappus in Eratosthenes, who reigns 100 years *minus* one hour, can hardly be a different person from the Phiops of Manetho, who ascended the throne at six years old and reigned to 100; the twenty-second in the list of Eratosthenes and the twenty-third of the Memphite dynasty in Manetho is a queen, Nitocris, an all but solitary instance of female succession in Egypt; in both, her immediate predecessor reigns only a single year, and succeeds the centenarian reigns of Phiops or Apappus. From these, and some other less satisfactory marks of coincidence, our acute and learned countryman, Dr. Prichard,† was led to conjecture, that Eratosthenes and Manetho did really record in the main the same series of kings, but that using the records of different cities they had named them differently, and that Manetho had swelled out his lists by admitting prefects and provincial governors into them; and especially that in the earliest fifteen dynasties he has repeated the same names, derived from different sources, e. g. This and Elephantine, as if they were two independent series, and thus has doubled, or led his followers to double, the duration of the reigns. His views were necessarily imperfect, for at that time the great discovery of the hieroglyphics had not been made; but they may perhaps have afforded a hint to Bunsen.

\* Præf. Vers. Armen. Bunsen, Urkundenb. p. 5.

† Critical Examination of the Remains of Egyptian Chronology, appended to his Analysis of Egyptian Mythology, 1819.



Bunsen, like Prichard, disclaims the idea that there really existed contemporaneous independent sovereignties in Egypt, which he believes, according to all the ancient authorities, to have formed one monarchy, from the time of Menes, except during the usurpation of the Shepherd kings. The discrepancies between the names in Manetho and those in Eratosthenes, he explains by supposing that Manetho has inserted the names and years of joint sovereigns, as well as rival sovereigns where such existed, while Eratosthenes has only given one series. Thus the years of Eratosthenes' list furnish a true chronological canon, the sum of the kings' reigns being the interval between the commencement of the first and the termination of the last, while the sum of the years of Manetho's dynasties and the apparent number of reigns must necessarily exceed the truth. This it must be granted is a mere assumption, and to make it at all credible that Manetho should have written history in this way, we must suppose that in his original work he had given some key, which his copyists and abridgers have allowed to be lost, by which a true chronology might be extricated from his dynasties. It must be observed that the Egyptians under the Pharaohs never in any age reckoned by an æra; no dates occur on any of their monuments, but years of the reign of a king; so that without some means of distinguishing the sovereign, by whose regnal years time was reckoned, from any joint or rival sovereign, the whole past must have been a scene of chronological confusion. That Manetho did include more reigns in his dynasties than he reckoned in his chronology may be inferred from the circumstance, that the sum of his dynasties amounts to upwards of 5,000 years, while he himself reckons the duration of the monarchy, from Menes to the last of the Pharaohs, at 3,555 years, a date too precise to have been fixed on any vague *data*. By what means then are we to separate the true *chronological* series of the kings of Egypt, from the *dynastic* series of Manetho? The preference given to Eratosthenes, in making his the standard, to which that of Manetho is reduced, appears at first somewhat arbitrary; but his character as a scientific chronologer renders it improbable that he would give a list which could serve as no guide to chronology, and other presumptions in his favour arise from a comparison of his



list with Manetho's, which Bunsen has carefully instituted. In all those dynasties which are not *Memphite* or *Theban*, of which names have been preserved, not a single name is found which corresponds with those of Eratosthenes; and where the names are wanting, the years assigned to the reigns prove that no such correspondence has existed. Hence it appears probable, previous to all examination of the monuments or historical tradition, that the series of Eratosthenes passes from the Thinite kings, of whom was Menes, the founder of Memphis and of the sole Monarchy, to the rulers of Memphis, and continues in their line, till it disappears, and Theban Monarchs take their place. Thebes and Memphis were the two capitals of Egypt; in them the legal sovereign was recognised and crowned; a custom which, as far as regarded the coronation, was continued, as we see from the Rosetta stone, even in the time of the Ptolemies, when Alexandria had virtually become the capital. The *Memphito-Thebaic*, or as more concisely expressed in Eratosthenes the Theban kings, represent, in the old monarchy (that which preceded the invasion of the Shepherds), after the extinction of the male line of the Thinites, the succession of the reigning monarchs of Egypt, by whose means the Greek chronologer gave the canon for this first period of Egyptian history.

To follow M. Bunsen in his detailed investigation would require much more space than we can command, nor could we make his researches or arguments intelligible, without a reference to plates. But perhaps by transferring to our pages his arrangement of the first dynasty of Manetho, we may give an idea of the mode in which he seeks to reconcile him with Eratosthenes.

ERATOSTHENES.		MANETHO.	
1. Menes.	62	1. Menes .....	62
2. Athothis.	59	2. Athothis .....	57
3. Athothis II.	32	3. Kenkenes .....	31
		4. Uenephes (Venenaphis Armen.) .....	23
		5. Usaphaidos (Usaphaes Armen.) .....	20
4. Miabies.	19	6. Miebados (Miebaes Armen.) .....	26
5. Pemphos.	18	7. Semeimpes (Mempses Armen.) .....	18
		8. Bieneches .....	26
	190		263

The first variation which we meet with here is in the third reign, where a second Athothis is found in Eratosthenes, Kenkenes in Manetho. But every Egyptian king had probably from the first two names, although this cannot be established from monuments till we reach the sixth dynasty of Manetho, and a substitution of one for the other might give the same individual the appearance of a difference. The name of the fourth king is written in the text of Eratosthenes Δ. ΔΙΑΒΙΗΣ, but the change of this into ΜΙΑΒΙΗΣ is a very legitimate exercise of conjectural criticism. Unephes and Usaphais, Bunsen treats as collateral reigns (*nebenregierungen*). The fifth king is written in Eratosthenes Ε. ΠΕΜΦΩΣ, but here again an easy conjectural emendation gives us ΣΕΜΦΩΣ, the Semempses of Manetho. *Bieneches*, Bunsen supposes to be only a variation in orthography for *Unephes*. None of these names are to be found in any contemporaneous monument, but that of Menes, written *Mena*, exists in the Ramesseion at Thebes, and in the Papyrus of Turin, which also contains that of Athoth. Semempses is, according to Bunsen, *Smenteti*, whose name occurs at the commencement of the series of kings on the tablet of Karnak.

A similar course is pursued through the first twelve dynasties of Manetho. If any one of them is designated as other than Memphite or Theban, he endeavours to show, that it cannot have been included in the lists of Eratosthenes, neither the names nor the numbers corresponding; and this negative proof is usually easy enough. If the dynasty be Memphite or Theban, the harder task is imposed upon him, of showing that the names and numbers, when cleared of corruption, do really correspond, and of assigning to the sovereign his place of rest in the pyramids, which from Abou-roash to the Faioum crown the platform of the Libyan hills. Many a rough, toilsome and dubious\* step has he to take before this can be accomplished.

πολλὰ δ' ἄναντα, κάταντα, πᾶραντ' αὖτε δόχμιά τ' ἤλθεν.

For truth, as he has well observed, does not lie on the

\* In the list of Eratosthenes, comprising 38 names, Bunsen makes 26 conjectural emendations. We admire their ingenuity, and the critical sagacity with which they are made, but after all they are conjectures, and we ask ourselves, Is it possible with such materials to attain that certainty on which he is so intent?

top of the rubbish heaps of antiquity, to be carried off by the first comer; the more the fragments of evidence multiply, the greater is the labour and thought required to make them fit together. The following is the condensed result. The kingdom of Menes having lasted 190 years was divided; one line, the second dynasty of Manetho, established itself at This; the other, the third, remained at Memphis for 224 years. The fourth dynasty, Memphites, reigned 155 years over the united kingdom. It was again divided between an Elephantine and a Memphite dynasty for 107 years. Two Memphite dynasties succeeded, the seventh and eighth, and a Theban, the eleventh, for 166 years; but contemporaneous with these were two dynasties of Heracleopolis in Lower Egypt, the ninth and tenth. The twelfth was Theban, and lasted 147 years. The whole process confirms us in the opinion before expressed, that even now no arrangement of reigns and dates in Egyptian history can be anything more than provisional. His supposition of collateral dynasties appears to us to differ so little from Marsham's of separate monarchies, as to be open to the same objection—the entire silence of all antiquity respecting the existence of such double sovereignties. Could they have existed so frequently as he supposes, without civil war, of which there is no trace in Egyptian history? Joint tenants of royalty seldom exercise their rights in peace. And that his collateral princes claimed equal honours with the Memphito-Theban is evident from the circumstance, that we find the hieroglyphics for “king of Upper and Lower Egypt” accompanying the cartouches of Elephantinite kings.\* We have also a difficulty in understanding why so many kings of a series whom Eratosthenes designates collectively as *Theban* should have been buried in the neighbourhood of Memphis, not one at Thebes, where the earliest sepulchre is of the 18th dynasty.

The important question, however, is not whether an uncouth name has been rightly deciphered, or the king who bore it reigned fifty or fifteen years, of which nothing is recorded, but whether we are walking among real historical personages, or the shadows of mythus and fiction. This question, we think, is irrevocably settled, and the historical character of the old monarchy decisively esta-

\* See Bunsen's Plates, Altes Reich. II. Book ii.

blished. The pyramids of Gizeh, raised by kings of the 4th dynasty of Manetho, the 15th, 16th and 17th successors of Menes, according to Eratosthenes, are contemporaneous monuments, and from their lofty summits we can look far backward into the depths of time. Not only was the hieroglyphical system then perfected, but *writing* was familiarly practised; for the well-known character of the reed-pen and inkstand is found in the adjacent tombs, which, from the names of the kings, must be of equal age. The people by whom they were raised were sufficiently advanced in astronomy to fix them in the precise direction of the cardinal points; in masonry, to coat the pyramid with stones, between whose joints the edge of the finest penknife cannot be introduced; in mechanics, to raise vast blocks into the sky, and perplex modern engineers to discover the method by which they wrought. Such a people could not be in the infancy of civilization, and whether they employed the art of writing to preserve their history or not, they are themselves historical. Menes may be a real personage, or, like Romulus, a name to account for the name of his capital; but the kingdom of Menes, like the monarchy of Rome, is a fact attested by works which are still before our eyes.

The very brief historical notices which Manetho gives, excite no suspicion of mythic fiction. The most doubtful are those which attribute sundry inventions to early kings, since, in the historic times, kings have destroyed much but invented nothing; but this might be mere flattery, ascribing to the monarch the real invention of his age.

We must pass over the interesting inquiries which Bunsen has instituted respecting the Pyramids and the Lake of Moeris, only observing in regard to the latter, that he altogether dissents from the opinion of M. Linant de Bellefonds, who had placed it in the centre of the province of Faïoum; and that he defends the old opinion that it is the Birket-el-kerun. We may fairly presume, that as Lepsius has sojourned so long in this province, he has satisfied himself that Linant's supposed discovery of the dam by which the waters were confined is fallacious, and that Bunsen in rejecting it, speaks the sentiments of this intelligent eye-witness. The statements of the ancients are irreconcilable with one another and with pal-

pable facts. Wilkinson, Linant, Bunsen, all agree that it is physically impossible the water of the Nile, once received into the Birket-el-kerun, should ever flow back again, the surface of the lake being more than 100 feet below the level of the Nile opposite to Faioum. Yet Herodotus says, *disertis verbis*, (2, 149,) that the water flowed six months from the Nile into the Lake, and six months back again from the Lake into the Nile. Bunsen has ingeniously endeavoured to extricate Strabo (17. p. 810) from the imputation of the same error, by rendering ἀποδοῦσα τῇ αὐτῇ διώρυγι, not "giving it back *by* the same canal," but "*to* the same canal;" but this, though an admissible, is not a natural construction of the Greek, since the office of a canal (διώρυξ) is not to *receive*, but *transmit from end to end*, nor suitable to the context. Strabo says, "the Lake of Mæris is adequate by its size and its depth both to receive the flood at the time of the rising, without overflowing on the inhabited and cultivated parts, and then, at the time of the sinking, having restored the superfluity by the same canal, through the other mouth, to keep as a residue, both lake and canal, what is useful for irrigation." If, with Bunsen, we render "to the same canal," the canal and lake together would contain, not a residue, but the sum total. It becomes every one to speak with diffidence on a point on which eminent critics have differed,\* but we think that Strabo is speaking, not of two mouths by which the lake communicated with the canal, but the same by which (p. 809) he describes the canal as communicating with the Nile; one higher up the stream, the Bahr Jusef, by which the rising water was admitted, the other, lower down, by which the superflux was discharged into the Nile as it sunk. Strabo and Herodotus were no doubt wrong in supposing that the water, once in the lake, could ever get back into the Nile; but as there was a free communication between the river, the canal and the lake, and the canal did actually give back its water to the river, it was natural for them to conceive that the lake did the same. The eye did not inform them of the difference of level, which renders this impossible. The real use of the lake was to receive the waste

\* See Groskurd's Translation of Strabo, 3, 377, note 1.

water of the inundation, and keep the Faïoum from being drowned.

We think, however, that there must have been also some great artificial basin near Arsinoë as M. Linant supposes; for Strabo's host walked from the dinner table to the shore, with a cake in his hand to feed the crocodile. The shore of the Birket-el-kerun is far beyond the limits of a *promenade* from Arsinoë.

The termination of the twelfth dynasty of Manetho does not exactly correspond with that of the 38 kings and 1,076 years of Eratosthenes, and though the dynastic and the regnal successions must necessarily begin together with Menes, there was no necessity that they should end together. On the contrary, it seems natural that Eratosthenes should close his series with some great political epoch, such as the invasion of the Shepherds. The eleventh dynasty of Manetho closes with Ammenemes, the twelfth begins with Sesonchosis, son of Ammenemes, and proceeds with another Ammenemes, Sesostris, Lachares or Lamares, builder of the Labyrinth, Ammenemes, Scemio-phris. And here we have to notice one of the most remarkable discoveries in Egyptology, which we owe to the united labours of Lepsius and Bunsen. It has been already mentioned (p. 15), that before Amoses, the first of the eighteenth dynasty, several kings had been found, whose names had been read Amunm and Osortasen, and reckoned by Major Felix, Wilkinson and Rosellini to belong to the 17th dynasty, as they immediately precede Amoses on the tablet of Abydos. This seventeenth dynasty, however, consisted of Shepherd kings, and it appeared incredible that they should be incorporated among the ancestors of Rameses the Great. In the year 1840, Lepsius came to the conclusion, that the *tablet of Abydos passes over entirely the period of the Shepherds*; that the Amunms and so-called Osortasens belong to the close of the old monarchy, and are in fact the twelfth dynasty of Manetho. The name of Ammenemes, occurring twice in this dynasty, fitted exactly with the Amunms of the monuments, but neither here nor elsewhere was any name to be found answering to Osortasen. This reading, however, rested upon the phonetic value assigned to the jackal-headed staff, pronounced *o* or *ou*; a value depending on very

slight evidence. It is never found phonetically used in the cartouches of the Ptolemies and Cæsars, nor in any unequivocal position in those of the Pharaohs. In fact, its imputed sound of *o* seems to rest on its occurrence in connection with a figure of Osiris, whose name, however, is usually spelt quite differently. Wilkinson, Plates, 33, 9.

Lepsius assigned it the value of *S*, and the name thus becoming *Sesortasen*,\* was fitted with no greater violence than the desperate corruption of the MSS. justifies, to the Sesostris and Sesonchosis of Manetho's twelfth dynasty, and the Sistosichermes of Eratosthenes. These were the conclusions at which Lepsius had arrived before he went to Egypt. Great must have been his delight when in exploring the ruins of the Labyrinth he found everywhere the cartouche of the third Ammenemes, the last king of the twelfth dynasty.† It is due to our countryman, Dr. Edward Hincks, to record, that in a paper on the Egyptian *Stele*, read to the R. I. Academy in 1841, and printed in their Transactions (Vol. 19, p. 2), he had made known his conviction that the five royal names which precede Amoses on the tablet of Abydos, are really those of the twelfth dynasty of Manetho. Dr. Hincks goes on to infer that the five dynasties intervening between the 12th and the 18th were either contemporaneous with the 12th, or altogether imaginary. In this sweeping conclusion, Lepsius, if we may regard Bunsen as the expounder of his opinions, is very far from agreeing. He considers the 12th as the last entire dynasty of the old monarchy, which however ran partly into the 13th, and the remainder, till the 18th, as Theban dynasties, contemporaneous with the existence of the Shepherd dominion in Lower Egypt, which the kings of the 18th dynasty overthrew. To the Shepherds he allots from first to last a dominion of 929 years. To these Theban kings, tributary to the Shepherds,‡ but still independent, he refers a passage, preserved by Syncellus from the chronology of Apollodorus the Athenian, in which after the 38 of Era-

\* The second Sesortasen is, according to Bunsen, the true Sesostris to whom Herodotus has imputed some of the actions of Rameses the Great.

† There is no other Ammenemes, except in Manetho's nineteenth dynasty; but Manetho himself refers the building of the Labyrinth to the twelfth.

‡ Joseph. c. Ap. 1, 14.



tosthenes, 53 other Theban kings are mentioned, whose names, says Syncellus, it would be lost labour to record.\* Now these cannot be the kings of the 18th and following dynasties, whose names he does record: whose then could they be but the kings of Thebais, contemporary with the Shepherds? That they should be purely imaginary is a supposition which no one we think who has accompanied the investigation thus far will be inclined to adopt. These 53 Theban kings, tributary to the Shepherds who reigned at Memphis, constitute the Middle Monarchy. Bunsen himself seems almost startled at his own boldness in thus adding nearly 1,000 years to the authentic history of Egypt, and he anticipates the outcry which will be raised by those with whom the correctness of the Mosaic chronology is an article of religious belief.

"How unexampled, at least how improbable, must it appear that a foreign people should maintain themselves for 900 years in Egypt, exercise their dominion in a barbarous spirit of destruction, and not leave a single memorial of their existence; and that at the end of this period, exceeding in length the historical duration of most modern peoples, the old kingdom of Egypt should re-appear in renovated youth, with its national peculiarities, its religion, its language, its art unimpaired, as if it had only suffered from a transient irruption of predatory Bedouins.

"But this is not the worst. What then becomes of the numbers of the Bible? ask the theologians. And what place is left for Noah's flood? exclaim the zealots. A wide field is here opened for reproach and ridicule; for to many zealous persons nothing is more welcome than to be able to fix the charge of uncritical proceedings on one whom they call a scoffer,† that is, one who declares that he does not believe in something which they deem sacred, though it be altogether of an outward kind. It would therefore, perhaps, be our wisest course to let this matter drop.

"But the cause which we are pleading is not *our* cause; it is the *truth* which we seek, whether we go astray or not. It is against indifference to the investigation of truth in ancient traditions, that we contend; it is the false show of true knowledge which we are earnestly endeavouring, not now for the first time, to dislodge from that seat in the domain of the oldest chronology, of which

\* Sync. Chronogr. p. 147, D.

† In writing these lines, Bunsen, we think, must have had in view the gross attack made on Niebuhr by the Quarterly Review, (No. 77,) who called him "a pert dull scoffer." The historian was eloquently vindicated by his friend Archdeacon Hare.

it has long had prescriptive possession. On the solution of the question, whether we can recover the duration of the Shepherd period, depends probably for ever the possibility of throwing a bridge over the chasm which separates the commencement of the human species from that newer time which begins with Moses. To what avails our knowledge of the duration of the old monarchy of Egypt at the one end, or the re-establishment of the chronology of the new, from Alexander upwards to the 18th dynasty at the other, if the thread breaks in the middle? The object of our inquiry is, therefore, as it seems to us, of universal importance. We entreat of those who value truth, to grant us an unprejudiced judgment and impartial tribunal; and some patience also for investigations into which not every one can readily enter."—III. 29.

We have already shown that we give our readers also some credit for patience, but we must remember the caution, "*dabitur licentia sumpta pudenter*," and not exhaust their stock. Bunsen thinks that he reads the names of the Theban monarchs of the Shepherd period in the *left-hand* side of the chamber of Karnak, as he had already referred those on the right (as the elder line) to the old monarchy. And he proceeds to carry out this principle with the same minute research as before, calling to his aid the Turin papyrus, which happens to present in this part several well-preserved names. The difficulty as regards the ancient testimonies is this—that Africanus makes the 15th, 16th, and 17th dynasties include  $284 + 518 + 151 = 953$  years, while Josephus, professing to follow Manetho, seems to make the time only 511 years. But the good faith of Josephus is more than suspected. He had a double object in view; first to make it appear that the Shepherds were really the progenitors of the Jews—which he does by putting his own words into Manetho's mouth;\* secondly, while raising the antiquity of the Jews as high as he could, not to come into collision with the scripture chronology, which, in the Septuagint,†

\* The fact appears to be, that the Egyptian records, τὰ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γράμματα, (c. Apion. l. 16 ult.) made no mention of the Jews or their Exodus, and that what Manetho does really say of them (ib. 26.) was derived, according to his own account, ἐκ τῶν ἀδεσπότως μυθολογούμενων.

† Exod. xii. 40, where the Septuagint inserts, "and in the land of Canaan," thus bringing the residence in Egypt to 215 years; since 215 had elapsed from Abram's coming into Canaan to Jacob's going down into Egypt.

allows only 215, in the Hebrew only 430 years, for the residence of the Jews in Egypt. He was therefore under strong temptation to suppress one of the dynasties of the Shepherds. Yet, even as it is, he makes their dominion to last more than five centuries, besides the time which elapsed from their irruption to the election of their first king Salatis. We are, therefore, very little disposed to place the authority of Josephus in opposition to that of Manetho; and the Jewish chronology is itself too uncertain to allow of our building upon it; but what must we think of a dominion of nearly 1,000 years which has left no traces in the country which was subject to it? Such an occupation is not conceivable, without some assimilation between the foreign dynasty and the native population, and how then are we to account for it, that they never employed the art of the Egyptians to leave a single memorial of themselves? No building, no carving, no sepulchre remains, as far as we know, either of the people or their kings. If no pyramid or painted *hypogæum* was to be looked for, some barrow or cairn might have been expected to mark the place of their interment. We must look to M. Bunsen's historical volume for some solution of this difficulty, which at present strikes us as very formidable.

After an interval, then, of six centuries, or of nine, the ancient line of the Pharaohs issued from their retreat in the Thebais, expelled the Shepherds, first from Memphis, and finally from their stronghold in Lower Egypt, and founded the new monarchy, which was prolonged through 13 dynasties, from Amoses to the second Nectanebus. And here we must cease to pursue in any detail the investigations of M. Bunsen. They are carried on with the same sagacity and industry, the same determination to slur over no difficulty, as before, but they have no longer the same interest, as requisite to fix "Egypt's place in the history of the world." The New Monarchy has marked its own place in that history, in lines and colours which time has not been able to efface. There remain many thorny questions of succession and chronology, of the correspondence of monuments with written testimony, to be settled; but the names of the principal monarchs and the great facts of their reigns are subject to no doubt.

We still see the nations of the earth bearing their tribute to the 3rd Thothmes, the gold, ivory, and ebony of the south, the apes of Western Africa, the precious vases of Sidonian workmanship, the horses and chariots it may be of Media.\* We see Rameses driving before him the flying hosts of his enemies, trampling them under the feet of his horses, or crushing them beneath the wheels of his car; attacking their fleets and storming their towns.† We can even follow him into the recesses of his harem, and distinguish the game with which he amused himself in his hours of relaxation.‡ Nor is it the sovereigns only, their pompous titles, their splendid ceremonials, their victories, and their sports, that the imperishable works of the Egyptians have preserved to us. The whole life of the people is portrayed in the paintings with which they have adorned the walls of the tombs which they regarded as their everlasting habitation, and there is scarcely a provincial museum in England, in which some subject of the ancient Pharaohs may not be seen, realizing to us the historical character of those distant times with an evidence, which neither Greece nor Rome have left of their much more recent existence.

It has been the great object of Egyptian chronologers to lay hold, if possible, of some fixed astronomical point, from which to make fast their reckonings, which must otherwise drift about upon the stream of time. The sidereal heavens are not, indeed, themselves exempt from change; but every thing else is infinitely more changeable, and their very irregularities obey a law. The early cultivation of astronomy by the Egyptians warrants the expectation of finding some such fixed point in their history. They had a period called the Cynic or Sothiac, which began with the rising of the dog-star, on the 29th of August, and was accomplished in 1,460 of their years, or 1,461 Julian years. For as their year consisted only of 365 days, while the Julian or true solar year is  $365\frac{1}{4}$ , it is evident that if any given year began with 29th August, it would be 1,460 ( $365 \times 4$ ) years before it really began again on the same day, all the intermediate years being wrong by a sum increasing yearly  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a day. Now we

\* Wilkinson, M. & C. i. Pl. iv.

† Antiquities of British Museum, fig. 155.

‡ Wilkinson, ii. p. 420.

know that this Sothiac period ran out in the year 138 A.D. (Gensor. D. Nat. c. 21); it must therefore have begun in 1322 B.C. Could we then ascertain in what year of what Pharaoh this took place, we could reckon upward to Menes and downward to Nectanebus, always supposing that our lists are genuine and accurate. Theon, in his Commentary on the *Almagest* of Ptolemy, published from a MS. in the Royal Library of Paris, by Larcher, in his notes on Herodotus, speaks of the *Æra* of Menophres, and from data furnished by the context, it is evident that it began 1322 B.C., and must therefore be the commencement of a Sothiac period. As the context speaks of the *æras* of Diocletian and Augustus, both sovereigns, it is reasonably presumed that Menophres was also a sovereign of Egypt. There is no such name in the lists or the monuments; but Bunsen's independent calculations make *Menophres* to have begun his reign in 1322, and the difference between ΜΕΝΟΦΘΗΣ and ΜΕΝΟΦΡΗΣ is so slight, and the confusion so common in MSS., as to give great probability to his correction. Hence he assigns to the reign of Menes the year 3643 B.C.

Had we not seen so many goodly fabrics of Egyptian chronology crumble to pieces, we should be inclined to say that Bunsen has solved the problem which he proposed to himself. But we have learnt to distrust the most plausible appearances; nor is the perusal which we have given to his work, though by no means cursory, sufficient to warrant a judgment on a subject so difficult and complex. Its merits must be tested by the profound study of the few who devote themselves to these inquiries, and above all by subsequent discovery. We trust that no other test will be applied to it, and that his character and the calm and earnest tone of his work, which betokens him to be a genuine lover of the truth, will protect him from the outcry of impiety, so often raised against those who call in question opinions supposed to involve the authority of Scripture.

His labours in the work which we have been reviewing are merely preparatory; a fourth volume, of which he hopes to begin the printing in the course of this year, will present the continuous historical narrative of the events, of which hitherto he has only discussed the evidence, and settled the succession. We shall look forward with great interest to

its appearance, and conclude our present notice by a translation of one of the few passages which afford an opportunity of displaying his power of generalization and philosophical reflection. He is speaking of the indifference manifested by the Romans to historical research.

"It is a universal characteristic, and to be explained only by the position of the Romans, in relation to humanity and truth. They knew how to conquer and to rule the world. They established Roman jurisprudence and regular administration, in the place of luxurious and intriguing courts, tyrannical aristocracies or the destructive conflicts of democracy. They carried their civil constitution, as they did their highways, in an unswerving line over the countries of the earth, and along them passed the Legion and the Colony, the Judge and the Publican, with the language of Cicero, and still more frequently of Homer and Plato, to establish themselves in the cities and kingdoms of the barbarians. Their generals and proconsuls were men of education, and taste for the arts, sometimes even of learning. How then has it happened, that the Romans have done nothing for the investigation of the languages, manners and customs of ancient nations, remaining in this respect shamefully behind the Greeks, whom they oppressed and despised? Simply, as it should seem, because they neither recognised nor revered humanity in any other nation than their own, and because the love of knowledge and truth, for their own sake, was to them an unintelligible phrase. They understood no people, except in its baser qualities; they loved none and were loved by none, because they neither came among them with human feelings, nor sought to call them forth; and never did good to others, except that some benefit might accrue to themselves. They showed no respect even for those to whom, from well-considered motives of selfish policy, they rendered essential service. Even in the Greeks, the Romans did not love and honour that pure humanity, which in them shone more brightly than in any other nation of the world. They were attracted by their social life, because it was well adapted to sensual and intellectual luxury; their flowing language filled the ear; it was useful in travelling; the rhetoric of Athens and Rhodes was the means of wealth and power at Rome.

"No genuine Roman, therefore, interested himself from pure human sympathy in the history of other nations, whom he considered to exist only as the means of furnishing money and pleasure to the masters of the world, and just as little from desire of the knowledge of the truth. Faithful and true as they were in their domestic relations, the best of the Romans, as such, was indifferent to the truth, which is the end and aim of all knowledge. No

genuine Roman mind was ever tormented by the thirst for knowledge and truth for their own sake ; and hence, even men of respectable learning among them appear ludicrously ignorant, or at least insignificant, beside the Greeks, when they venture into the path of investigation. It was the Greeks who made even the antiquities of their own country intelligible and attractive to the Romans. Pilate was their representative, and his question their motto. On the other hand, it is the Greek element in the character of Cicero, which enchains us to him in spite of all his weakness, and lends such an incomparable charm to his writings, that even the philosophical please. He believed in truth, and loved it for itself ; he was a philanthropist, and revered humanity."—I. 194.



ART. II.—*Explanations. A Sequel to the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.* By the Author of that Work. Churchill: London, 1845.

THE treatment encountered by the work entitled "*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*," has been such as greatly to disappoint calculation. It has been warmly received by the public, and fiercely attacked by the physical philosophers. If an outcry of impiety, infidelity, and atheism, had come from popular quarters, no one would have wondered; but that it should draw down on itself a storm of religious, as well as scientific, indignation, from men who have barely escaped similar imputations themselves, this it did not occur to us to anticipate. The public, on the other hand, has done itself much credit. The work was eagerly demanded, as long as it was supposed to contain truth; the sale was suddenly checked, as soon as it was understood that those who ought to know aright, deposed that its statements were erroneous.

In common with the mass, who are forced to take their scientific knowledge at second-hand, *we* are dependent on the physiologists and physical professors for the facts on which our judgment is to be based: nor have we, consciously, the least desire to shelter the Author of this work from any censure which he may deserve for carelessness or ignorance as to the details on which he has rested his peculiar hypothesis. His work had, to our judgment, obviously weak and untenable chapters,—concerning Phrenology and the Quinary System,—which nevertheless it did not seem to be *our* place to assail, since we desired to preserve a neutrality as to the purely scientific controversies. We confess we feel some satisfaction, that in the "*Explanation*" now offered, the Author all but abandons the Quinary System, and observes a judicious silence concerning Phrenology. As to other leading points, on which he has met with vituperation almost unmeasured, we have here from him a temperate and dignified reply, the very tone of which is a severe rebuke to his Edinburgh reviewer. It is perhaps a mere act of justice, on the part of those who have read the critique to which we refer, to peruse the *Explanations* of the Author.

CHRISTIAN TEACHER.—No. 31.

D

In us it would be a gross impertinence to endeavour to mediate, wherever the question between the combatants is one of fact; nor do we intend to enter into any of the details. But we cannot help protesting against the assumption of his critic; nor can we shut our eyes to the extraordinary *mode* in which so many eminent men of science have testified their annoyance at the Author's speculations. The Edinburgh Reviewer appears to hold, that nobody has a right to philosophise about Creation, whose hand is not hardened by the geological hammer. He speaks with contempt of the idea, that one who has his scientific knowledge "second-hand," should dare to propound an hypothesis. This is really too absurd. The details of every hypothesis will, no doubt, be sifted by the men of detail; and from them we shall ultimately get either disproof or verification: but they must not be allowed to monopolise the functions of thought or philosophy; and much less to be angry, because suggestions are offered by persons whose knowledge is derived and not independent. Nor do we for a moment admit, that practical geologists are to dictate concerning the Laws of Evidence; as if nobody but they could properly know what "Induction" meant. If the doctrines of the Edinburgh Reviewer were to prevail, we doubt whether Induction could ever discover fruitful channels for its own operations: for he so scornfully repudiates Analogy, under the title of "the philosophy of resemblances," as to deprive Induction of its pioneer. Everybody knows that Analogy may be unskilfully applied; but every philosopher ought also to know, that when it is best applied, it is at first either only a clue to further investigation, or a provisional result, to be held until disproved. The Edinburgh critic appears to show spleen, rather than philosophy, when he most intemperately and dogmatically condemns the Author's use of the analogical argument, in cases where no other argument is, as yet, possible to us.

But the conduct of many other men of high scientific name has been such as to inspire a strong suspicion that other motives than a simple love of truth has, unconsciously to themselves, actuated them. As if startled by the novelties of the present Author,—who, after all, is not so very novel, considering the doctrines of French naturalists,

—they have suddenly uttered protests against much which was previously looked upon as either certainly established or highly probable; and they appear to be labouring to get rid of many results, which the progress of knowledge had been silently working out. It is ten or twelve years since Conte's philosophy was reviewed in the "Edinburgh" with high approbation, and with a marked preference over Whewell's similar work. The Nebular Theory of Herschel and La Place has been propounded again and again in the most current works, with Conte's (alleged) verification of it; and no whisper of dissent from our first astronomers reached the popular ear. Geologists have eagerly discussed the doctrine of the Earth's Central Heat; and all who have been disposed to embrace the belief that the temperature of the interior is very intense, have appealed to its spheroidal form,—many of them also to the astronomical demonstration of the internal regularity of its shells,—in proof that the whole was once fused by heat: and this has been familiarly spoken of as referable to the time when our Solar System was in the nebular state. But new light has dawned, if not on the astronomers, yet certainly on the public, since the "*Vestiges*" has elicited an oracle from those who in such matters must teach us. Sir John Herschel wholly disowns the calculations of Conte; and those who are *not* astronomers forthwith speak very disparagingly of the ostentatious Frenchman. We are now assured that the Nebular—Hypothesis, not Theory,—is a splendid vision, which may possibly be proved true 500 years hence. As for Conte, his error was not one of computation, but of principle. Sir John Herschel, if he is now right, must have seen the flaw in the argument with a glance of his eye: for, it seems, "everybody is aware" that we are not acquainted even with the laws regulating condensation, on which the whole calculation depended; and Conte most obviously had no data to proceed upon. We cannot but be amazed, that our leading men of science should have uttered no previous protest against the delusion: and it does seem very hard, now to assail the Author of the "*Vestiges*," as if he were peculiarly to blame for having believed that in which we have all been so long allowed to acquiesce.

Nor is this all. For the last twenty years we have been

continually interested and instructed by fresh discoveries concerning the immense duration of geological epochs, the uniformity of system, and the reign of Law and Order,—backwards in time, as well as outwards through space. Violent efforts were made against this doctrine by the champions of catastrophes and convulsions and divine interferences; and many were the imputations of impiety launched by them against the newer geologists. But under such men as Hutton and William Smith, Lyell and Sedgwick, and a host beside, not only has the heterodox opinion established itself as true, but we have learned to believe that it is more honourable to the Deity to work by Law than by Intervention. The first person, as far as we know, who deliberately propounded in print, the statement that the *origination of new species* was “a natural, in contradistinction to a miraculous event,”\* was Sir John Herschel. But now, the same eminent personage publicly renounces his own doctrine, without giving any explanation of the grounds of his change, or seeming to be conscious that he has changed at all: and a chorus of scientific men protest that Creation by Law is but a decent name for Atheism. The Author of the *Vestiges* is attacked as if *he* were responsible for the great ideas, to establish which, the leading members of the British Association have been devoting their whole lives.

To go a little into detail. It was very slowly and unwillingly, that many of us, unscientific people, first received from the great geologists of our times the belief that the Creator did not bring all animated beings into existence in six solar days; but that the act of creation was spread over many ages: moreover, that a progress can be traced from the less to the more perfect animal forms;—that creation began with the humbler types of life, proceeded to fishes, thence to reptiles and birds, to mammalia, and finally to man. No one of any name dares now to deny this wonderful history; yet, strange to say, eminent geologists are endeavouring to obscure or hush it up. They appear to claim, that we will not only believe whatever facts they report to us, but will draw no theological in-

\* The Author of the *Vestiges* now, very properly, quotes Sir J. Herschel's own words; and contrasts them with his recent language: p. 141 of the Explanation.

ferences but such as they guarantee. They insist that the order in which animated forms appear, does *not* indicate any Law that regulated Creation, *because* certain "cephalopods" are found in "Protozoic" systems of rock. Without being geologists, we are entitled to reply, that we cannot overlook a primary law, because of its perturbations. A first approximation does much, if it can seize the great outline of truth. He who first enounced that the planets moved in circles, conferred a great benefit on science; and if any observer of that day had had a telescope to ascertain that there were deviations from a true circular orbit, he would have been a mischievous caviller, not an advancer of truth, if, on this ground, he had cried down a theory, which it was his duty to improve upon. What else are those men of science now doing, who denounce as superficial error the doctrine of order and general progress in the great scheme of Creation?

This conduct can be compared to nothing but to that which is often to be seen in religionists who wish to unite the reality of independent thought with a reputation for orthodoxy. We once knew a clergyman, notorious for his freedom of speculation, two of whose intimate friends and disciples became at last too heterodox to remain as fellow-clergymen with him any longer. Upon this, he addressed to them much vehement expostulation. One of them replied, that they had merely followed out his teaching to its necessary results. "No!" replied he: "I set up the ladder by which you should have mounted to the top of the walls of Zion; but the devil has thrown you over on the other side." We would on no account impute the same motive to all who have acted in the same way: but there is too much room to think, that some are desirous of securing immunity to their own speculations, by a cheap display of eloquent zeal against all who dare to go beyond their measure. However, it concerns us not, to find out *what* is actuating men, if we see that there is some bias or other which is deranging their judgments.

Another point of much importance in the "*Vestiges*," belongs to physiology—the state of the embryo human brain—and on this also the Author's critics have dealt unjustly with him. He has been treated as meaning what he did not mean,—and what was evidently more than his

argument needed,—for the mere sake of contradicting him : and inferences concerning physiological development, which had been for some years before the public in other and highly-esteemed works, are now visited on him, as a peculiar iniquity and absurdity of his own, because he has enlarged the same doctrine by an ingenious, if untenable, hypothesis. In all this, we can see nothing else but the intense prejudice of his critics, who (with a few honourable exceptions) appear far more eager to run him down by invective, and by fastening attention on all his weak points, (of which he has very many,) than to separate what is proved or probable, from what is doubtful or false.

That he ever committed himself to so much as the suggestion, that the human race was produced out of a *still-existing\** race of inferior creatures, was a great error of judgment ; for it was wholly needless to his general argument, and could only give a handle against it and against himself. If the rest of his hypothesis should ever be admitted so far as inferior animals are concerned, no long time would elapse before all would concede that Man also must have been developed out of lower races ; and that, though we should be ever so much forced to avow, that no known creatures can be fairly regarded as representatives of what man once was.—The Edinburgh Reviewer does himself much discredit by the coarse mode in which he taxes the Author with “bestializing” man ; an imputation which the latter had so well guarded against, when, in terms more delicate than we now employ, he reminds us that no one is ashamed of having been a shapeless embryo in the womb. In truth, there is a cant of purity almost monkish in this same reviewer, who seems to mistake hatred of materialism for spirituality.

But we must here quote the Author's reply on an important part of this subject.

“ Most of the large carnivores and pachyderms of the late tertiary formations, very closely resemble existing species ; but they are nevertheless determined to be distinct species by Professor Owen and other eminent authorities, in consideration of certain peculiarities. The peculiarities are, in general, trifling ; such as, differences

\* On referring to his work, we cannot alight on any such statement ; but his critics allege that he teaches mankind to be descended from the monkeys. We find only, that of existing creatures, the monkey is *nearest* to man.



in the tubercles or groovings of the surface of teeth, or greater or less length of body or extremities. . . . . There is a *Badger* of the Miocene, which cannot be distinguished from the badger of the present day. Our existing *Meles Taxus* is, therefore, acknowledged by Mr. Owen to be 'the oldest known species of mammal on the face of the earth.' It is in like manner impossible to discover any difference between the present *Wild Cat* and that which lived in the bone-caves with the hyæna, rhinoceros and tiger of the ante-drift æra, all of which are said to be extinct species. The learned anatomist takes occasion from these facts, to speak of a survival, by small and weak species, of geological changes, which have been accompanied by the extirpation of larger and more formidable animals of allied species. The inference from the facts and doctrines of this school is, that Divine Power has seen fit to change the species of elephants, rhinoceroses, tigers and bears;—using special miracles to introduce new ones, one with perhaps an additional tooth, another with a new tubercle or cusp on the third molar, and so forth;—while he has seen no occasion for a similar interference with the otter, wild cat and badger, which, accordingly, have been left undisturbed in their obscurity. Such may be the belief of men of science, anxious to support a theory: but assuredly, it will never be received by any ordinary men of fair understandings, who may be able to read and comprehend the works of Mr. Owen."—P. 153.

It is only a fair deduction from the views of the same school for a philosopher to live in trembling, lest new anatomical observations, or new microscopic discoveries, should force him to turn atheist. Men whose zeal for their own way of discerning the Deity is so importunate, are little aware how unstable and doubtful an affair they make out religion to be.

But the quotation which we have made, comes close upon a point on which most of the Author's critics exhibit an exceedingly dense, and we are disposed to say, a wilful, ignorance: viz., the worthlessness of those "Inductions" about which they talk so pedantically, to decide concerning the fixed uniformity of Species through remote ages. They confess that the Solar System *may* once have been a Nebula. They know that mere observation of its present regularity proves nothing at all concerning infinite time: and yet, relying on the fact that, during our narrow experience, the species of animals do not transgress certain limits, they magisterially contradict and haughtily rebuke one who ventures to suggest that the organised, as well as



the unorganised world, may have changed, in those millions of years, concerning which their Geology teaches,—far more than our limited observation can have noted. This Author holds it to be probable, that, in (we will suppose) fifty thousand years, asses might turn into ponies: can any one disprove this? “Yes,” replies the proud man of science: “it is quite impossible; *for* we have had no experience of so great a change: and the ignoramus who dreams of it does not know what Induction means.” We are disposed to reply, that the self-conceit which assumes such airs is blind to its own shallowness. To dogmatise on *either* side, is alike unbecoming and absurd; but if possibilities are not to be calmly discussed,—if inquiry is to be nipped in the bud by authoritative denunciations, all progress of science is at an end. We may add; to demand experimental proof of such matters, is a mere weakness of understanding.

On this point the Edinburgh Reviewer is guilty of a misrepresentation so glaring, as to affix a deep stigma even on his good faith. We could scarcely believe our understandings when we read it (p. 166), and turned to the Author's pages to satisfy ourselves. To illustrate the uselessness of mere observation in deciding concerning the eternal uniformity of a series of natural events, the Author had quoted from Mr. Babbage's “Ninth Bridgewater Treatise,” where Mr. Babbage himself employs his celebrated calculating machine in illustration of the argument, that *no amount of mere consecutive observation suffices to establish a Law, that can be counted on as eternal.* The substance of the meaning is this:—I can set my machine, so that if any one were to watch it for more than 100 million figures, it would apparently follow a certain very simple law; yet at a stage a little later, this law will fail: now who knows that Nature's laws may not, as easily, be misread, and as easily delude the man, who assumes that what has been during recent experience, always was and always will be?—It has been justly remarked, that the reference to “my machine” was needlessly egotistical, and that the phænomena of a clock which strikes the hours would have been as instructive, if not so striking, an illustration: but for this the Author of the *Vestiges* is not responsible. He did but adopt Mr. Babbage's sentiment, and quoted his very

words; deducing the same general conclusion, that laws of nature, apparently ascertained, may nevertheless fail utterly *in long time*. The argument, of course, applies only against those laws which rest on mere *observation*; where *experiment* is scarcely possible, and our means of verification therefore very confined. It is true, that Mr. Babbage used it to show, that certain so-called "miracles," which philosophers have disbelieved, may yet be true, but may have been really results of a hidden law, and therefore be improperly named miracles or interferences with law: while the Author of the *Vestiges* applies it, as illustrating, that mere observation of the uniformity of species, in the short space of human experience, does not avail to establish that this is the true and eternal law. But *both* these are legitimately contained in Mr. Babbage's principle. The Edinburgh Reviewer must know this; but as he wished to darken the subject, he bursts into indignant declamation, hurrying the reader on in a torrent of words, until (after deploring Mr. Babbage's lot in being thus "dragged forward") he at last manages by insinuation to leave on the reader's mind that Mr. Babbage's argument is thus travestied by the Author of the *Vestiges*: "If my machine can *calculate*, why may not monkeys *reason*?" These, assuredly, are not the reviewer's words; but any one who confidently peruses his turbid and stormy page, will bring away this notion, or none at all.

But we have written more than enough concerning this able but overbearing critic, whose pretensions to legislative dictatorial in morals, theology and logic, are not warranted by his undoubtedly high geological attainments. The man whom he seeks to trample under foot, however greatly he may have reached beyond his own strength in most of the details and in some large parts of his subject, has done much to excite inquiry, and help on the advance of unbiased philosophical thought; and even if his special hypothesis of development of species out of species should be abandoned as a dream, he will not have written in vain: philosophy will be freer in research, and more fertile, for his having written. Geologists will not be allowed to assign the limits to human thought. If they continue to lead onward, as they have hitherto nobly done, in the path of free inquiry, they will receive double honour: but if they rudely thrust

aside, whether from mean jealousy, theological bigotry, or any other unworthy motive, those who dare to outstep them, they will degenerate into the mere purveyors of science,—hewers of wood and drawers of water, for the service of those who cultivate genuine philosophy.

The name of Sir John Herschel has always commanded our unfeigned veneration. His unaffected modesty and simplicity have been extolled by all, as equalled only by his various attainments, and it was with much regret that we saw his influence on this occasion so decidedly exerted to silence inquiries which are very proper to be made, and crush errors which were sure to die a natural death.

The Author of the *Vestiges*, thus assailed, has replied by a short and gently-worded retort, which falls upon Sir John Herschel with severe effect. He reminds us of what we had either scarcely observed or nearly forgotten, that Sir John values science, chiefly, if not solely, *for its material results*!

“Perhaps a more lively illustration of deficiency in the life and soul of Nature-seeking could not be presented, than in the view which Sir John Herschel gives of the uses of science, in a treatise reputed as one of the most philosophical ever produced in our country. These uses, according to the learned knight, are strictly material—it might even be said, sordid—namely, ‘to show us how to avoid attempting impossibilities . . . . to enable us to accomplish our ends in the easiest, shortest, most economical, and effectual manner—to induce us to attempt and enable us to accomplish objects which, but for such knowledge, we should never have thought of undertaking.’ Such results, it will be felt, may occasionally be important in saving a country gentleman from a hopeless mining speculation, . . . . [but] . . . . when the awakened and craving mind asks, what science can do for us in explaining the great ends of the Author of Nature, and our relations to him, the man of science . . . . is mute . . . . Can we say, that where such views of the uses of ‘divine philosophy’ are entertained, there could be any right preparation of mind to receive with candour or treat with justice, a plan of Nature like that presented in the *Vestiges of Creation*?”—P. 177.

The industrial uses of science have in the long run immense moral effects. We do not mean to doubt the influence of cheap food, cheap clothes, healthy abodes, rapid and sure conveyance, cheap luxuries, and cheap literature,

on the highest interests of man. But a writer must either have very mean notions of the true scope of philosophy, or be writing for a profoundly materialized public, who could lay *sole* stress on the economic applications of science and the practical power which it imparts, as the argument for cultivating it. Forsooth, astronomy is to be valued, only as assisting navigation; chemistry, as that which bleaches or dyes our calico, disinfects our house, provides medicines, and ascertains the amount of aliment in articles of food; geology, as directing mining operations; electricity, for its lightning conductor, electrotype and telegraph. We cannot believe that either Sir John Herschel, or any of the great geologists, are infected with this degrading notion; we are forced to infer that they nevertheless live in contact with hundreds who thus measure the claims of science.

The religion of the day countenances the same view, by stripping the universe of everything divine, in order to concentrate all that is supernatural and spiritual within the pages of a book: and it becomes the interest of men of science as much as possible to obscure the fact, that there is any abstract or conceivable possibility of Natural Philosophy being opposed to the Scripture. Of course, if the two have the same field of contemplation, a collision is possible: hence perhaps the current opinion, that philosophy has *no right* to teach us anything concerning the past dealings of Deity, or, at least, that this would be anything but a *recommendation* of it. But we have made much progress, as a nation, since Sir John Herschel wrote his celebrated Discourse. The very reception of the *Vestiges of Creation* by the public, proves that a new spirit is already powerful among us; and we may confidently expect that the next Discourse on Philosophy which shall enjoy an equal popularity, will be concerned with the topics which Sir John Herschel prudently threw into the background, and which the Author of the *Vestiges* has rightly made prominent. We shall, in conclusion, quote his statement of the intention of his work.

“ It was with the design of *giving a direction to inquiry*, and leading to views of nature previously little thought of, but unexpectedly grander than those commonly entertained, that, too eager

for truth to regard my own imperfections, I ventured upon my late speculation. When an ordinary reader judges of it, let him remember that the question lies, not between two philosophical theories, but between one philosophical theory, and a view of nature which does not even profess to look to nature as a basis. As a system, moreover, which finds none of the previous labours of science shaped or directed in favour of its elucidation ; but all in the contrary way, it obviously calls for every reasonable allowance being made for its defects."—P. 181.

## ART. III.—FRENCH DEISTS.

1. *Histoire des Institutions de Moïse et du Peuple Hébreu.* Par J. SALVADOR. 3 Vols. Paris. 1828.
2. *Jésus Christ et sa Doctrine ; Histoire de la Naissance de l'Eglise, de son Organization, et de ses Progrès pendant le premier Siècle.* Par J. SALVADOR. 2 Vols. 1839.
3. *Origine de tous les Cultes ; ou, Religion universelle.* Par DUPUIS. *Edition nouvelle revue* par M. P. R. Anguis. 10 Vols. 1835.

WE have been led to peruse these works by the mention made of them by Blanco White in his Diary,\* and though we cannot say that we have derived much novelty of thought or correct argument from them, they have interested us, as showing the state of opinion among those who are influenced by the wide-spread literature of France, and more especially as explanatory of much that appears peculiar in the views of Blanco White himself.

The speculative tendencies of Mr. White's mind were first fed by the literature of France. While a priest in Spain, he hung over the productions of the French press, with all the delight of a student and the trepidation of one who seeks forbidden lore, and in his old age, when he felt himself free to choose where he would, he returned with redoubled pleasure to the same fount of mingled sweet and bitter waters. There is something affecting in the intense pleasure he describes himself as feeling in the chance sight and purchase of Volney's Works (*Vide* Vol. II. p. 212.), an author who called up no doubt the recollection of scenes long past, and the fortunes of his early life. To those Unitarians who looked upon Mr. White as an Unitarian whose sentiments were similar to their own, his opinions, as shown in his life, have been a source of extreme perplexity. Indeed, Mr. White's Unitarianism was always of a radically distinct character from that prevalent among us. Ours has

\* Vol. III. p. 186 and 277.

been formed by the contest of dissent with the authority of the Church of England—his resulted from the controversy between the Deists and the Church of Rome.

English Unitarianism was formed *pedetentim*, step by step, as our authors have felt their way to successive positions—his by bold strides from papal superstitions to the extreme of rationalism. Neither process has as yet landed the inquirer in a satisfactory position, though the former is the safer and surer way. However this may be, we think that no one can well understand the changes of Mr. White's opinions who has not some acquaintance with the deistical writers of a Roman Catholic country. The works at the head of this article have cleared up to us one point—confused to us before—viz. the little account Mr. White makes of the question of miracles. The writers leave this question, which is of such paramount importance with us, almost out of view; when the miracles are spoken of, they are quickly dismissed, as of little philosophical importance.

The solution of this phenomenon is probably to be found in the different state of feeling among Protestants and Catholics; for the Bible has not been so intently studied among the French as among ourselves, nor is it esteemed of the same importance, since the traditions of the Church and the authority of the priest are practically of greater influence with the population. The question then with the French Sceptics is not the Bible *versus* Reason; but Reason *versus* the Church. Now the minds of the Roman Catholics are saturated from infancy with accounts of miracles, every Saint's day brings its accumulated wonders, until at last the gospel miracles are almost lost sight of in the vast multitudes of later accretions. M. Guizot tells us that the lives of 25,000 Saints have been recorded in the "*Recueil des Bollandistes*," and that the publication is far from complete. Imagine each of these with a train of wonders if not of miracles—add to these all the modern miracles wrought by statues of the Virgin, pictures of Christ, &c., the miracles of the Holy Coat at Treves, the Estaticas in the Tyrol, Prince Hohenloe, and San Januarius,\*—and we cannot wonder that, in the effort necessary to throw these off the mind, the miracles of the New Testament, of infi-

\* For a defence of some of these miracles, see Waterton's last series on Natural History.



nately greater importance, should be lost sight of altogether.

Instead then of being occupied, like the English Deists, with discussions as to the historical value of the accounts in the New Testament, their French writers, whom we are reviewing, attempt to give a philosophical and consistent account of the origin of Christianity. But here we observe the effect of the orthodox systems in indisposing men to receive Christianity. The Christianity against which these attacks are levied is not the teachings of Christ and his Apostles, but the corruptions of the Church. The miraculous conception and the deity of Christ, the Trinity, the fall of man, and the orthodox scheme of Redemption, are the points which they consider; and to the far greater part of their works no Unitarian would have any objection on doctrinal grounds. The well-informed Unitarian, far more any one who has gone through a competent course of theological study, will find extremely little with which he is not already familiar, except indeed the peculiar hypothesis of Dupuis.

This, as the first in the order of time, we will now consider: it was published in 1794, and made a great sensation, for it appeared in the heat of the Revolutionary fervour when the French believed they were going to regenerate earth and heaven. The author speaks in the preface of destroying the Christian religion!—a task however not yet accomplished. The work had the honour of being defended by Lalande. Various editions and abridgments of it have been published, and it does not seem altogether out of date, as the edition from which we quote was published so late as 1835. Those who have read Volney's *Ruins of Empires* will easily understand its scope when we say that it is an endeavour to show that Christianity is nothing but an allegory of the course of the sun through the stars—Christ being the sun, the scene of whose passion and death begins with the autumn equinox, when the days begin to shorten, and whose resurrection takes place yearly, at the triumph of the sun over the winter, at the spring equinox.

Volney must bear the chief merit (if there be any) of this sort of interpretation, as his work appeared in 1791, three years before this of Dupuis.

In order to give an idea of his theory of the origin of

Christianity, we present a sketch of his system, as given in his recapitulation, vol. vii. p. 331, and following.

The fall of man and the ascendancy of Satan are borrowed from the Theology of the Persians, who got them from the signs of the Zodiac, where the Serpent, which rises at the same time as the constellation *Libra*, at the autumnal equinox, leads on the conquest of night over day—as the nights at this time begin to be longer than the days—thus appearing to triumph over the immediately preceding constellation, *Virgo*, which represents Eve.

At the winter solstice, the end of December, when the days begin to lengthen, is placed the birth of the Sun-god. That Christ is this Sun-god is evident, as the Christians turn to the east in prayer, and celebrate Christ's birth at this time of the year. *Mithra*, the Persian Sun-god, was born in a grotto, as Christ in a stable. The star which pointed out his birth is the constellation of the Virgin, then just visible above the horizon to the east. This celestial Virgin is, in the Egyptian mythology, *Isis*, the mother of *Horus*, the Sun-god. This is the virgin, too, who is pursued by the dragon in the Apocalypse. Now the mother of *Isis* was called by the Romans *Anna Perenna*, and *Anna* is the name given by Christians to the mother of the Virgin.

The story of the Resurrection of Christ is taken from the entrance of the Sun into the sign *Aries*, the Ram, when after the summer equinox the days become longer than the nights. A difficulty occurs here, as the name of the constellation is the Ram; but this the author quickly dismisses by saying, a Ram is the same thing as a Lamb: the Lamb then, the name of the constellation, is put for the Sun, and Christ is the victorious Lamb. This story, he urges, is the same as that of the Egyptian *Osiris*, the Sun-god, who, according to the Egyptian mythology, was put to death, descended to *Hades*, was mourned for many days, was then resuscitated, and appeared a conqueror over the tomb. So also *Bacchus*, born in the winter, exposed, persecuted, &c. So *Adonis*, who was "wept by the Syrian maids," whose tomb they prepared, and then after several days of grief, celebrated in triumphal songs his return to life, and to the empire of the gods. So *Horus*, the son of *Osiris* and *Isis* (for he affirms the father and son to be

identical). So the Phrygian god Atys. So the Persian Mithra. And to such an extent does he assimilate the Persian with the Christian religion, that he calls the Christians a Mithriac sect : and, indeed, Unitarian writers have long acknowledged that many of the commonly-received doctrines sprung from the teachings of Zoroaster. Lastly, he endeavours to point out the origin of the Christian Trinity. Of this he gives an explanation, similar to that given by Unitarian writers ; though, being obliged to quit his astrological ground, he moves with less freedom, and does not show any deep acquaintance with the subject.

Of his theory of the origin of the Christian Mythos, we may say, that we wish we could get rid of Orthodoxy at so easy a rate ; but his theory is apparently weak in its foundation. It rests entirely on the circumstance that Christmas-day occurs close to the winter solstice. But it is acknowledged on all hands, that Christmas-day was chosen as the day on which to celebrate Christ's birth, because this day was a holiday kept by all the world, and the Christians were wise enough to fix their festivals on the days already in use by other people ; the coincidence is accidental, and nothing more.\* Again, he is so full of his hypothesis about Christ being the Sun-god, that he never troubles himself about Jehovah ! he never once tells us what deity the Jews worshipped, though he acknowledges that they were the founders of Christianity ! A third curious result is, that he separates the origin of the story of the fall by 1,000 years from that of the redemption. In Genesis we have described the ruin of the earth ; in Christ its redemption. He gives no astronomical explanation of the creed of men during the interval.

The hypothesis too is, after all, confusing, for he makes the Sun, that is Christ, be conquered and die during the months of September, October, and November ; be born in December, and have his resurrection in March. So that his birth intervenes between his death and resurrection, an absurdity not shared by the heathen fables.

\* That such was the usual policy of the Christians may be seen by Pope Gregory's letter to Saint Augustine, where he tells the Saint to preserve the holidays still in use by the English, as by these means they would more easily be reconciled to Christianity.

But a deeper fault than that of a false hypothesis may be charged on the author; he absolutely ignores all the moral grandeur of Christianity, and assimilates the passion of Christ to the beastly fables of Bacchus, Adonis, and Atys. We felt ourselves contaminated by the mere reading of his comparisons. So obscene are the fables of the gods alluded to, that it is impossible that we should state the grounds of our indignation: what shall we say of an author, who can compare Bacchus riding in triumph, intoxicated with wine, on an ass, to Christ entering Jerusalem?

He takes no account of what is usually considered the chief merit of our religion—the divine life and example of Christ—but sweeps it away with the astrological dreams of antiquity, as of no greater value. Further notice of this part of these volumes seems unnecessary.

But the work of the author is on the origin, not only of Christianity, but of all religions. This part is characterized by the same fundamental fault as that on Christianity—he can see nothing but the forms of Religion. The soul, the living intellect of man, the moral power which works even in Material Nature; of these he sees nothing. The world to him is but a machine, and by his own account very badly put together. He traces the origin of all the religions of antiquity to astronomical myths; the Sun, the Moon, and Stars, were originally worshipped as gods: seven became a sacred number, as it was that of the planets; twelve, as it was that of the number of the months of the year; and he thinks that the various fables concerning the gods are, when analysed, astronomical allegories. But this, after all, is but a new version of the old story—the ancient religions stand upon astrology; but what does astrology stand upon? He says the labours of Hercules are but an allegory of the sun passing through the twelve signs of the Zodiac; but, we ask, why did the animals and men which form the constellations of heaven receive their place there? He commits the absurdity of overlooking the fact, that men had religions before they had found out the exact length of the year, or understood the relation in which the revolutions of the moon stood to those of the sun. Hence, as an essay into the origin of religion, the book is worthless. Religion rises out of the hearts of men—he places it in the sun and moon.

To be just, however, we must allow that the book has a certain value, viz. that it recalls the fact, that at the birth of Christ these astrological speculations occupied men's minds. In the decay of the influence of the old mythologies of Greece and Rome, two opposite tendencies appeared to fill up the religious void—the first was philosophy, in varied systems; the other was allegorical interpretation of the old fables, by which it was sought to reanimate them, and enable them still to attract men's reverence. Of these allegorical interpretations, none were more popular than the astronomical, and properly so, as astronomical truths are of themselves so grand that even in the dilution of fable they raise our awe and admiration. The contest which Christianity had with these was perhaps more formidable than that with the old superstitions. It bears marks still of the conflict with all three. The influence which pagan superstitions and philosophy have had on Christianity has often been pointed out; it is undeniable that astrological fables had some agency in corrupting it: and M. Dupuis, without giving us clear ideas of the extent of that influence, still enables us to affirm its existence, and to trace, from the mountains of Persia and the banks of the Euphrates, those fables about the power of the stars which so much influenced imaginative men in the middle ages, and which, notwithstanding the triumphs of science, have hardly ceased at the present day to influence our manner of thinking.

Before parting from this work, we ought to express our hearty admiration of the powers of reading possessed by the French public. These ten volumes of 450 pages each, would exhaust the patience of the English reader as well as the pocket of the adventurous deist who printed so much. But the French not only buy, but read; a feat we have not been able to accomplish: only by the severest efforts have we been able to get through as much as relates to the origin of worship and of Christianity. Five volumes of dissertations have been totally lost upon us.—The scepticism of the author is unrelieved by any interesting quality of thought or style—there are indeed many quotations from ancient authors which are always delightful, from their fresh vigour and liveliness of thought. From one oasis to another of these quotations we have

travelled with pain across the barren sands of our author's speculation.

The two works by Salvador possess a much higher merit ; but their chief interest lies not so much in the account they give of the Mosaic and Christian revelations, as in the undercurrent of pleading in favour of the Jews which pervades them. The writer is a Jew, and says in effect,—We, the Jewish nation, gave the sublime systems of Moses and of Christ to the world—we are the great instructors and benefactors of mankind—ought we then to be treated with contumely and reproach ? And it must be confessed that there is something striking in his language, (*Jésus Christ et sa Doctrine*, Vol. II. p. 99,) when he speaks of the passion of Christ being a type only of the miseries of the Jewish people, which have roused so often the genius and the lamentations of their prophets, and declares his expectation that after near twenty centuries of grief they will now give to the world another Christ, more true, more great, and more powerful than the teacher of Nazareth. (For rationalist as he is, he cannot entirely give up the long delayed hope of his race.) But, on a review of the persecutions of the Jews, we feel unable to say that a great part of the blame has not rested with themselves. Nothing, of course, can excuse cruelty and persecution—but if a little knot of men will separate themselves from the rest of their fellow creatures—refuse to marry, to eat, to drink, and hold familiar intercourse with them ; always claiming to be of a nobler and more favoured race,—they must expect that the rest of mankind will resent their exclusiveness, and make them feel the disadvantage of it whenever they can. That this contest with the embattled world has developed the intellect and the energies of the Jewish race, no one will deny, nor that they have produced many famous men ; though here they greatly exaggerate their importance ; for the entire Jewish people, from the time of Paul to the present day, has not produced so many nor such great men as one Gentile town, Florence, in the course of the three centuries which constituted its era of greatness. We do injury, indeed, to the great spirits of Dante, Michael Angelo, and Galileo, to mention them in comparison. That the Jews will now produce another



great religious teacher is extremely unlikely. The Jewish character has fitted itself to servitude, and bears the stamp of those social vices which ensue upon that state. We blame not the Jews—we think that their existence in the heart of Europe during all the ages of triumphant orthodoxy was a great and important benefit to mankind, and we should be as glad to accept truth at their hands as at those of any other race. But in those writings of the modern Jews which we have seen, we think we observe the burning, not of a freshly-trimmed, but of a dying lamp. Our author, with all his boast of another Christ, leans more to the past glory than to the future prospects of his race, and enumerates, with Hebrew amplitude, among their great men, not only Genghis Khan, but Zoroaster and Confucius, or at least their instructors. We wonder why he should stop with these; he might as well have claimed as Jews more heroes of antiquity. Hannibal for instance. Their claim of relationship to this man might be made out as satisfactorily as to some others. Thus, Hannibal was a Carthaginian, but the Carthaginians came from Tyre—Solomon was intimate with Hiram, king of that city, and they sent out fleets in concert—doubtless they colonized together; therefore it is not impossible that Hannibal was the descendant of a Hebrew colonist: whether Hannibal was a Hebrew or not, can only be told by the character of the individual; and here the proof is abundant—his vast genius could be the product of only one country, and that is—Judæa. But apart from Satire, (and we should be sorry to heap odium on the condemned,) the day of glory has passed to the Jews as to other nations of antiquity. As easily might we expect an Epaminondas or Pericles from modern Greece—a Cyrus from Persia—or a Sesostris from Egypt—as an Isaiah or a Christ from the modern Jews.

The controversial value of these works to the Deist lies in the proof they contain, that the morality of Christianity was taught by Jews before the coming of Christ; but this, we suppose, was never disputed, for Christ himself said the same, in answer to the question, Which is the great commandment of the law?—Matthew xxii. 37—40. "Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This



is the first and great commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."

Here we find acknowledged by the founder of Christianity all that this work is spent in proving. The real problem which lies at the root of the question, viz. the origin of so divine and so commanding a character as that of Christ, which should possess force enough to impress itself upon all nations, is never touched by him. The morality taught by Christ seems comparatively easy and natural to us, now that he has given us a living exemplar; the difficulty lay in supplying that exemplar. Indeed, throughout his dissertation on Christ and Paul, under an assumed indifference, there runs a spirit which shows that if he has renounced the religion of his forefathers, he has not wholly lost that fierce hatred to the founders of Christianity which has always characterized his nation. This total want of sympathy with the founders of Christianity mars his work, and destroys all the efficacy of his argument. For the revolution effected by Christ has been so palpable a benefit to mankind, that to be blind to that benefit seems to put the reasoner at once entirely out of court.

The second work however, *Jésus Christ et sa Doctrine*, possesses a certain interest, from the great familiarity of the author with works not much studied, at least in England—Philo and Maimonides. There are many extracts from these authors which are remarkable for a beautiful morality. He endeavours, however, to prove by extracts from Maimonides, that Christ's peculiar view of a spiritual worship and supremacy was shared also by the Jews; but this is a singularly defective proof, as Maimonides was not born till eleven hundred years after our Lord, so that it is apparent that Maimonides must have borrowed from Christ, not Christ from Maimonides.

This leads us to the fundamental defect of our author's mind, which is an incapacity for the observance of historical perspective. He treats of the men of all ages and countries as if they were cast in one common mould of humanity, and did not appear in an infinite variety and succession of character. Sceptic as he is, his mind is en-

larged little beyond the circle of mere Jewish ideas. Classical antiquity, literature, and history, as well as those of modern times, as far as shown by his works, have been little studied by him, and mostly at second hand. We have seen that he anticipates that the present age may produce a greater and more powerful Christ. He sees nothing remarkable in the Messiah the world reverences; there were many, says he, who in that age gave themselves out as the Redeemer. The cooking up of a religion he esteems quite a common event. One would suppose men sat down to worship on as little provocation as they sit down to dinner. Christianity has nothing to fear from this style of reasoning. The religion is rooted deep in the hearts of men, and such slight "winds of doctrine" will not overthrow it. As regards the origin of orthodox Christianity—a principal point aimed at in the book—there is some curious though not uncommon information in regard to the incarnations of oriental deities, and extracts from Philo, showing the Alexandrian notions of the logos; the author has not, however, sufficient skill to complete the picture of the influence these have had on Christianity, but only enough to indicate the sources whence the materials for this task must be drawn.

Salvador's work on the Institutions of Moses is much more interesting than that on Christ, being evidently written more *con amore*. Though he does not believe in the miraculous mission of Moses, he watches over the reputation of the lawgiver with more tenderness to the records of the Pentateuch than has been shown by many Christians. He cannot bear to part with any of the early history of his race, so that we have the curious phenomenon of a rationalizing Jew preserving intact all the early records of his race, cutting out only the miracles—while Dr. Arnold, and many firm Christians with him, believe that the records of the Old Testament call for the hand of a Niebuhr to separate the mythical from the true.

This method of treating the Jewish history leads him to some absurd results. Thus he says Moses led 600,000 fighting men out of Egypt, with their wives and families, but gives no account how this immense multitude, estimated by himself at 2,500,000, was supported in the desert

without a miracle. He endeavours also to get rid of the characteristic story of the spoiling of the Egyptians, so often thrown in the teeth of the Jews, by affirming that the trinkets were got, not by deceit, but by open and successful war. *Credat Judæus.*

In this work the dose of heresy may be considered homœopathic, and to a person who is unacquainted with the learned languages, and has not access to any of the great works on the subject, we would recommend this work, as being written in a lively style, and conveying a just and interesting view of the merits of Moses as a lawgiver, apart from his theology. It is much perhaps that it is written by a Jew, for it breathes a patriotic enthusiasm. The author however has not sufficient information to compare the Jewish institutions with those of other ancient nations.

The most novel position taken by M. Salvador is to be found in his attempt to free the Jews from the odium of Christ's death, by saying that Christ rendered himself amenable to justice by claiming to be God ;—to do this was blasphemy according to the Jewish law, and the rulers of the Jews therefore were justified in prosecuting him before Pilate, and upon Pilate alone must rest the guilt of his condemnation. The argument is ingenious, though we do not care to reply to it, as we do not think Christ proclaimed himself to be God : yet after all it seems to rest upon a fiction, as the accusation before Pilate against Christ was that he proclaimed himself not the God, but the King of the Jews.

In conclusion we would say that the whole controversy which we have reviewed has revived in us a regret we have often felt before—that the study of the various religions of the world is so much confined to professed theologians. These religions have been neglected on the ground that they are wholly false, and the work of imposture : neither of these allegations are true. There is a certain sublime truth in all, which gives them vitality, and their errors are the result of ignorance, not of fraud ; and at all events, to the philosopher and psychologist, they exhibit invaluable materials for the study of human character. It is perhaps the greatest mistake we can commit in regard to the workings of providence, to suppose that God has granted all the benefits

of religious consolation to Christians exclusively, and left the rest of the world utterly neglected and forlorn. He works in various ways among all peoples, and nothing can be more interesting and instructive than to mark the various attempts men have made to grasp the attributes of the Eternal, to interpret his providence, and bring him nearer to their hearts by modes of adoration and prayer.

ART. IV.—UNIVERSAL SALVATION OUT OF  
INHERENT DEPRAVITY.

*The Three Grand Exhibitions of Man's Enmity to God.* By  
DAVID THOM. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 558. London: Simp-  
kin, Marshall & Co.

THIS book is extremely curious as a psychological phenomenon. In this respect, and as an example of the incredible vagaries, in the shape of compact Systems all whose parts marvellously dovetail, which theological man constructs when he adopts a view of Revelation which professes not to enlighten but to subvert human Reason, the book is not without interest and instruction. It is a Theory of God and his Providence not constructed out of those materials which the collective Reason of mankind admits as Truths, but growing out of views of human nature and its relations to the Deity, which the author and his friends enjoy by private inspiration. It is not human Intellect, nor human Spirit, nor human Soul, however enlightened by Scripture, that serves to give them any glimpse of God and his Truth; but a special introduction of the Divine Nature into them, upon the destruction of their human nature, lifts them into gods. We cannot be indifferent to any form that Christianity assumes, to any action of human nature upon the elements of belief traditionally supplied to it,—though in giving some brief account of this work we occupy our pages with an Individual rather than with a Class. Though Sandemanians, and Plymouth Brethren; "Miss Hobbs of Waterford; Mr. Adolphus Kent of Bath; and Mr. William Seabrook of Plymouth, author of a beautiful tract on the Millenium, and some other treatises," and "other dear friends," may in some respects approach the author, yet we suppose he claims to stand alone among "scripturally taught and divinely enlightened minds,"—arrogating however no merit on that account, but nevertheless recording the fact, as an instance of the 'Election of Grace.' We refer to the action of human nature upon the elements of belief which tradition and system authoritatively supply, because we are really inclined to regard the theory of our Author

as an ingenuous and ingenious violence committed upon Orthodoxy by a generous and large-hearted man in order to twist it into some conformity with the irrepressible demands of his own merciful nature. Admitting the several, separate, doctrines of Orthodoxy, he forms them into a system of divine Love and all-embracing Salvation. With him Calvinism becomes identified with Universalism. Starting with the necessary, inherent, constitutional, and ineradicable enmity of human nature to God, he ends with "the termination of man's enmity," and the everlasting enjoyment of Salvation by all mankind. But *how* can this be? for the statement contains a contradiction in the terms. Why, in this way:—

It is all a mistake to suppose that God is *educating* human Nature; that Religion, natural or revealed, was ever intended to strengthen, enlighten, and develop the divine element in man, to subdue his selfish and lower tendencies, and conform him to the purpose and will of God. Human nature, it now appears, *cannot be educated* into a heavenly goodness; there is in it no seed of goodness to educe, no divine element to appeal to,—and this not at all in consequence of Adam's fall, but on account of its own necessary and inherent enmity to God, of which Adam's fall was itself a consequence. God then, according to our Author, is not educating but *exposing* human nature, experimenting upon it in every possible way, solely with the view of bringing out into open manifestation its radical and inveterate malignity;—putting it upon its trial, under every variety of circumstance, and in every form of indictment, until He succeeds in obtaining a verdict against it upon every conceivable count,—and so shall become justified before Heaven and Earth in utterly abolishing it as irreclaimable;—upon which he will supply mankind with a *divine Nature*, in place of the one which He first gave them, and then proved, to the universal satisfaction, to be not worth giving, and only fit for destruction. Well,—this at least sets us at ease about the issue; all is to be right at last; every human being is at death, some few before it, to have the divine nature superinduced upon him. A system which provides for us thus beneficently, at least does not so bewilder us with terror that we are incapacitated for coolly examining it. It will naturally be asked, why did God ori-

ginally create this human Nature, only to show that nothing can be made of it? Six thousand years have already been spent solely in this process of *Exposure*. Is this a fitting object for God's Providence,—to create a nature for the sake of proving, by every kind of test, that it must be destroyed as originally and unalterably bad, and a better one substituted? Why did not God begin with this better nature, seeing that He knew from the first that the human nature could never be improved,—and that the only possible result of the operations of his Wisdom and Love upon it, would be to bring into the light its innate badness?—Unfortunately these are questions which our Author does not answer, does not even conceive that anybody will be so troublesome as to ask. But, then, what could he do?—A believer, a traditional believer, in the Deity of Christ, in the Atonement, in the Election of the Church of God, what other purpose could he find for God's providence, so as to make the whole result in the eternal salvation of every individual of mankind? This conclusion his own better nature, and Scripture, and his clear perception that God is Love, forced upon him, and so the separate points of Orthodoxy must be woven into a new System, with Universalism for its issue. Now this new system is, every whit, as scriptural, as compactly hung together, as consistent with itself, as the old Orthodoxy, and it is immeasurably more benign and gentle in its spirit. Who could have believed that Calvinistic principles and materials logically pursued and applied would have issued in a System, which so far as concerns *the future world*, goes far beyond Unitarianism, in the immediate participation of a divine nature and of divine joys which it claims for every individual of mankind without exception. With the premises that God is Love, and that human Nature is constitutionally at enmity with Him, there is no other legitimate conclusion,—and so our Author boldly seizes the only hypothesis that could satisfy his innate Benevolence, and he proclaims that God is not educating human nature, but testing, trying, experimenting upon it in every possible way, so as to leave it no plea, pretext, or subterfuge,—that he may destroy it safely after having, as it were, stopped all the holes of escape.—God's Providence on Earth is made up of these various experiments upon human Nature, with a view to unveil, and show in-



disputably, its unchangeable enmity. These experiments were made successively in three ways, which exhaust God's earthly providence, that is, complete his proof of man's irreclaimable malignity.

I.—The first Experiment was made upon the first man, Adam, who, as a fair specimen of human nature, represents the fall of the whole race, when exposed to the easiest possible trial. Not that Adam entailed sin on his posterity: that is a vulgar orthodox notion: he merely *showed* the enmity of all his race,—proved its malignity in the person of an unexceptionable sample of the whole. Our Author convicts his Orthodox brethren of two flagrant errors; 1st, in supposing that Adam was spiritual before his fall, and 2ndly, in supposing that Christ restores to human nature only what Adam lost. He is a most formidable logical opponent of Orthodoxy, *upon its own grounds*. He unquestionably demolishes the common theory of revelation. It is quite clear that if Adam was perfect at first, he never could have fallen,—and that if Adam was not perfect, Christianity cannot be merely a contrivance for restoring the perfection lost by Adam.

"Adam's one transgression, then, rendered not his nature hostile to God, but merely proved it to be so. Violating the prohibition, he made apparent the negative and utterly worthless character of his previous righteousness, at the same time that he brought to light the enmity to God which had lain latent in his constitution from his very origin."

This is called the first of the series of Exhibitions of man's enmity to God. But before this conclusion holds it is necessary to show that man's *whole* nature was opposed to the divine will, that in the very act of transgression he was not in enmity with *himself*, as well as with God. Otherwise the transgression establishes only the weakness of Conscience, in the struggle of flesh and spirit,—but surely not that Adam was "diametrically opposed to God in his very nature itself," since part of his *own* nature was resisted in the act of sin. Our Author is very confused, and indeed directly self-contradictory, on this point. He first asserts that Adam was so entirely fleshly as not to be "capable of forming any correct idea even concerning the meaning of the terms employed by God in forbidding transgression,"—

"a mere grown infant." But, then, how could such an one become justly subject to punishment, to the deprivation of earthly life threatened as the wages of disobedience? Accordingly, our Author finds it necessary next to declare, in flagrant opposition to himself, that,—

"Unquestionably in transgression Conscience was by Adam violated, and therefore punishment was by him deserved: for Conscience, regarded as the *capacity* of regarding moral obligations, or regarded *subjectively* as the schoolmen speak, being essential to the constitution of human nature, was, with every other faculty that belongs to man, possessed from his creation by our progenitor; while Conscience in him, regarded objectively, was also roused or stimulated into activity, by the prohibition which God saw meet to impose upon him, and the threatening with which that prohibition was accompanied. Guilt thus could be, and actually was by him incurred. And that Conscience thereupon proceeded to the discharge of one of her most important functions, that of *condemnation*, is manifest from Gen. iii. 7, 8."—P. 52, *Note*.

So that according to our Author himself, Adam's condemnation proceeded from a part of Adam's own nature. Is not this to abandon the whole idea of man's nature being in entire Enmity to God? The man, Adam, was at enmity with his own nature, as well as at enmity with God; and his highest nature *sided* with God, and condemned his disobedience. We may as well observe here as any where else, that this fatal concession is made throughout in reference to every alleged instance of the *total* opposition of human Nature to God. In every instance it is conceded that there is *something* in man's nature condemning his disobedience, and consequently not in itself opposed to God. Is not this to upset the theory that Providence is *exposing* an ineradicable enmity, and not educating a divine seed of goodness? Here is the full and fatal Concession:—

"Condemnation of human nature, in every one of the three instances of man's enmity to God of which we treat, proceeds equally and justly on the ground of man's violation of Conscience, or of natural views and principles which he possesses."—P. 233.

In all the cases there was a "Violated Conviction," and hence a "just condemnation." Is not this to admit that there is *some part* of human nature that is not opposed to

God, but that reissues the mandate of his will, and condemns disobedience? We know well what our Author's reply would be; viz.,—that this is *fleshly* Conscience, which though capable of instruction in God's Will so far as to become subject to judgment for disobedience, is yet by its very nature *incapable* of obedience. Now this we take leave to call unmitigated nonsense; nonsense without the least veil of sophistry to cover its nakedness. Man cannot be, at one and the same time, guilty for not doing God's will, and by his very nature incapable of doing it. If he is a subject for just punishment, he cannot by necessity of his being be at inevitable enmity with God. God cannot at once be exposing the *inherent* opposition of man's nature, and yet making a claim upon its obedience. Our Author has abandoned his whole theory, under the necessity of justifying the punishments inflicted by God. Let us confess, however, that this view of Adam's fall, viewed by itself and apart from its place in the system, although no doubt a doctrine of original sin, is totally opposed to that of *hereditary* Depravity, and is a perfectly true view of human nature as represented by Adam. Adam did nothing to *make* human nature weak and sinning, but showed it *to be* weak and sinning,—weakness and sin, however, implying that *there is something in man's nature* which judges and condemns them. This *something* surely is not at enmity with God, but on God's side,—and it is the purpose of his providence to educate it.

II.—The second Exhibition of Man's enmity to God was given by one Nation, Israel, in its rejection of the crucified and glorified Redeemer, and was confined to the period of forty years between the death of Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem,—whilst the original enmity displayed by Adam in disobeying the command of prohibition, was repeated in the person of every man of every nation from the beginning of time, in their disobedience of the laws of their own nature, or, as in the case of the Jews, of express prohibitions of God.—The second Experiment upon man required thus to be preceded by what our Author calls "an Experiment made upon the Lord Jesus," with the view of showing "what he the Creator could do, as contrasted with what mere creatures had not done and could not do." We are not informed why four thousand

years were allotted to the various forms of the first Experiment, the result of which was evident, we are told, in the person of Adam in a single day. We merely collect that the Experiment was varied for the sake of silencing all cavillings or objections that it had not been *fairly made*, and that hence arose the peculiar circumstances of Noah and Abraham, and their respective descendants. In the case of Abraham it is admitted that he was adorned with the requisite righteousness of faith; but this we are not to attribute to human nature, but to the divine nature super-induced upon him. During this long period, the guilt of disobedience being constantly going on, whilst Knowledge and Experience were constantly accumulating, mankind were in every possible way multiplying the manifestations of their *necessary* enmity to God.—The faith of Abraham gained for his posterity certain temporal and earthly blessings. The continuance of these blessings was dependent on their obedience to the divine command to receive Jesus as the Messiah, to *abstain* from rejecting and crucifying him. Had they abstained, however, the Jewish state and church would have remained for ever; just as in Adam's case, if he not had sinned, mankind would have remained grown babies for ever, and the earth would be peopled by immortal infants.

“But neither event could happen: both Adam personally, and the Jews nationally and corporately, behoved to transgress. And the transgression of the Jews in crucifying the Lord of Glory, having destroyed their national and corporate capacity as the Church of God upon earth, the way was opened up for the address to them and to others, individually and personally, of the second law, or law of command.”

This Law of Command ran for forty years, between the death of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem. It was a pause of judgment, and a second opportunity offered to the Jews and others, to accept the now glorified Messiah, and become the subjects of his Church. But the opportunity was forfeited; they would neither accept him who had kept their whole Law, and fulfilled its righteousness; nor him whom God had raised up and glorified,—so that scope was now given to God, to put them aside altogether, and commence another and final *Experiment* upon man-

kind. The death of Christ, as a righteous being, prepared the way for this last experiment. "It took away sin, by bringing to an end in himself, as one not only with the Jews but with the whole human family, that human nature to which sin, sin against Adam's Law and sin against Moses' Law, attached—a nature which, by the peculiar circumstances of his birth, and by his total abstinence from evil, he had previously shown to be pure, spotless, and holy in himself. And it brought in righteousness, or was the consummation of obedience." That is, *the Creator* did all this, and so fulfilled Law, and completed Righteousness, and brought human nature to an End—and since the demands of Law were now satisfied, and human nature as "subject to law of course ceased to exist," God was now free to offer an *unconditional* Salvation to the World.—All this is evidently nothing but the confusion, and substitution, and hopeless paralogisms of the old Calvinism, wrought into a milder system. Our Author is like an Architect who has to convert a Jail into a Palace. He does his best with the gloomy dungeons and rusty bars—and, with infinite trust in the 'make-believe' of his readers, gets on wonderfully.

III.—God's Experiments upon men are not yet complete. They had violated his law of prohibition, given in Adam, and in Moses; they had violated his law of faith by their opposition to the Apostolic Message, by "refusing to become sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty," on the simple condition of having faith in Jesus,—and now God, in the third place, exhibits the Enmity of human nature in the highest degree, by showing it *refusing to accept* heavenly and divine blessings, offered as a free gift, and without any conditions at all. This charge our Author lays at the door of all Christian Churches. God wishes them to accept eternal salvation as a free gift, and to look upon their possession of it simply as a fact,—whilst they will insist in opposition to God, that *some conditions* are annexed, will not understand the meaning of the word *gift*, nor be satisfied with being saved and blessed without asking any questions, or taking any trouble whatever except that of simple acquiescence. This is man's crowning exhibition of *Enmity* to God. He will not accept Salvation as a free gift. He will be asking what he

*ought* to believe, and what he *ought* to do. He will not consent to feel himself blessed, on God's express assurance, whatever he may believe, or whatever he may do. Human nature would rather be damned than gratify God by accepting a gift from Him, though that gift was eternal Blessedness, offered to men without any conditions whatever, except that they would be good enough to accept it, and please not to be eternally destroyed. The strictest orthodox Churches, according to our Author, are the most actively concerned in exhibiting this extreme of Enmity to God—they will be talking of *saving* faith, and will not simply take up with the fact, that *they are* saved. Unitarian moralists are equally audacious malignants—they will be talking of righteousness and duty, and will not consent to forget altogether that human nature, alone subject to law, which Christ brought to an end. This then is the sin of the world in the last Age, from the destruction of Jerusalem to the consummation of all things,—it will not accept an unconditional Salvation,—it will not please God so far as to acquiesce in His gift,—it will refuse it out of inveterate Enmity. When every form of a *conditional* Salvation which the ingenuity of man can frame shall have come into existence, and so a perfectly *free* Gospel be made, in every possible way, "the object and butt of man's unhallowed opposition,"—then his Enmity to God shall have exhausted all its possible manifestations, and then God will terminate altogether the existence of this incurable nature. The apotheosis of mankind will follow, when it has thus been clearly proved that human Nature is inveterately diabolical. *Its* punishment will be its everlasting destruction; but *nobody* will be punished, for those very same persons who existed before as men will appear in heaven clothed with the divine nature. Every man will be *saved* with the eternal blessedness of a spiritual and celestial existence; but every man will nominally be *punished* by losing for ever his diabolical human nature. Well, this is a milder way than Calvinism discovers for keeping God true to His threatenings, faithful to His word. But *Theology*, trifling, quibbling, paltering, falsifying, playing at words with the eternal God, exhibits exactly the same character in both *systems*. But what can a man do who has to make a Universal Salvation out of



Calvinistic materials,—to admit all into Heaven through the gate of inherent Depravity? In Luther's phrase, not only does 'the cover fit the dish,'—but great must have been the stimulus imparted to Ingenuity by natural Love and Mercy, to find such a cover for such a dish.

We have yet to say a word of our Author's view of the Election of grace. It consists simply in the knowledge being imparted to some few, whilst yet on Earth, of their unconditional salvation through the life of Christ,—in their acquiescent acceptance of the fact, with an accompanying consciousness that they are now in possession of the earnest of the divine nature. Our Author is one of the select few. He claims no merit however. It is all God's mercy. Nevertheless the fact remains, that he and others, with Christ, are now reigning over all those unregenerate and unbelieving who profess Christianity in the Roman Catholic, or Anglican, or Calvinistic, or Independent, or Baptist, or Unitarian way. This superiority however is confined to our Author's earthly state. At death he ceases to reign, and resigns his kingdom to God, who then becomes all in all. We had supposed that Christ reigned *in* the hearts of believers: but it appears that he, with our Author and others, reigns *over* the unbelieving portion of mankind, which includes all existing Christian Churches, as they falsely term themselves.—Such are the consequences of all attempts to elevate man upon the ruins of the rational constitution given to him by God. Such must ever be the character of Theology when its standard of Truth is *external* to human Reason; and only for the sake of bringing out this instructive fact, have we laid before our readers this last attempt to show how a being may be saved who possesses a nature that is incurably bad,—how a man may leave his nature behind him, and in a real spiritual sense perform the feat of 'jumping out of his skin!'—But our Author is open to no answer, and must be extremely gratified by the universal opposition offered to his views. For us, who avow ourselves only human creatures, to agree with him, would be a most perplexing circumstance. We thank him however for the keen logic by which he has established his own incredibilities upon orthodox premises. If compelled to adopt his data, we could be so comfortable nowhere as with him. We thank him too for saving us all at last, and



as for his little term of Kingship, we wish with all our hearts that all spiritual sovereigns reigned as mildly and as harmlessly. Our Author's object is to establish the universal Love of God as manifested in a Universal Salvation. We think that God does this by submitting human nature to a divine Education. He thinks that God first proves that human nature is incurably bad; and when that point is established, that He will then clothe every possessor of it with a divine being. There is no use in asking again, why did God begin with this incurably bad nature? Starting with Orthodox premises our Author has done the best he could,—and we thank him for the proof he has given, that human nature insists upon framing a system of divine Mercy out of theological materials, which have hitherto appeared to us who are not burdened with them, as inveterately bound up with exclusive Salvation for the few, and eternal condemnation for the many. In his triumph over human nature, we see the triumph of it,—and God's loving spirit asserting its existence in one who, whatever he may think, we take to be nothing more than a man, a human creature of the common kind. That any large portion of mankind could have accepted Calvinism, without finding some such refuge as this, would have been to us the only strong evidence of a diabolical selfishness in human nature.

We must afford space for one or two specimens of our Author's manner. He indulges occasionally in the lofty scorn not unnatural to a Sovereign who reigns over subjects who do not recognise his Kingship. We must admit however that Calvinistic "coxcombs" will find the logic of this passage too hard for them:—

"This system actually ascribes a greater power to Jesus' death than it does to his life. For it ascribes to his death, or to a work performed by him in his earthly and inferior state, the power of bestowing a blessing *unconditionally* [the remission of Adam's debt], while it ascribes merely to his life, which is connected with his heavenly and superior state, the power of bestowing blessings *conditionally*! It ascribes to his death an efficacy which extends to *every human being*, while it restricts the efficacy of his life to a *portion of the human race only*!—Such is human theology, when, in the plenitude of its ignorance and hatred of eternal life as gratuitously bestowed, it would, by way of a little variety in its freaks, try upon human principles to impart consistency to the statements of

Calvinists respecting the Atonement. The first step made by the coxcombs who maintain the view upon which we are at present animadverting, is to run their heads against the scriptures, and to plunge over head and ears into the grossest inconsistencies."—P. 216.

Our Author is in the strictest sense a believer in a *Verbal* revelation ; he accepts the text as he finds it, apparently with a total abnegation of criticism ; illumination however does not come from the letter, but from the Spirit using it as an instrument of conveyance. Here is one of the intimations imparted to "a scripturally taught and divinely enlightened mind :"—

"Solomon says, 'Of making many books there is no end ; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.' Is there not contained in these words a suggestion that a state of highly advanced knowledge and civilization is not, therefore, a state of unmixed felicity ? May it not be that society is now merely throwing off one form of evil, namely, that of ignorance, to exchange it for another form of vice, namely, that of secular and fleshly knowledge ?"

Here is a striking remark upon the anti-spiritual effects of miracles :—

"Upon heathens and fleshly-minded Jews such special divine interpositions, instead of improving and enlarging their minds, tended but to produce the impression of God being a local Deity, and of his interfering in the affairs of men only by fits and starts. He was to heathens, when specially avenging himself upon them, *the God of the hills, but not the God of the valleys*, a God who took notice of some events, while he was absolutely indifferent about, if he did not even slumber over, a large proportion of others. Roused only when he appeared after an extraordinary fashion, the rest of the lives even of a majority of his chosen people was spent in an exhibition of practical infidelity. Was it possible even for men taught from above, living in a period when divine Knowledge was comparatively slender, to escape altogether the contagion of such views and feelings ? Could they fail to be affected more by miraculous appearances of Deity than by a steady, profound, divinely-imparted, and well-regulated conviction of his omnipresence, omniscience, and constant energetic operation ? Blessed be God, I say, all temptation to the indulgence of semi-infidel notions and feelings has now, with miracles, in the case of the church, passed away. That temptation to regard God as present only in some places and on some occasions, to which miracles necessarily gave rise, has been suspended by

higher and holier views of things. There are now no miracles, and consequently the church has no inducement to localise or otherwise restrict the operations of Deity."—P. 316.

The following piece of advice is richly merited and cleverly put. The Author speaks too as one who had been let into the secret, and "knows all about the matter."

"Perhaps a hint to popular and eloquent preachers of what are called evangelical sentiments,—if any such should chance to honour my work with their perusal,—may not be without its use, and may be taken kindly. Never, my good friends, proclaim new and clearer, and more scriptural views of divine truth, than those which your hearers have been in the habit of listening to and receiving, even although they should be imparted to you. Popularity, you know, is your aim; perhaps also the acquisition of the means of living. Nay, do not wince; make the admission honestly at once. Remember that I have been behind the scenes, and know all about the matter. Under such circumstances you cannot afford to irritate your hearers,—and irritation with its usual unpleasant consequences would be the necessary result of any attempt on your part, by bringing the word of God more purely and spiritually under their notice, to carry them really forward in the divine life. Keep them, therefore, as much as possible, moving in a circle—going the same dull and perpetual round of practices, duties and doctrines. Tell them what they already know and already relish. Make them fancy that they are learning, certainly; but all the while take care to be merely tossing to them views which they already have, and with the truth and perfect accuracy of which they are fully satisfied. Never by leading them to think they have been deceived, offend their prejudices. Thus to act gratifies their self-love. Some talent and considerable experience, no doubt, are required to manage all this well. There must be variety in the topics selected, as well as in the phraseology employed—there must be human eloquence—there must be frequent and powerful appeals to the feelings of your auditory—their itching ears must be tickled—their self-righteous notions must be adroitly managed and qualified—their pharisaical prejudices must be taken advantage of. Thus will matters go on smoothly. Priests and people will continue cherishing towards each other sentiments of mutual esteem and satisfaction. But no higher and more spiritual views of divine truth—no attempt at real teaching—if you value your influence, your peace of mind, and your pocket. Supposing you to proclaim what is really spiritual, God, it is true, may bless you; or rather his own truth. He may make you the honoured instrument of carrying forward in

heavenly sentiments and vital godliness some of his dear children. But what of that? Think of the awful risk to yourself at which this good would be accomplished. For one whom you are made the means of enlightening, you irritate, you make your enemies, you lose perhaps ten, perhaps a hundred, of those who formerly hung on your lips, and almost worshipped you. Even those to whom you are made the means of imparting higher views may not sufficiently appreciate the value of the blessing, and may by their coldness and apathy add to the feelings of vexation and disappointment of which the open opposition of former supporters is productive. No, no, my friends; no such foolish conduct as this should ever be yours. It is a capital maxim for you, and one to be constantly borne in mind and acted on by you, that 'whatever is new in theology is therefore necessarily false.' Never mind, although God's word should contradict this. What have you or your hearers to do with that word, except in so far as it can be rendered a means of promoting your mutual self-satisfaction? Expediency, denominated usefulness, you know is the principle upon which you are acting; and therefore by a regard to expediency let your whole procedure be regulated.—And yet, dear friends, why address you in this strain? Why pretend to communicate to you instruction or learning on this matter? You are far better adepts in the system of religious jugglery than I can expect to make you. You understand, and by your mode of dealing with them you show that you understand, of what materials your respective congregations are composed, and how they require to be managed. To you therefore I have no information to convey; but it may be that some young, amiable, sanguine preacher is not exactly aware of the dangers attendant on a faithful and growing exposition of divine truth in its purity and spirituality. To him I say, Beware!" —P. 405.

One word, in conclusion, respecting the style and composition of this work. The separate sentences are remarkably clear and lucid. The Author is a master of perspicuity. Yet such is the wearisome reiteration, the endless repetitions, the constantly occurring recapitulations, the nauseating attempts to make yet clearer, by some other mode of statement, what is already worn to a rag, and from the first, to use a pet phrase of the Author's, might be 'seen through at a glance,' that the result is indescribable confusion, bewilderment, and weariness. If it ever should reach a second edition, (and such works do reach second editions, which is a matter beyond our understanding,) we recommend its Author to reduce it to one quarter of its

bulk, and to present his series of Exhibitions and arguments, in a consecutive order, without repetitions, summaries, or recapitulations.

We should be refusing to gratify our own feeling if we abstained from saying, that we believe the Author to be a man of unimpeachable integrity, of universal kindliness of heart, of a pure life, of a keen and vigorous intellect, of the logical order, and of a noble and unworldly devotion to the cause of Truth. He has given proof that he is one of the few, whose honesty and simplicity are too strong to yield either to the tyranny, or to the cajolery, of Churches.

## ART. V.—THE FORTY SHILLING FREEHOLD.

*The League Newspaper*, Jan. 3rd, 1846 :—"Qualify, Qualify, Qualify."

*Building Societies simplified and improved.* Houlston and Stoneman : London, 1845.

THE great movement of our day no longer needs the support of argument ; and we must leave to more stirring and popular organs the important duty of urging those who know what is just and right, to apply their own energy for remedying the wrong. At the same time, it will not interfere with active interest in the cause, calmly to consider the present aspect of our social state, and the prospects of futurity which suggest themselves.

In a very early stage of civil union, every community gains a clear perception how essential *security of property* is to all social well-being. While indeed the feuds of hostile races still survive, men will exult in the process which has driven off the cattle of a neighbour, or burnt his crops : but the first manifestation of national unity is found in the establishment of LAW for the equal protection of all ; nor is it then long, before the industrious masses rally round the law and support it, as the charter of their prosperity. In security of person and of property all nations have felt and known their Freedom to consist, and in this cause have had to wage a difficult war against the powerful Few. But it is only in a later stage that they understand *Freedom of Industry* to be a most essential condition, without which there is no security of property to those who live by laborious exertion. It may seem very evident, that if one class of the community can dictate to another on what wages it shall serve, this is but a modified serfdom ; which, pressed to its limit, would mean, that the labourers, like other slaves, shall be fed and clothed barely well enough to sustain their working powers. But those who enact such unjust laws under a system of nominal liberty, never dare to avow the meaning and aim of the process ; but artfully veil its iniquity by specious phrases and pretensions ; and corrupt the consciences of the very class whom they oppress, by affecting to make them par-

takers of the unrighteous gain. Such is the deceptiveness of class legislation, that it has needed the cool and far-reaching inquiries of science to expose it to the literary student, and the sufferings of half a century to press it on the notice of "freeborn Englishmen." Indeed, it is but two or three years, since it was imagined that *Free Trade*, however good for Townsmen, was a bad thing for Peasants and Farmers. Because we are accustomed to see in towns the operations of trade conducted on the largest scale and within the narrowest compass of time and space, it was forgotten that every workman is a trader;—that a farmer produces cattle or corn, as articles for the market;—that a peasant brings into the same market, as his only commodity, his labour, wishing to get in exchange as much as possible of all the good things there set forth for sale. But the sufferings of millions, the enlightened liberality of hundreds, and the untiring energies of a few men,—to whose eminent services futurity will do homage,—have made it clear before all the world that Freedom of Trade means Freedom of Industry; that the so-called "Protection" is a robbing of the many to enrich the few; and that the class whose military superiority once enabled it to plunder with a high hand, has in these more decorous ages abused its senatorial functions, to raise its rent-rolls by legislating for the public starvation. This was a fearful deed to do, and it may seem a fearful thing that the nation has at length discovered it. And now comes the question: Will the matter rest here? or are we to look with anxiety to extensive political changes, as necessary results of the breach of trust thus brought home upon our landed aristocracy?

Such anxieties not unnaturally suggest themselves, on considering the operations now in process for attaining the county franchise. A property of forty shillings a-year, clear value, may be estimated as equivalent to fifty pounds sterling of ready money; so that it seems, our law has pronounced, that the House of Commons, so far as county members are concerned, shall be elected by the possessors of £50 and upwards; the poorest elector having legal votes equal to the richest. This certainly appears intensely democratic, considering the overwhelming superiority of the Commons, when united and determined, over the Sove-



reign and the Lords together. A foreigner might imagine, that the power thus conferred on the mass of the industrious had been extorted from the aristocracy by the celebrated Act of Reform: and great, probably, would be his surprise, to learn, that it is older than that Act; and that the most thoroughly *ochlocratic* portions of that great measure were introduced at the express desire of the Tory landlords. In the excitement of the contest, the democratic tendencies of the Reform Bill were exaggerated both by friends and foes; but a short trial showed, that the Whig statesmen who originated the new settlement had been actuated by a genuine Conservative policy. When the Bill had become Law, no one saw more quickly than Sir Robert Peel how unfavourable to popular enthusiasm, and how useful to long-sighted policy, was that part of it which concerned the registration of voters. This point alone, even if the franchise had been still wider, would have gone far to cripple democratic impulse, if men who had become accustomed to turn the public purse to their private convenience could have learned in time to be prudent. But—as in the free states of antiquity, so in modern England—the oligarchy uses the dependent poor and the needy mob as its tool or its screen, when attacking the middle classes and the thriving labourers: and our landed gentry,—who amended the Reform Bill to make it more democratic, while exclaiming against democratic innovation,—first set the example of “working” these clauses for their own especial benefit. Leases were split between a farmer and his sons in order to multiply votes which the landlord could command; and by means of the forty shilling freeholds in the hands of numerous dependents, the decision of the county elections rested with the great proprietors. This is the critical fact which will unnerve the landlords in the approaching contest. They remember that when Wellington and Peel carried the Bill for Catholic Emancipation, Ireland had to forfeit, as purchase-money, the system of forty shilling freeholds, which had passed out of the hand of the landlord into that of the priest: and if they could, they would gladly imitate that precedent. But Ireland was then constrained by England; and by what shall England herself be constrained? At the time of the Reform Bill it

might have been done, if the party so long in power could have been less selfish and therefore more wise. It might then have pleaded that forty shillings in the reign of Henry VII. (to which time Hallam traces this limitation of the franchise), when meat was less than a halfpenny a pound, should equitably be translated into fifteen or twenty pounds sterling of our more plentiful currency and in our greater proportionate wealth. They might also have opposed, as absurd, the enactment, by which a man who has an annual return of £4 in one county is made equal to him who has but £2; though, if the £4 be split into two counties, it confers votes in each. In short, had they sought to improve the bill, with a view to the public good, they might have done much or everything for their own future power; but by their characteristic system of considering nothing on principle, but everything with a view to their own immediate predominance, they have certainly brought us within view of a more democratic franchise than England has ever seen; and as they have zealously worked it for their own purposes, they will not dare to make any public effort against the use of the very same weapons by the population of our towns. What, we ask, is to come of this discovery of the power which the lower classes may seize?

Happily, a very great security against rash and violent proceedings is afforded by the very nature of the recent movement. The people wish to be industrious; and they complain that the law keeps them in idleness, and of course in penury, whenever our harvests are unprosperous. The firstfruits of their victory over a bad law, will be,—increased industry and increasing wealth: the best of all possible guarantees that no unsubstantial imaginations will be allowed to impel them to the pursuit of further organic change. It is rather to be hoped, that the ambitious spirits which were on the whole rightminded and good in the Chartist movement, will now seek to enfranchise themselves and their fellows according to the existing law, and that the evilminded will be unable to arouse any interest in unpractical or unpracticable schemes.

At the same time, the present movement of the League, although grounded upon a democratic franchise, is extremely far from a strengthening of democracy, in the low

sense of the word. The franchises which are thus suddenly purchased, are evidently purchased out of abundance, not out of indigence. Men who can pay down, almost at a week's notice, three or four sums of sixty pounds sterling, do not belong to the ranks of the poor. Moreover, those who thus put out money in freehold investment, mean to use their votes for a public purpose. They must calculate on having the means of leaving their business and travelling at their own expense to the poll, when the days of election arrive. No one can imagine that they expect to be remunerated by the candidate whom they favour; much less is there the least danger of their votes becoming venal. It is, therefore, on the whole, most distinctly a movement on the part of the substantial, independent, and industrious part of the middle classes, to obtain and use that portion of influence over national legislation, to which their property and intelligence fully entitles them. From their increased power, no new principles of politics are to be expected, but only a more thorough working out of principles avowed and professed. They may probably insist on extirpating the still rotten boroughs, and refusing to allow small constituencies to return members to Parliament. This will be but a carrying out of Lord Grey's principle, that the House of Commons should be formed by representation, not by nomination: and in so far as this perfecting of the Reform Bill will extinguish intimidation and bribery, it will lessen all desire for the vote by Ballot. It need hardly be added, that the larger the constituency shall become under the existing law, the more enfeebled will the desire and power become to introduce a new principle of franchise. On every side, therefore, the present move for the County Freeholds seems to be conservative of our existing organization, though directed to infuse a new spirit into the mode of working it.

But other and more gradual means of extending the franchise are arising, yet more democratic in their aspect; among which the Building Societies, which are already coming into favour with working men, deserve attention in the present connection. Their plan is, to advance money for the purpose of building or buying a house, which will confer freehold rights upon the

possessor; who mortgages the property to the Company until such time as he shall have discharged the debt; but becomes a freeholder of the county from the day of his occupation. As far as wealth is concerned, men in very low station may thus attain the franchise; for by tenantry their own homes, they save house-rent, which makes the process of enfranchisement almost inexpensive; while to lay up money in the visible form of a house, by redeeming the mortgage, is to most more satisfactory than to lodge it in a Savings Bank, and yields them a better interest. The system is quite in its infancy; yet there appear to be, in its moral aspect, considerable checks against abuse, and valuable ends to be gained. None will be likely to reside permanently in their own house, but men of fixed and steady character, who feel sure of regular work in the same neighbourhood: nor will the Societies ever be willing to advance money, except to those who have a superior reputation for general trustworthiness. We may infer that the system will of itself sift out the worthier part of the labouring class, and in so far as it prevails, will confer the franchise on them exclusively. At the same time, if the desire of a political voice should induce many of the working men to become proprietors of their own homes, out of this will rapidly grow many substantial improvements. Fixedness of occupation and independence will impart a new tone to their feeling; and the direct moral benefit,—even were the action of these Societies carried to their furthest limit,—must, we hope, more than overbalance any political inconvenience that might be apprehended. A new class will grow up, and will exert some influence on public events; but as it will have “a stake in the country,” it will soon become conservative of pecuniary interests, and capable of imbibing much from contact with older elements. Our aristocracy, in country and town, has been so overwhelmingly powerful hitherto, that a large infusion of opposite tendency could be borne, not only without inconvenience, but with advantage. If the democratic energy should reach its height, a lingering struggle might be expected, during which each party would learn to moderate its demands, or its expectations: but no convulsive crisis that could now be predicted, would even then seem to threaten us,—idleness and starvation by law being exterminated. Far more probable is it,

that when the industry of the country is unimpeded, the less educated majority will be too busy and too prosperous to take any great practical interest in political movements; and that local improvements and other details will absorb the general concern, in spite of the efforts which will be made by agitators of another class to imitate the proceedings of the League.

Although the forty shilling freehold, which has recently assumed so much importance, is of so old a date, it would perhaps be an error to undervalue the importance of the Reform Act in re-animating it. The expectations and the enthusiasm awakened by that measure, have given an important stimulus,—for good and evil,—to the whole national mind; and have made it impossible to tamper with the public liberties as in former days. If the League had been born a generation earlier, and had endeavoured to carry out its plans under Sidmouth, Castlereagh and Vansittart, stringent acts of Parliament would have been passed expressly to stop it. Indeed, if we mistake not, the legal doctrine of conspiracy, as lately propounded by the Chief Justice of Ireland, would suffice to condemn the League; but had this failed, plots would have been conjured up for the occasion, by help of the secret service-money and venal spies; the leading spokesmen would have been put under arrest, and accused perhaps of high treason; or the Habeas Corpus Act have been suspended. The massacre of Peterloo, in contrast to the tranquil discussions of the Free Trade Hall, which stands, we believe, nearly on the spot of that melancholy event, speaks volumes as to the change of the times, and bids us congratulate ourselves that our lot is cast better than that of our immediate fathers.

But in speculating on the consequences of the great commercial revolution, which we trust we may say is just at hand, or certainly cannot be long delayed, we will venture to call particular attention to one point;—the due filling up of all chasms between class and class. No small part of the strength of our aristocracy has depended on the insensible degrees by which it shades off into the commons. Our baronets and country squires on the one side, our bankers and merchants, lawyers and judges, on another, have afforded it a bridge of transition, and have

allowed it to receive perpetual accessions of fresh blood, talent and property. Hence our peerage has been called the "most upstart nobility in Europe;" which, however fair a sarcasm against it, when it assumes airs of haughtiness, is the real secret of its intrinsic power. But while we find the upper portion of the middle classes,—all, in short, who are currently called *gentry*,—admirably cemented to the highest, a just complaint has been made that the same gradations do not exist in the lower parts of the social scale. In the metropolis indeed, and some other old cities, the wealthiest retail tradesmen touch upon, or are reckoned in, the *gentry*, while the poorest shopkeepers come down to the level of the humble mechanic or domestic servant. But in the manufacturing towns they are not sufficient to fill up the gap between the rich and the poor: nor only so, but in each particular business the larger capitals have shown a tendency to drive out the small; so that a sort of internal discontinuity arises, impeding the passage from class to class. This has been keenly inveighed against by the advocates of monopoly, who have described the great manufacturers as bloated monsters enriched by other people's poverty. It has been willingly forgotten, that the very same flaw disfigures the country districts; in which small proprietors have been almost exterminated; where the rise of labourers into farmers is unheard of, and for mere farmers to become landed proprietors is exceedingly rare. In town and country alike, the large properties have been swallowing up the small. This indicates wide-spread and overruling causes, not local avarice or the accident of particular occupations. The result indeed has been far more signal and marked in the country, than in the towns; as can be shown by comparing the present holdings of property with those of a century ago:—a subject of great interest, on which we trust that more exact details will before long be given to the public.—But whence does the phenomenon proceed? To attribute it entirely to *one* cause, might be rash; nor have we materials for a full investigation of it, as it has actually occurred among us. Yet it is easy to point to at least one cause, which is known to have existed, and to have acted in this direction; we mean, the lowering of profits. We here use the term with unscientific latitude, to imply all increased difficulty of accumu-



lating, which a poorer man encounters; whether from the expensiveness of the necessities of life, measured in his labour; or from the want of profitable investments for the little which he has begun to lay up. Although skilled artisans earn a high remuneration among us, and in our manufacturing towns labour in general is well paid, yet the value of their wages is much reduced through the high prices of food, of fresh air and clean water; their constitutions are exhausted by the want of natural tonics and healthy relaxation, and great numbers of them are no better off than the peasant who earns but half or a third part of their wages. Still more difficult is the position of the small capitalist; who has found his gross profits very variable and on an average small, competition severe, and all his most needful expenses high. The very large capital needed to start with success in any business, is an obvious result of the low rate of profits. In the United States of America no inconvenience of the sort exists, and the fact deserves to be noted. If we impute it to their abundant possession of unappropriated land,—an hypothesis not wholly false, though not in itself the whole cause,—freedom of trade will approximately impart to us the very same advantages. On the other hand, we cannot attribute our low rate of profits on capital, our workmen taking too large a share of the gross profits; for the American labourer gets higher wages still. Evidently then it must depend on their total gain being greater than with us; and whenever our industry is as free as theirs, we have every reason to expect that our humbler capitalists will enjoy the same advantages. Upon the abolition of all restrictions on trade, the reward of labour will become more sure, and on the average greater, while employment will be far more constant, without the revulsions and stagnations now periodically suffered. At the same time, the whole world being thrown open to English capital, with an immense demand for it upon the soil of England also, it seems quite impossible that, for a length of time to come, accumulation, however rapid, should be able to keep pace with the increase of profitable investments; and a rise in profits generally, as well as in the interest of money, may be anticipated; both of which are of extreme importance for fostering small capitals.



The owner of many thousands becomes sensibly richer year by year if he can clear a net profit of only 5 per cent. ; but he who possesses a single hundred needs some greater stimulus to recompense his abstinence from immediate enjoyment : and a very low rate of interest exposes the little fortunes to great peril from wild schemes of speculation, which offer a slight increase of return. Miscalculations will always exist ; but they are least to be dreaded when the investments competing with one another are numerous, different in kind, and unchanging from season to season ; and when the steady and well-known sources of revenue yield a high profit. It is, we believe, a common idea, that low interest of money implies public prosperity ; but this, surely, must be a confusion of thought. When a government which desires to borrow, is forced to pay high interest, *solely because it is insecure to lend*, that, certainly, is an undesirable state of things ; but it appears scarcely possible for gains to be permanently raised, without a rising of the interest of money ; or for gains to be depressed, without interest falling. In what proportion the increased productiveness of labour shall go to raise wages, or to remunerate capital, is to us at present a secondary consideration. The general result must be, to make it easier for the workman to become master of a small establishment ; for the peasant to rise into a farmer ; and for the small proprietor to live in independence. The most threatening danger of our social state will thus be obviated, and our lower and middle classes will become cemented together as indissolubly as the gentry to the nobility. England has immense moral advantage over her American colonies in variety of social elements ; and when our different ranks are brought into healthy contact, and a freer circulation between them all is established, we anticipate that ere long it will be visible, that neither physically nor morally have we any cause to envy our Trans-Atlantic brethren. Our great business for a half century at least, is, to show, that without revolution or upturning of political institutions, an industrious, intelligent and inventive population may be as happy, as wealthy, and as wise, on this side the Atlantic as in the far West.

## ART. VI.—THEODORE PARKER'S DISCOURSE OF RELIGION.

*A Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion.* By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Second Church in Roxburg, Mass. Boston: 1842.

It is a dishonourable characteristic of the present age, that on its most marked intellectual tendencies is impressed a character of FEAR. While its great practical agitations exhibit a progress towards some positive and attainable good, all its conspicuous movements of thought seem to be mere retreats from some apprehended evil. Its new sects are the results of certain prevalent antipathies, and are like herds flying from a common repulsion. The open plain of meditation, over which, in simpler times, earnest men might range with devout and unmolested hope, bristles all over with directions, showing which way we are *not* to go. Turn where we may, we see warnings to beware of some sophist's pitfall, or Devil's ditch, or Fool's Paradise, or Atheist's desert, or enclosure of the elect, with its "*procul este profani*." A despair of truth seizes our timid and degenerate men. Checked and frightened at the entrance of every path on which they venture, they spend their strength in standing still; or devise ingenious proofs, that, in a world where periodicity is the only progress, retrogradation is the discreetest method of advance. The first Tractarians were evidently men not unused to explore the grounds and seek the limits of religious faith; and having pushed forward over this vast field till it was trackless except by heretic feet, they were startled at their position; hid their faces, and refused to look into the distance; grew terrified at their own lengthening shadow, and felt as though at its further extremity it were already dipping into some dread abyss. The recoil of Coleridge, and more recently of the Cambridge men, from the philosophy of Locke, is no less clearly an act of repugnance; a shrinking from consequences which it was not expedient to meet. And now, a certain spectral monster, called "Transcendentalism," disturbs the serenity of conventional believers, and produces an excitement greatly

disproportioned to its alleged feeble and unsubstantial nature. Those who report upon it declare that they plainly discern it in many places, and can trace all its approaches; they pronounce it, at the same time, the most bewildered of chimeras,—in fact, entirely destitute of eyesight: yet wherever it gropes its way, it produces, like the hunter in blind-man's-buff, first an audible rustling in the childish crowd, and then a shooting off in all practicable radii. But it has always been the way with ghosts, to do little, and to scare much. This intellectual cowardice,—connected, like all cowardice, with an unloving and cruel temper,—is a fatal indication of religious decline; and a source of the imbecility of the pulpit, compared with the power of the secular press. Religion no longer thinks, soliloquizes, and is overheard in worship; but stands consciously in the presence of a host of enemies, and elaborates its defence and plans its attack. Theologies, philosophies arise, not now as the simple tent which the soul would pitch, and where it would abide, and whence look forth, under the shelter of sufficient faith from the natural inclemencies of this universe; but as shot-proof fortifications, built with engineering skill, to protect some threatened treasure, and defy some formidable artillery. Anxiety for a *safe* creed, and, from reaction, indifference to all creed, are the two bad sentiments with which priestly influence has impregnated the mind of Europe, in place of the natural desire for a *true* creed. The rarity with which doctrines connected with morals and divinity are looked at with a single eye to their truth or falsehood, is disheartening to those who know what this symptom implies. The fear of doubt is already a renunciation of faith. With all the talk of infidelity in this age, no one has more certainly a heart of unbelief than he who cannot simply trust himself to the realities of God; who cannot say, 'If here there be light, let us use it gladly; if otherwise, let us go into the dark, where heaven ordains; owning our helplessness, we shall feel the Invisible Presence near us keeping his holy watch: but pretending that we see, we shall be left to a bleak and lonely night.'

To those who are haunted with fears lest "neological" speculation should undermine the foundations of religion,

it must be consolatory to remember, that though mankind, according to the testimony of divines, have always been on the point of renouncing their belief in God, they have never actually done so. On the appearance of every great class of discoveries in physical Science, every large extension of ancient chronology, every new school of metaphysics, the danger has been announced as imminent : yet the Atheism of the world, like the Millennium of the Church, is a catastrophe which continues to be postponed. The researches which assigned a high antiquity to the dynasties of Egypt and the mythologies of India, were charged with audacity for trespassing beyond the Flood, and even passing without notice by the gates of Eden ; as if in fixing the place of Menes, and finding the origin of the sagas, the Creator was superseded, and the world abandoned to fatalism. The great geological periods, descending by colossal steps down into the darkness of the past eternity, were thought to conduct into the chambers of a godless necessity. The theory which admits, and the theory which denies, the " Necessary Connection" between Cause and Effect, have both been accused of hostility to the first principles of natural theology, and have both been employed to invalidate them. And the attempt to evade the danger by resolving all assignable powers into the activity of God, is condemned as mischievously Pantheistic, melting away every divine element from life in the solvent of indiscriminate mysticism. Yet, after all these shocks, the theoretic faith of men stands fast, and the shelter of a divine rule is felt to overarch us still. Amid the vicissitudes of the intellect, worship retains its stability : and the truth which, it would seem, cannot be proved, is unaffected by an infinite series of refutations. How evident that it has its ultimate seat, not in the mutable judgments of the understanding, but in the native sentiments of Conscience, and the inexhaustible aspirations of Affection ! The supreme certainty must needs be too true to be proved : and the highest perfection can appear doubtful only to Sensualism and Sin.

Gladly then do we gird up our hearts to follow the bold and noble steps of Theodore Parker over the ample province of thought which he traverses in his *Discourse on Religion*.

However startling the positions to which he conducts us, and however breathless the impetuosity with which he hurries on, the region over which he flies is no dream-land, but a *real* one, which *will* be laid down truly or falsely in the minds of reflecting men; his survey of it is grand and comprehensive, complete in its boundaries, if not always accurate in its contents; and the glass of clear and reverential faith through which he looks at all things, presents the most familiar objects in aspects beautiful and new. The book treats in orderly succession of every topic interesting to the religious philosopher, and needful to be handled in the construction of a positive faith. It opens with a discussion of the Metaphysics of Religion, distributed over two Books; in the first of which the psychological sources of worship are investigated and traced through their manifestations in Fetichism, Polytheism, Monotheism; while in the second, the passage is made to the Ontological conclusions which the religious sentiment demands, and, in determining the relations of God to Nature and to the Soul, the questions of Miracle and Inspiration are reviewed. This leads to the Historical and Critical theology of the two succeeding books; the first treating of Jesus of Nazareth personally, the source of his authority, the essence of his religion, the attributes of his character; the second, of the Hebrew Records by which his nation is known to us, and the Greek in which the impression of himself and his disciples is handed down; the claims of their origin, the credibility of their contents, and the just limits to our veneration for their statements. A concluding Book examines the origin, organization, and distribution of the Church; and estimates the merits and defects of its Romish, its Protestant, and its Philosophical parties. So vast a mass of matter, requiring for its management a very various skill, cannot, it may be supposed, be dealt with by one man, and in one volume, otherwise than superficially. Yet there is a mastery shown over every element of the great subject, and the slight treatment of it in parts no reader can help attributing to the plan of the work, rather than to the incapacity of the Author. From the resources of a mind singularly exuberant by nature and laboriously enriched by culture, a system of results is here thrown up, and spread out in luminous exposition: and though the processes are

often imperfectly indicated by which they have been reached, they so evidently come from the deep and vital action of an understanding qualified to mature them, that an opponent who might stigmatise the *book* as superficial, would never venture to call the *author* so. There are few men living, we suspect, who would like to have a controversy with him on any one of his many heresies. The references in his notes, though often only general, are, when needful, sufficiently specific and various to show an extent of reading truly astonishing in so young a writer: yet the glow and brilliancy of his page prove that the accumulated mass of other men's thought and learning has been but the fuel of his own genius. The copiousness of German erudition, systematized with a French precision, seems here to have been absorbed by a mind having the moral massiveness, the hidden tenderness, the strong enthusiasm, of an English nature. The least perfect of his achievements appears to us to be the metaphysical: he is too ardent to preserve self-consistency throughout the parts of a large abstract scheme; too impetuous for the fine analysis of intricate and evanescent phenomena. His philosophical training, however, gives him great advantages in his treatment of concrete things and his views of human affairs: and in nothing would he, in our opinion, more certainly excel than in history,—whether the history of thought and knowledge, or of society and institutions. As to the *form* in which our Author presents his ideas, our readers must judge of that from the passages we may have occasion to quote. We have small patience at any time with the criticisms on style in which “Belles Lettres men” and rhetoricians delight: and where we speak to one another of the solemn mysteries of life and duty and God, such things affect us like a posture-master's discussion of Christ's sitting attitude in the Sermon on the Mount, or some prudish milliner's critique on the penitent wiping his feet with her hair. Men who neither think nor feel, but only learn, pretend, and imitate, may make an *art* out of the deepest utterances of the human soul: but from these histrionic beings, who would applaud the “elocution” of Isaiah, and study the “delivery” of a “Father, forgive them,” such a man as Theodore Parker recalls us with a joyful shame. “Thought,” said Plato, “is the soul's hidden speech;” with our Author,



and all such, we have the obverse of this, viz., Speech, which is the soul's open Thought. He reasons, he meditates, he loves, he scorns, he weeps, he worships, *aloud*. It may be thought very improper that a man should thus publish *himself*, instead of some choice, decorous, excerpts, "fit for the public eye." As, in prayer to God, it is deemed, in these days, no sin to utter, instead of our real desires, something else which we should hold it decent to desire; so, in addressing men, it is esteemed wise, not to say, or even to inquire, what we *do* think, but to put forth what it might be as well to think. Weary of all this, and finding nothing but a holy dulness and sickly unreality in the conventional theology of the pulpit and the press, we delight in our Author's irrepressible unreserve. No doubt there are rash judgments; there is extravagant expression; the colouring of his emotions is sometimes too vivid; the edge of his indignation, too sharp. But he believes, and *therefore* does he speak. You have his mind. These things are true to him: and if not true in themselves, that is an objection to their substance, not to their style; the excessive force of which, while it drives the truth the deeper, lays the error more open to reply. It has become the practice, in matters of theology, always to suppose that a writer acts upon the "doctrine of reserve,"—which, by the way, Tractarian Jesuitry might have saved itself the trouble of recommending;—it is thought impossible that a divine should say simply what he means, nothing more, nothing less. Especially if he recedes from the traditional standard of his class, he is supposed to have "gone away backward" immeasurably beyond his apparent position. The heresies he produces are concluded to be a mere sample of the store he carries in his satchel: and every doubt he avows becomes a multiplying factor, capable of indefinite involution, and sure to reappear in terrible dimensions from the imagination of some accuser. We propose it as a problem to the curious; "Why men, particularly preachers, are rarely supposed to believe *more* than they profess; continually, *less*; scarcely ever, precisely that, and nothing else?" Is the instinctive shrewdness of the world mistaken in this impression? Not in the least. Secular common sense sees the matter as it is. And if the very existence of such a rule of interpretation does not



show how habitual to the clerical character, pretence or self-sophistication has become, we know not how to explain it. Nay, so well understood is the shameful fact, that it is openly alleged as a reason for further unvaracity. Experienced counsellors speak as if it were a regular law of the human mind to believe, not just what is told it, but something different. They advise us to compute this deflection, and allow for it. To the young soul, burning with guileless truth and love, they say, "Be cautious; do not disturb men's minds by novelties; let their harmless mistakes alone; they cannot safely do without them. Besides, you will be sure to be misunderstood, and supposed to go further than you do. You will really leave 'the truest impression' by a judicious silence, or a mere hint that these things are not to be put upon a level with 'essentials.'" That is to say, if we would obtain credence, we must give forth, not truth, but a lie. Past falsehoods are made the plea for present ones; and such as to-day is, will the morrow also be; and so on to the end of the chapter of hypocrisy; unless men arise who cannot hold the word that is in them, and will cast this diplomacy to the winds. And after all, it is only the false men that can long "misunderstand" the true; natural speech is not hard to the upright; it can put no one out of his reckoning, but those who miss in it the "hints" they have been accustomed to calculate, and their favourite "silence which speaks for itself." Honour then to the manly simplicity of Theodore Parker. Perish who may among Scribes and Pharisees,—*"orthodox liars for God,"*—*he* at least *"has delivered his soul."*

Of the noble spirit of truth that is in him, some idea may be formed from the following sketch of the preaching of Jesus:—

"Yet there were men who heard the new word. Truth never yet fell dead in the streets: it has such affinity with the soul of man, the seed, however broad-cast, will catch somewhere, and produce its hundredfold. Some kept his sayings and pondered them in their heart. Others heard them gladly. Did priests and Levites stop their ears? Publicans and harlots went into the kingdom of God before them. Those blessed women, whose hearts God has sown deepest with the orient pearl of faith; they who ministered to him in his wants, washed his feet with tears of penitence, and wiped them with the hairs of their head, was it in vain he spoke to them? Alas for the anointed priest, the child of Levi, the son of Aaron,

men who shut up inspiration in old books, and believed God was asleep. They stumbled in darkness, and fell into the ditch. But doubtless there was many a tear-stained face that brightened like fires new stirred as Truth spoke out of Jesus' lips. His word swayed the multitude as pendant vines swing in the summer wind; as the spirit of God moved on the waters of chaos, and said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light. No doubt many a rude fisherman of Gennesareth heard his words with a heart bounding and scarce able to keep in his bosom, went home a new man, with a legion of angels in his breast, and from that day lived a life divine and beautiful. No doubt, on the other hand, Rabbi Kozeb Ben Shatan, when he heard of this eloquent Nazarene, and his Sermon on the Mount, said to his disciples in private at Jerusalem, This new doctrine will not injure us, prudent and educated men; we know that men may worship as well out of the temple as in it; a burnt-offering is nothing; the ritual of no value; the Sabbath like any other day: the Law faulty in many things, offensive in some, and no more from God than other laws equally good. We know that the priesthood is a human affair, originated and managed like other human affairs. We may confess this to ourselves, but what is the use of telling it? The people wish to be deceived; let them. The Pharisee will conduct wisely like a Pharisee—for he sees the eternal fitness of things—even if these doctrines should be proclaimed. But this people, who know not the law, what will become of them? Simon Peter, James and John, those poor unlettered fishermen, on the lake of Galilee, to whom we gave a farthing and the priestly blessing in our summer excursion, what will become of them when told that every word of the Law did not come straight out of the mouth of Jehovah, and the ritual is nothing? They will go over to the Flesh and Devil, and be lost. It is true, that the Law and the Prophets are well summed up in one word, Love God and man. But never let *us* sanction the saying, it would ruin the seed of Abraham; keep back the kingdom of God, and 'destroy our usefulness.' Thus went it at Jerusalem. The new word was 'Blasphemy,' the new prophet an 'Infidel,' 'beside himself, had a devil.' But at Galilee, things took a shape somewhat different; one which blind guides could not foresee. The common people, not knowing the Law, counted him a prophet come up from the dead, and heard him gladly. Yes, thousands of men, and women also, with hearts in their bosoms, gathered in the field and pressed about him in the city and the desert place, forgetful of hunger and thirst, and were fed to the full with his words, so deep a child could understand them; James and John leave all to follow him who had the word of eternal life; and when that young carpenter asks Peter, Whom sayest thou that I am? it has been revealed to

that poor unlettered fisherman, not by flesh and blood, but by the word of the Lord, and he can say, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. The Pharisee went his way, and preached a doctrine that he knew was false; the fisherman also went his way; but which to the Flesh and the Devil?

"We cannot tell, no man can tell, the feelings which the large free doctrines of absolute Religion awakened when heard for the first time. There must have been many a Simeon waiting for the consolation; many a Mary longing for the better part; many a soul in cabins and cottages and stately dwellings, that caught glimpses of the same truth as God's light shone through some crevice which Piety made in that wall Prejudice and Superstition had built up betwixt man and God; men who scarce dared to trust that revelation—'too good to be true'—such was their awe of Moses, their reverence for the priest. To them the word of Jesus must have sounded divine; like the music of their home sung out in the sky, and heard in a distant land, beguiling toil of its weariness, pain of its sting, affliction of despair. There must have been men, sick of forms which had lost their meaning; pained with the open secret of sacerdotal hypocrisy; hungering and thirsting after the truth, yet whom Error, and Prejudice and Priestcraft had blinded so that they dared not think as men, nor look on the sun-light God shed upon the mind."—B. III. ch. vii. p. 305.

To discuss worthily any one of the many great topics over which this volume carries us is impossible within the compass of a review. We shall endeavour to go at once to the bottom of the matter, and fix our attention on the real point of divergence between the author and his opponents. It is useless to dispute about the proof of the miracles, while we are at issue respecting their value, when proved; to inquire into the Inspiration of prophets and apostles, without first determining what "inspiration" means; to talk about the evidences of "Revealed" Religion, till we have agreed upon the distinction between "Nature" and "Revelation;" to balance the comparative claims of the Bible on one hand, and "Reason and Conscience" on the other, till we are sure that a book and a mental faculty *can* become proper competitors, and find a common field of rivalry. An inconsiderate reasoner is little aware, how completely figurative are all theological formulas, implying a whole system of conceptions which they do not name, and which may not be held in common by himself and his opponent. It is in the *suppressed*

*matter* of every religious controversy that the real disagreement will be found: and until the moral and psychological assumptions are drawn out, which dictate the phraseology of belief, discussion must continue to be an aimless battle of words.

The scheme of belief, which has given rise to Theodore Parker's reaction, may be summed up in these words: That Christianity is a divine *message*, imparted to *teach us our duty*, and to *present the sanctions of a future life*: and that this message is *proved to be from God*, by accompanying *miracles*,—the characteristic marks of his agency. We are so accustomed to this kind of language, that the real contents of it escape our notice. Let us carefully draw out the conceptions which it involves, with respect both to the divine nature and to the human mind.

As divine agency has an appropriate mark by which we may distinguish it, it is thus separated from other agencies, to which we should else refer the phænomena submitted to our examination. By the help of this mark we are enabled to say, 'This is from Heaven.' Take away this mark, and we can no longer say, 'This is from Heaven.' God, therefore, is *one of a plurality of causes* now operative in the universe: and is discriminated, by a characteristic of his own, from other members of the general class of "powers."

The characteristic in question by which his phænomena are recognised, is their *miraculous* nature. Without pausing to make any exact analysis of this phrase, we may consider it as denoting *departure from Law*. This will be admitted to be no incorrect statement of the feature we expect in any event claiming to be a miracle. In order, therefore, to rescue a phænomenon from other Causes and refer it to God, it must be exceptional and out of course in relation to the general order of the known world.

So long as this peculiarity *cannot* be shown to belong to it, the other Causes retain their claim upon it, and the attempt to refer it to the divine agency is unsuccessful. That is to say, *wherever Law is, God is not; and where God is, Law is not*. The boundary line thus drawn,—where does it pass? what lies within it,—what beyond? The realm of Law is co-extensive with Nature, as an object of human study. *Science* is but our register of phenomenal laws;

and nothing which can ask for entry there can be anomalous. Science, however, is excluded from no department of the material or mental creation. From the bed of the ocean to the clusters of the milky way, it passes with its detective instruments of Number and of Measure, and never without the discovery, or at least the augury, of order. Whenever it alights on a fresh region, the first confusion begins instantly to show signs of an incipient symmetry, and the ranks of established law pass the confines which had arrested them, and spread their lines over the new realm. This then is a province actually conquered from God; as philosophy, with its "forces," advances, His power is dislodged in our belief, and retreats; and every fresh occupation effected by human knowledge is an expulsion executed upon the divine energy. That this is the sentiment really entertained by the upholders of the prevalent theology, is evident from the reluctance with which they admit any unexpected extension of the dominion of law. To find a rule of order, where they had fancied only insulated and anomalous volitions, seems to them like a loss of God. Who can doubt that this feeling is at the foundation of the hostility displayed against the "*Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation?*" The author has no doubt committed errors in detail, and availed himself of questionable hypotheses, in order to connect the parts of his system, and complete his generalisation. But the detection of these imperfections has been sought with an eagerness not to be misunderstood; and has brought relief to the awe-struck imagination of many a reader, to whom the spreading tracks of law, as they pushed their perspective deeper and deeper into the wilderness of phenomena, seemed but a highway for the exile of his God. Science thus becomes burdened with a tremendous responsibility: wherever it works, it is engaged in superseding Deity: it drops, as a deadly night-shade, on a cluster of phenomena, benumbing all that was divine; and as the narcotic circle widens, the awful sleep extends.

It would be unjust however to stop at this point in our development of the scheme in question. Nothing can be further from the minds of its advocates, than to snatch the whole domain of law from the Supreme Rule. They bring

this also under the sway, not indeed of his present, but of his past volition; completing their system by the maxim, implied if not expressed, that where Law *is*, God *was*. Order, they affirm, requires a *Mind* to set it on foot, and carries with it the traces of antecedent Thought: no other causes are adequate for its explanation. The theory therefore sums itself up in this: that God, as an Agent, is excluded from the sphere of Order during its continuance, but is required for its commencement. "True;" may the objector say, "*if* it ever commence at all. Putting myself back in imagination, as I doubt not you are doing, to a state of supposed chaos, and stripping the universe, as far as my conception can effect it, of all the forces which you admit to be operative *now*, I may grant that, out of this lawless confusion, law could not spontaneously arise; and that *if* ever there were a time, when Space was yet a seed-field of infinite, undetermined possibilities, nothing but a Mind could make election from such prior conditions, and elicit this definite creation and no other. But what reason have we for assuming the antecedence of any such state of things? Why am I to suppose a time when there were no dynamic elements? What trace has electricity or gravity of a modern origin,—of origin at all? If such power acts now,—acted yesterday,—and has left its traces on structures immeasurably old,—where is the date past which it is irrational to run back its agency? Your proposition therefore is true as an hypothesis; but your hypothesis cannot be legitimated as a reality."

That *Order commencing* requires a *Mind* to produce it, may therefore be acknowledged by Atheist as well as Theist: that *Order existing* is beyond the reach of other and mere "natural" causes, must be denied by both. Indeed, the assertion is manifestly false, upon the principles of the scheme under review, and stands in direct contradiction to its assumption, that where Law is, God is not. What *are* those "other causes" which are incompetent to the case? Doubtless, such physical forces as we have before referred to,—electricity, gravity, &c. And to what *are* these powers adequate, if *not* to produce orderly phenomena? Name the sphere within which their explanation is valid, since it fails wherever uniformity is found. How do we know them as causes at all, except by the regularity of

their effects, completing a determinate cycle of successions, and affording us fixed rules of expectation? What are all our books of Science but expositions of regular and beautiful phenomena,—nay, of *all* the regularity and beauty within the circle of our knowledge,—distinctly referred to these very causes? They account for order; or they account for nothing.

Everything then, in this form of Theism, depends on our ability to find some proof of the recency or commencement of the existing “forces of nature.” Can any one produce such proof? Dr. Crombie confesses the failure of every attempt at metaphysical demonstration of this point: and resorts, as a last refuge, to certain physical and other indications impressed on the system of the world, at variance, as he thinks, with any great antiquity in the dynamics of the universe.\* Of what kind are these indications? Why, the supposed resistance of an ether or of the sun’s light to the planetary revolutions,—showing that the solar system will have an end and must have had a beginning: and the recent origin of the human species. The known energies of nature being inadequate to account for the origination of these structures, a divine source is indispensable. But what if,—with our advancing knowledge,—the “energies of nature” should be found *not* inadequate to the explanation, and the effects in question should enter the dominion of law? Are we in that case to turn Atheists? It would appear so, on this theory;—a theory, in which God is invoked only as a supplementary Cause, to eke out the imperfections of other powers, for ever spreading their acknowledged achievements to the prejudice and peril of his sovereignty; and all is staked on our *not finding a solution* for this or that scientific perplexity. Religion poises itself on a trembling apex, if this be really the footing on which it stands.†

\* Natural Theology, Vol. I. ch. i. § 10, 11.

† M. Comte, in his remarkable work, ‘Cours de Philosophie Positive,’ assumes this to be the real state of the relation between Science and Religion: and accordingly decides that there is “an inevitable antipathy between research into the real laws of phenomena and the inquiry respecting their essential causes:” he treats as chimerical all attempts to remove the “radical incompatibility” between Theology and Positive Philosophy: and, relying on the irresistible scientific tendency of the modern European mind, entertains confident hopes of getting rid of the “Hypothesis of a God!” Tome IV. 51<sup>e</sup> Leçon.



The truth is, the Theist who takes this ground has made a concession false in itself, and fatal to his argument. Yielding to the tendency, invariably created by inductive science, to confound together the notions of *Law* and *Cause*, he has admitted physical agencies to be real powers : and has thus put instruments into the hands of Atheism, with which he will in vain struggle to contend : his utmost skill can give him only a drawn battle. Once allow that Causes are of two sorts, living Will, and dead Forces, and the competition between them for the governance of the universe can never be determined. How alone can we proceed to make choice between two causes, both claiming the parentage of a given system of effects ? Assuredly, by seeking throughout these effects for some feature exclusively belonging to the one or the other of the causes in question. And where we have to account for a *limited series* of phenomena, we may hope to detect such signature of their origin ; they will display some peculiarity, in which they differ from other assortments of phenomena, and will so teach us something of the nature of their cause. But where the facts are absolutely infinite in number, and comprise all things, this method can lead to no result : because the phenomena observed, not being *this* set, or *that* set, but *all* sets,—the sum-total of what exists and what happens in the universe,—can have *no characteristic*,—no common property which other things have not ; for those “other things” are in your list as well as these ; and it is only by characteristics in the effect, that you can infer the nature of the Cause. A theology therefore which relinquishes the unity of causation, and permits science to dismember the idea and create a whole class of powers, performs an act of suicide. By equating the distinction between divine and non-divine with the difference between natural and non-natural, it surrenders, in our opinion, the very citadel of faith : turns the universe from a monotheistic temple into a Pantheon of philosophy, and whips out the worshipper to make way for the experimentalist.

The same system makes assumptions respecting man, to which it is quite as difficult to give assent, as to its representation of God. Revelation, we are assured, is to be conceived of as a *message*, proved by attendant miracles to be from heaven, and designed to *teach us our duty* and pre-

sent the *sanctions of a future life*. Our duty then is authenticated by the message; and the message by the Divine mark. What is this but to say, that from *God as known* we learn *duty as not known*? Nay, it is worse; for there is no other knowledge of God here supposed than a recognition of his *power*; and what is really implied is this,—that our Senses may know his *physical* mark, when our Conscience cannot tell his *moral* mark. The moral faculty is the dunce, whose dullness the senses, with their horn-book, undertake to instruct in the laws of right and wrong. When the lesson is learned by rote, it is enforced by the announcement of future retribution: and when carried into practice under this influence, the specific purpose of the Revelation, as above defined, is perfectly fulfilled. Yet it is plain that from a nature, assumed to be insensible to the intrinsic obligation of what is taught, nothing but external conduct, imitative of genuine and affectionate duty, can be obtained by this preceptive appeal to self-interest. And it would seem to follow, that Revelation accomplishes its characteristic end, when it has brought us to act, from prudential hope and fear, *as though we loved our neighbour and our God*. We are well aware that the supporters of this scheme do not practically attribute to human nature the moral stolidity which their theory suggests; they allow a considerable, but imperfect, perception of right and wrong. This however relieves no difficulty, and is an ineffectual compromise. The duties taught by the Revelation either accord with the moral perception addressed, or do not accord with it. If they do, then nothing beyond the natural law is given us. If they do not, then a collision arises between the requirements of miracle and the dictates of nature; and as the physical sign of God is assumed by the theory to be better known by us than his moral trace, and for this very reason adopted as the instrument of instruction, we ought at once to renounce the suggestions of Conscience, and do any wickedness which “the wonderful work” may recommend. Whoever shrinks from this conclusion acknowledges, that miracle cannot over-ride Reason and Conscience; that these powers have a *вето* on all professing enactments of almighty law; and supply a paramount natural inspiration diviner than any that is supernatural.

We are convinced that, notwithstanding all that is said  
CHRISTIAN TEACHER.—No. 31.

in praise of the "miraculous evidence," it is gradually loosening its hold on the minds even of its defenders. The indications of this are not to be mistaken. Attention is more and more drawn in and concentrated upon the great strong-hold, which we believe to be impregnable,—the resurrection of Christ,—an event whose *testimonial* character is, to say the least, very subordinate to its higher relations. The other miracles, so far from being deemed available as *media* of proof, are usually treated as the great *objects* of proof. They were once the affidavit; they are now the brief. And only those of them are heartily referred to, in which the *credential* element is lost and absorbed in their character of majesty or mercy, which enables the moral affections to quiet the cross-questionings of the understanding. Miracles in which the pure evidential ingredient is found unmixed, lie in the most unaccountable disuse, and appear even to excite an uncomfortable feeling. That Jesus paid a tax by having a fish caught with a shekel in his mouth, is not adduced to convince the doubting, of his divine authority: nor do we hear Paul's mission argued from the miracles wrought by his apron. Why not? These are genuine "*signs*," empty of all value *except* their significance as evidence: *this* however remains quite perfect in them; for they are surely as good proofs of superhuman power as any other miracles. They rest on the same testimony as the events most firmly believed. Yet is there any one who does not feel, that the testimony will scarcely bear the strain of these events? And who then will deny, that it is the *moral* element of Christian history that must authenticate the miraculous, not the *miraculous* that authenticates the moral?

The whole language of this scheme involves conceptions unworthy of the present capabilities, often below the present state, of religion among thoughtful and devout men. For the first disciples, themselves on earth, and constantly looking for Christ's return hither, it was only natural to imagine two spheres of being, with the wilderness of clouds and space between; the one, the scene of God's local presence, where Jesus "sat at the right hand of God:" the other, this world of waiting and of exile, which had nothing divine but as an express emanation from that upper sphere. Filled with the fancy of a physical distance be-

tween heavenly and human things, they fitly spoke of *Messengers* and *Ambassadors* of God, as we should of visitants from a foreign potentate. To treat the miracles as *Credentials* was a suitable thing, when such acts, though out of nature upon this lower earth and among ordinary men, were regarded as the established ways of the upper world to which Messiah belonged, and accepted as the overflow of his diviner nature upon his mortal career. And there was something in the way of positive information, startling enough to be described as a *Message* from God, to those who thought themselves apprised of the speedy Advent and approaching end of the world. This was to them a notice of an historic event, which would affect their whole course of action in the meanwhile. But all this is incapable of harmonising with our altered state. Our outward universe, our personal expectations, are totally different from theirs. Their one world, storehouse of heavenly things, has burst into ten thousand spheres, not one of which is nearer to the awful presence than our own. We are not remote from our Father, that he should have to *send* to us; there is no interval between. Nor are the universal principles of Faith and Duty, which constitute the essence of Christianity, so strange to our nature that we should treat them as a communication from foreign parts. There is no going and coming, no telegraph, or embassy, no interposition and retreat, no divine sleeping and waking, in pure religion. The human race is for ever at home with God; and his Inspiration, intensest in the soul of the Galilean, is fresh and open for every age.

The recoil of Theodore Parker from the received system is vehement, and, we certainly think, excessive. But there is great difficulty in giving an account of his scheme as a whole: for he is not an exact writer, scarcely a consistent thinker; and his convictions are rather a series of noble fragments, waiting adjustment by maturer toil, than a compact and finished structure. His vast reading, and his quick sympathy with what is great and generous of every kind, have given an eclectic character to his philosophy. His mind refuses to let go anything that is true and excellent; yet in adopting it takes insufficient pains to weave it into the fabric of his previous thought; so

that the texture of his faith presents a pattern not easy to reduce to symmetry. At one time he hates evil, like a Dualist; at another, pities it, like a Fatalist; now, melts away the human soul and becomes lost in the Universal Being, like a mystic; and then, brings out the individual free-will again with force and prominence worthy of a Stoic. Zeno and Spinoza seem to us to co-exist in his mind; but they have not struck up a mutual acquaintance.

Our Author argues from the religiosity of man to the reality of God; and concurs with Schleiermacher in regarding the *Sense of Dependence* as the source of human faith. The Sentiment of religion, like any other primitive want of our nature, doubtless directs itself to an object, not illusory, but actual; and that we "feel after" a perfect Being is enough to prove that he exists, and that we can "find Him." Thus is legitimated the "intuitive Idea of God," which is said to be the idea of "a Being infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodness." Of this "Idea" many things are affirmed, to which, we must confess, we can attribute no defensible meaning. It is said to be the "logical condition of all other ideas" (p. 21); and yet to be "afterwards fundamentally and logically established by the *à priori* argument" (p. 23). What media of proof can "establish" that which is the logical condition of those very media? It is also said to be primitive and simple, like the idea of "existence" (p. 22): and it puzzles us to think how that which is perfectly unique and simple, and destitute of characteristics, can be "logically established." And the account which our Author gives of this Idea does "*not*," he assures us, "*define* the nature of God, *but does distinguish our idea of Him from* all other ideas and conceptions whatever." This appears to us simply self-contradictory: and we cannot deny that there are many other things of the same sort. We could easily dismiss blemishes of this kind, arising from insufficient precision, if the looseness did not accumulate and condense itself into a doctrinal conception very seductive, but, in our opinion, very erroneous. The oscillation back from the atheistical tendencies of a cold and mechanical philosophy has generally flung the reasoner into Pantheism: and our Author has not, in our

opinion, escaped the danger,—if, at least, we must judge by the words of his theory, rather than by the spirit of his mind. Offended at the usurpation effected by “natural powers,” he has swept them *all* away, and drowned them in the ocean of the One Supreme. Shocked at the banishment of God as a living Agent from the actual scenes and recent ages of this world, he has revoked the Almighty Presence with such power as to make an absence of all else; and when we look round for the objects that should be His correlatives, the beings that should receive His regards, the theatre that was waiting for His energy, they are gone. Perhaps we shall be asked, “What then? Can there be in human faith an *excess* of Deity? Is there anything you would care to save from the general merging of all inferior causes?” Yes; we reply, there *is* one thing that must not be overwhelmed, even by an invasion of the Infinite Glory. Let all besides perish, if you will; but when you open the windows of heaven upon this godless earth, and bring back the sacred flood to swallow up each brute rebellious power, let there be an ark of safety built (it is Heaven’s own warning word) to preserve the *Human Will* from annihilation: for if this sink too, the divine irruption designed to purify, does but turn creation into a vast Dead Sea occupied by God. Theodore Parker has failed to perceive this. The more effectually to contradict the system which makes the Creative Power only One Cause among many, he has represented it as the Solitary Cause. Our Author seems aware that he is open to this criticism: and as we should be sorry to be confounded with the alarmists who have raised the cry against him in his own land, we will state more precisely the ground of our objection to his theory. He observes:—

“The charge of Pantheism is very vague, and is usually urged by such as know least of its meaning. He who conceives of God, as the *immanent* cause of all things, as infinitely present, and infinitely active, with no limitations, is sure to be called a Pantheist in these days, as he would have passed for an Atheist two centuries ago. Some who have been called by this easy and obnoxious name, both in ancient and in modern times, have been philosophical defenders of the doctrine of one God, but have given him the historical form neither of Brahma nor Jehovah.”—B. I. ch. v. § 2. p. 94.

Now if one who denied the Divine absenteeism from creation and life, as they now are, or, what is equivalent, the Divine inertness within them, were justly called a Pantheist, we should glory in the name. We do not believe in *epochs* of Creative activity, exceptional to the general constancy of a godless repose. With the prophet of old, we should be ashamed to think of the everlasting Hope of men, "as a Stranger in the land, and as a Wayfarer that turneth aside to tarry for a night."\* His work is bounded by no chronological conditions, and is neither old nor new. His dial indicates always the same hour of eternity: its infinite shadow never moves; flung across the universe, it eclipses no living world, but darkens only death and the abyss. His agency is no intermittent tide, carrying a shifting wave of glory from sphere to sphere, from century to century, and leaving a dreary strand of desertion between, strewn only with the wrecks of the receding God. The legendary Creation-week, the consecrated date of our childish thought, has long since burst open, as the capsule of illimitable ages, through all of which the Productive Will has been as fresh and fertile as at the moment when "light was." We protest against the ascription of causality to the "laws of nature" which Science investigates. The methods of Science can teach us nothing but the order of phenomenal succession to which our expectations are to adjust themselves; and this, in spite of all the special pleading of "acute analysis," does *not* fulfil our idea of Causation. The mind demands a Power beneath the surface over which sense and observation range, to evolve this serial order, to marshal the punctual ranks of beneficent and beautiful events, to measure the invariable cycles, and beat time to the listening seasons. We think that that Power cannot in reason be otherwise conceived than as the Living Will of God. So far therefore as outward nature is concerned, we are far from objecting to sink all its so-called "forces," and to regard them as so many manners of divine agency. "This view seems" to us, not only "at first" (as our Author says) but to the end,

"... congenial to a poetic and religious mind. If the world be regarded as a collection of powers,—the awful force of the storm, of

\* Jer. xiv. 8.



the thunder, of the earthquake ; the huge magnificence of the ocean, in its slumber or its wrath ; the sublimity of the ever-during hills ; the rocks, which resist all but the unseen hand of time ; these might lead to the thought that they were God. If men looked at the order, fitness, beauty, love, every where apparent in nature, the impression is confirmed. The All of things appears so beautiful to the comprehensive eye, that we almost think it is its own Cause and Creator. The animals find their support and their pleasure ; the painted leopard and the snowy swan, each living by its own law ; the bird of passage that pursues, from zone to zone, its unmarked path ; the summer warbler which sings out its melodious existence in the woodbine ; the flowers that come unasked, charming the youthful year ; the golden fruit maturing in its wilderness of green ; the dew and the rainbow ; the frost-flake and the mountain snow ; the glories that wait upon the morning, or sing the sun to his ambrosial rest ; the pomp of the sun at noon, amid the clouds of a June day ; the awful pomp of night, when all the stars with a serene step come out, and tread their round, and seem to watch in blest tranquillity about the slumbering world ; the moon waning and waxing, walking in beauty through the night ;—daily the water is rough with the winds ; they come or abide at no man's bidding, and roll the yellow corn, or wake religious music at night-fall in the pines : these things are all so fair, so wondrous, so wrapt in mystery, it is no marvel that men say, this is divine. Yes, the All is God. He is the light of the morning, the beauty of the noon, and the strength of the sun. The little grass grows by his presence. He preserveth the cedars. The stars are serene because he is in them. The lilies are redolent of God. He is the One ; the All."—B. I. ch. v. § 2. p. 89.

Our Author professes to discard the view which he has thus unfolded with so much beauty. Yet he appears to us to adopt it entire, and to complete it by applying the very same mode of thought to the mental world, which is here restricted to the material. He is like many a deep thinker, who, when sent by Spinoza into his field of speculation, might say, "I go not ;" but afterwards *went*. We wish he had definitely stated the reasons for either his supposed repudiation, or his apparent adoption, of the doctrine. In the absence of such guidance from him, we must explain, that the very ground of our own assent to the physical half of the theory, as just presented, is also the ground of our dissent from the other half. With our obstinate notions, the reasons for advancing thus far absolutely forbid us to move a step further : but, with more

open temper, our generous friend—if philosophy compel him to go one mile, will go with her (or, may be, *without* her) twain. In the present instance, *what* is it which induces us to put denial on the whole system of scientific “forces ;” to insist that God,—Spirit though he is,—is not hindered, by any veil of “nature,” from *himself* putting the beauty and the wonder into the smallest of his works ; and to proclaim all the laws of the unreflecting universe the action of his Mind ? It is simply this,—the conviction that there is, and, for us, can be, no other Causation than the intelligent and voluntary ; that no second sort of originating energy is at all conceivable ; and that, in the last analysis, such phrases as “inanimate power” involve a contradiction. We are persuaded that no observation of consecutive phenomena could ever give us the notion of power ; that the conscious rising of effort against resistance is the real source of the idea ; and that *Cause* and *Will* mean at bottom the same thing. The experience of Causation in ourselves is the birth-place of all our knowledge and thought upon this matter ; our whole language on the subject has no meaning whatever, except as it keeps close to this experience ; for nothing new is afterwards added to it, though the benumbing influence of time may take something from it. When the wondering child asks what it is, or, as he will always say, *who* it is, that bends the rainbow, or hangs up the moon, he dreams of nothing else than of some living hand directed by intending thought. *That* is an originating cause well known to him : there is no other possible to his conception *then* ; no one can pretend that his subsequent experience gives him any closer insight into the nature of power : and we believe, therefore, that he will never be nearer the truth than when, under the intuitive feeling, common to him and Herschel and Archimedes, that ‘every phenomenon must have a cause,’ he attributes what he sees to an unseen and acting mind. No later discoveries, we do submit, can show the faintest right to correct this earliest impression. They only stupify the first startled sentiment, and turn aside the questionings of reverent curiosity to make room for the researches of practical utility. For the satisfaction of faith we want to conceive of the *Cause* ; for the service of life we want to find the *order*, of the events

around us. The latter inquiry, in which we make continual progress, encroaches on the former, which remains to the manhood of our race the same mystery that brooded around its infancy. And while Custom gradually lays devout wonder into sleep, Science unhappily pilfers its language lying unguarded by its side; *antecedents* are labelled *Causes*, and laws become *powers*; the knowledge of nature gets surreptitiously baptized into the waters of faith, and goes through the world with a Christian name, but with a Pagan spirit. When thus arrogating the place of Religion, Science, with its stock of "forces" behind every cluster of phenomena, is but the *atheistic Fetichism* of our days; and there is at heart no meaner superstition than its dynamic worship. The Indian makes gestures in his wigwam before his "medicine-bag," praying to the *Spirits of power* that rule his world: and the philosopher,—down he goes prostrate in the musings of his library, before his electricity and his nebular hypotheses, and his corpuscular attractions,—putting his trust in *powers of Matter* that govern the universe. Fetichism was *not* wrong in setting a back-ground of living Will behind the objects and appearances of nature; but in the multitude and isolation of its unseen Agents. The Idolatry of Science has retained the multitude, and taken away the living Will. The simplicity of Monotheism cancels the pretended host, and takes the collective universe as the symbol of the Omni-present, and the Omni-active Mind.

Now if it is the consciousness of Will in ourselves that sets us on search for a Will that rules the world, we must attribute to Him whom our faith may find, the very kind of power which belongs to us; and we must retain in us the power we ascribe to Him. But this is what Pantheism declines to do. As soon as it has found its Source of the world, it abdicates the very faculties that impelled it on its holy pilgrimage. It recognises in Him not only the pervading Life of nature, but the Autocrat, or rather the very Essence, of the Soul. The believer insists on self-annihilation; says he has no power of his own; is as water under the finger of God; is cause of nothing; scarcely even an effect; only a phenomenon; a flake of snow falling on the mighty river. And so he dissolves himself away. Now if this be true and he could only have perceived it at first,

then, having no causation within him, he would have sought and discovered none without him ; and to him there would have been no God. By knowing the truth, he would have been plunged into the most tremendous of falsehoods : and it is only by assuming a falsehood that he can reach the sublimest of truths ! Religious faith can never be of this parricidal nature, devouring its own premises.

And it is curious to observe the action and re-action of this mode of thought, in its alternate influence on life and on religion. When the theorist has got rid of his Free-will and entire individuality in his sense of Deity, he has stopped, as far as practicable, and sealed up the proper sources of his feeling of causality ; he seeks to be disposed of with a serene fitness to the Divine Thought : his active energies decline : his only aim is to suffer without a murmur in evidence of utter self-renunciation : he dreams and mortifies his life away. Human nature, attenuated to this state, is no longer qualified to furnish, from its self-consciousness, the true and noble type of God : voluntary purpose, with the mental and moral attributes associated with it, is less and less attributed to him : the sickliness, which descended at first from the too overshadowing thought of Him, returns upwards and infects the conception of his Infinite nature ; till He is dishonoured into Nature's animal life or transmigrating principle ; the spiritual mysticism completes its metaphysic revolution ; and having lifted itself into too thin an air of contemplation, plunges down and dies in the mire of a gross idolatry.

For these reasons among others, we esteem it of the highest moment to protect from embarrassment the consciousness in man that he is a Cause in himself ; and to prevent the slightest loosening of the idea of WILL from the conception of God. And as the Will is that in which *Personality* resides, this is the same thing as to say, that we must hold fast to the faith of a Personal God. We strongly object to much of Theodore Parker's language on this subject. If indeed he uniformly adhered to the definition already given, "a Being infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodness," all would be well : for it is to save these very attributes from being frittered away, that we insist so strenuously on retaining the analogy between man and God in the quality of Will. Without this, as we have shown, there

is no "Power:" without this,—the faculty which directs itself to preconceived ends,—how can there be "Wisdom?" without this, by which selection is made among undetermined possibilities, how can those exclusions take place which leave the ways of Heaven "good," and good alone? And if Will be indispensable, we know not how it is possible to satisfy our Author's yearning after a God wholly "Absolute" and "without limitations." Is it possible to conceive of Will, and the moral attributes involving it, entirely insulated, and acting without any extrinsic conditions? Can there be *quæsitæ* without any *data*? We do confess that our notions of either *Mind* or *Character* lose their ground and vanish in this attempt to destroy all the Divine *relations*. A Deity, to be thought of first as a lonely Unity, then self-evolved into a creation, whose material forms are the development of his extension,—whose minds of his consciousness, appears to us to be fatally remote from any possible trust, and love, and aspiration in our hearts. We lament therefore that our Author should have committed himself to such positions as these; that God is "not Personal nor Impersonal" (p. 160); that "our human *personality* gives a false modification to all our conceptions of the infinite" (27): that He is "the reality of all appearance" (164); "the Absolute ground" of "nature" and "the soul" (21); "*the substantiality of matter*" (170): "*the spirituality of spirit*" (182). If God be thus both the Essence and the phenomena of matter on the one hand, and of mind on the other, his Being coincides with the whole of the two hemispheres which compose our universe: nothing is left over to *be* matter, or to *be* mind: He and the "All of things" are identified; and scarcely even does the distinction remain between the "*natura naturans*" and the "*natura naturata*." The relation of *Cause and Effect* is exchanged in the phrascology we have quoted, for that of *Substance and Quality*; and whenever *this* is resorted to in order to represent the connection between God and the world, we are on the traces of a Pantheism far from harmless.

On the whole, the fundamental formulas of the several theories may perhaps be justly presented thus. The prevalent system says: Phenomena require a Cause; Where Law is not, the Cause is God; Where Law is, God *is* not,

but *was* the Cause. Pantheism says: Transient phænomena require an Absolute ground, as quality is the predicate of substance; that Absolute ground is God. The scheme which appears to us most true, says: Where phænomena are, a Cause is; Cause implies Will; and (within the sphere of our observation) all beyond the range of Human Will is Divine Will. According to the first view, God is, to us, one Cause among many; according to the second, He is one and All; according to the third, He is one of Two.

And now that we have discharged our Conscience in this matter, let us say that our protest against Theodore Parker's statements is occasioned more by the probable tendencies of thought in his readers' minds, than by what we suppose to be his own. We do not believe that he is at all deeply tinctured with Pantheism. Expressions drop from him continually which are wholly incompatible with the doctrines we have condemned. He speaks, for instance, of the different orders of things "receiving each as high a mode of Divine influence *as its several nature will allow*" (p. 174): and he therefore undeniably recognizes some *rerum naturam*, as a condition or *datum* for the reception of divine power. Indeed the whole spirit and character of the book proclaim its affinities with a school quite remote from the Spinozistic. The Author has nowhere stated the principles of his *ethical* doctrine, or bridged over the chasm which separates it from his theology. But the purity and depth of his conceptions of character, his intense abhorrence of falsehood and evil, the moral loftiness of his devotion, and the generous severity of his rebuke, are in the strongest contradiction to serene complacency of a mind, suspended in metaphysic elevation *above* the point where truth and error, right and wrong, diverge, and looking down from a station whence all things appear equally divine. Hear the account he gives of "Solid Piety," or "Love before God:"—

"Its Deity is the God of Love, within whose encircling arms it is beautiful to be. The demands it makes are to keep the Law he has written in the heart, to be good, to do good; to love man, to love God. It may use forms, prayers, dogmas, ceremonies, priests, temples, sabbaths, festivals and fasts, yes, sacrifices if it will, as means, not ends; symbols of a sentiment, not substitutes for it.

Its substance is love of God ; its form love of man ; its temple a pure heart ; its sacrifice a divine life. The end it proposes is, to reunite the man with God, till he thinks God's thought, which is Truth ; feels God's feeling, which is love : wills God's will, which is the eternal Right ; thus finding God in the sense wherein he is not far from any one of us ; becoming one with him, and so partaking the divine nature. The means to this high end are an extinction of all in man that opposes God's law ; a perfect obedience to him as he speaks in Reason, Conscience, Affection. It leads through active obedience to an absolute trust, a perfect love ; to the complete harmony of the finite man with the infinite God, and man's will coalesces in that of him who is All in All. Then Faith and Knowledge are the same thing, Reason and Revelation do not conflict, Desire and Duty go hand in hand, and strew man's path with flowers. Desire has become dutiful, and Duty desirable. The divine spirit incarnates itself in the man. The riddle of the world is solved. Perfect love casts out fear. Then Religion demands no particular actions, forms, or modes of thought. The man's ploughing is holy as his prayer ; his daily bread as the smoke of his sacrifice ; his home sacred as his temple ; his work day and his sabbath are alike God's day. His priest is the holy spirit within him ; Faith and Works his communion of both kinds. He does not sacrifice Reason to Religion, nor Religion to Reason. Brother and Sister, they dwell together in Love. A life harmonious and beautiful, conducted by Rectitude, filled full with Truth and enchanted by Love to man and God,—this is the service he pays to the Father of All. Belief does not take the place of life. Capricious austerity atones for no duty left undone. He loves Religion as a bride, for her own sake, not for what she brings. He lies low in the hand of God. The breath of the Father is on him.

“ If joy comes to this man, he rejoices in its rosy light. His Wealth, his Wisdom, his Power, is not for himself alone, but for all God's children. Nothing is his which a brother needs more than he. Like God himself, he is kind to the thankless and unmerciful. Purity without and Piety within ; these are his Heaven, both present and to come. Is not his flesh as holy as his soul—his body a temple of God ?

“ If trouble comes on him, which Prudence could not foresee, nor strength overcome, nor Wisdom escape from, he bears it with a heart serene and full of peace. Over every gloomy cavern, and den of despair, Hope arches her rainbow ; the ambrosial light descends. Religion shows him, that, out of desert rocks, black and savage, where the Vulture has her home, where the Storm and Avalanche are born, and whence they descend, to crush and to kill ; out of these hopeless cliffs falls the river of life, which flows for all, and



makes glad the people of God. When the Storm and Avalanche sweep from him all that is dearest to mortal hope, is he comfortless? Out of the hard marble of Life, the deposition of a few joys and many sorrows, of birth and death, and smiles and grief, he hews him the beautiful statue of religious Tranquillity. It stands ever beside him, with the smile of heavenly satisfaction on its lip, and its trusting finger pointing to the sky."—B. I. ch. vii. § 3. p. 145.

The objections which we have brought against our Author's Theistical doctrine extend themselves to his views of Inspiration. To examine them, however, within the remaining limits of this article, is impossible. To draw a precise line of discrimination between the Divine and the Human mind, and pronounce, as to the range of our own faculties, what may be included without presumption, and what excluded without enthusiasm, is one of the most difficult problems of religious philosophy. That Dr. Priestley's denial of all Divine Influence, because no miracles could be found going on in the mind, did *not* settle the question, is acknowledged by a piety that is wiser than philosophy, if not by a philosophy that would be wiser than piety. We feel no less assured that Theodore Parker has not settled it, by simply calling the ordinary faculties of men by the name of God's Inspiration, and treating the Principia of Newton as the work of an inspired man. Were we to attempt a solution, we should commence from the division, before stated, of all Agency into the two categories of the Human *Will*, and the Divine Will: we should endeavour to determine the circle of the former; and whatever lay wholly beyond it, though still within the limits of Conscientiousness and of Law, we should refer to the latter. Not everything however that must be ascribed immediately to God, can be called *Inspiration*. He acts *out of* the Spirit, or in *Nature*, as well as *within* the Spirit, or in our *Soul*; and we must therefore again exclude the whole of the former sphere, and reserve only the *characteristic faculties of Man*. If it were maintained that there were a plurality of these, a further reduction might be allowed, till the attribute alone remained which manifests itself in worship,—the consciousness of moral distinctions, and reverence for moral excellence and beauty. Whatever gifts are found in this province of the soul, which are *not* the produce of human will; which have been neither learned nor earned; which,

without the touch of any voluntary process, appear in mysterious spontaneity; are strictly the Inspiration of God. Thoughts of God, purposes of constraining pity, sanctities of duty, rising above the level horizon of the mind, silent, self-evidencing, holy, clearing themselves, like the pure stars, as they ascend, of the low mists of doubt and fear,—these will ever be deemed true heaven-lights kindled from the eternal fires, whatever volumes be written to prove them only gas-lamps, distilled from the embers of past pain and pleasure in the transforming alembic of the brain. Inspiration would thus be to the highest faculty, what Instinct is to the lower; a guidance coming of its own accord,—which we know cannot lead wrong, yet which we cannot prove to be right. Happily, it needs no proof: for there is the same conscience, latent though not awake, in all; sunk no doubt in various depths of slumber; but in some ever ready to apprehend and recognise the truth which higher souls may find. To such it passes, telling, as at first, its own divine tale. To others, with whom, when they have heard it in the word, and *seen it in the life*, it does *not* authorise itself, it simply cannot pass at all. “Surely,” it will be said, “these are just the cases for a miracle,—and where the Resurrection would powerfully tell.” Not in the least;—“If they hear not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.”

We differ then from our Author in this: that he admits, and we exclude, in treating of Inspiration, the *voluntary products* to which the Mind gives birth. All learning, all Science, all work in achievement of a preconceived end, we take to be disentitled to the name. In justification of his question, “Is Newton less inspired than Simon Peter?” Theodore Parker, substituting Moses for Simon Peter, observes,—

“No candid man will doubt that, humanly speaking, it was a more difficult thing, to write the *Principia* than the Decalogue. Man must have a nature most sadly anomalous, if, unassisted, he is able to accomplish all the triumphs of modern science, and yet cannot discover the plainest and most important principles of Religion and Morality without a miraculous revelation.”—B. II. ch. viii. p. 218, note.

Now that the amount of *inspiration* in an achievement should be measured by the *difficulty* and labour spent upon it, appears unreasonable on the principles which we have stated. Let the product be at all of a kind to be yielded by the successive steps of a toilsome process, and it is a thing of voluntary fabrication; and by those who can so conceive of it, will never be regarded as an inspired creation. The disposition to extend the idea of inspiration to abstract or scientific truth appears also in an attempt, on which we look with strong repugnance, to render Christianity independent of the individuality of Christ. "If," says our Author, "Christianity be true at all, it would be just as true, if Herod or Catiline had taught it."—P. 244. Yet the same writer who could set down this painful paradox, has said, within 30 pages of it, "A foolish man, as such, cannot be inspired to reveal wisdom; nor a wicked man to reveal virtue; nor an impious man to reveal religion; unto him that hath, more is given." . . . "The greater, purer, loftier, more complete the character, so is the inspiration."—P. 221. Then surely the suggested combination of a "true Christianity," with a wicked Christ, is no less absurd than it is revolting. If, indeed, as is usually assumed, inspiration implied intellectual infallibility in matters of doctrinal knowledge, and could be evidenced by displays of miraculous power, character *might* be dispensed with in a divine messenger; and the alleged grounds of supernatural authority in the religion would be undisturbed, though its revealer *were* "a Herod or a Catiline." On the principles of this system, the moral perfectness of Christ is not an essential, but a subsidiary, support to Christianity;—a delightful confirmation of his mission, but not a condition on which we are at liberty to stake our faith in him. "Prove what you will against his life," might it then be said, "his attested doctrine remains." "Prove what you will against his doctrine," would we rather say, "his divine life remains; and with more 'truth' in it, than in any proposition in the Bible or out of it." No revelation of duty is possible except through the Conscience: and Conscience cannot be effectually reached but by the presence of a holier life and a higher spirit. From the spectacle of devoted excellence and saintly beauty of

mind, as from nothing else, flashes down upon us the awful and redeeming sense of new obligation: the thing seen in the concrete becomes conviction in the abstract: and a religion lived passes into a religion believed. And so we regard it as a rule in matters of devout faith, that it is *reverence for persons which gives perception of truth in ideas.*

Had our author shared our full persuasion that this rule is true, he would not have diffused his "inspiration" so widely over the human race. Filled with the idea, that religious and moral guidance are the most indispensable of God's gifts, he loosely infers their universality. He is resolved to snatch such precious blessings from all dependence on special causes. He esteems the Reason, Conscience, and religious Sentiment, with which God has endowed us, fully adequate to their manifest end; and has the firmest confidence that every man, faithful to their suggestions, may know what is true of God, love what is good in life, and do what is right in duty. He not only scorns the claim of any possible outward *authority* over these powers; but makes light of any outward helps to them: and though devoutly thankful for the disclosure in Christ of "the highest possibility of human nature," is anxious to disclaim the kind of *reliance* on him which is usually welcome to the disciple's heart. We confess that this sometimes gives to our author's position an air of Stoical isolation on which we look, at best, with more admiration than sympathy. Moreover the doctrine of which it is the result is, we are persuaded, a mistake. Outward sources of religion are just as needful to us as inward faculties; and without the *beings* given to our experience, an utter barrenness would attach to the *constitution* given to our souls. Reason and Conscience are not, as sometimes called, "*the light*," but only the *eye*, of faith; which first has *vision*, when the lustre of pure and great natures is shed on it through the atmosphere of life. Not only are *some* external conditions indispensable to us; but these *human* experiences, and no other; this commerce of souls; this wondering look, to see how greatness and wisdom manage the problem of life. For what is called "Natural Theology," which a man is supposed to get by studying all sorts of things inferior to himself, and making a lonely scientific expedition through

earth and air and water, we have but a small esteem. Well as a supplement, it is nought as the substance, of religion. Faith comes, we are persuaded, through the *moral* elements of our nature, by the presence of spiritual causes above us, not by the observation of material effects beneath us. Hence all great religions have been *historical*: the thorough interweaving of all the roots of Christianity with the history of the world on which it has sprung, is at once a source of its power and an assurance of its divineness; and the attempt to give it an abstract character, to loosen its connection with the individuality of Christ, and disengage from it a metaphysical indestructibility called "Absolute Religion," is a mistake, in our opinion, not only of its particular genius, but of the universal springs of human Faith.

In fact, we can find no rest in any view of Revelation short of that which pervades the 4th Gospel, and which is everywhere implicated in the folds of the Logos-doctrine; that it is *an appearance, to beings who have something of a divine spirit within them, of a yet diviner without them, leading them to the Divinest of all, that embraces them both*. No doubt, this conception, while it adheres to the necessity of an historical mediator, generalises the idea of Inspiration; renders it impossible to affirm, that God has never touched any human heart out of the circle of the Hebrew nation; and leaves to Jesus simply a transcendent pre-eminence,—the very pre-eminence claimed for him, that he "had the Spirit without measure" that we can gauge. That this was the doctrine of the Christian Fathers, who did not deny a portion of the divine Logos to the wise and good among the Heathens, is known to every reader of the ancient Apologies,\* and ought to protect it in the eyes of those who want an authority for their truth more than truth for their authority. And is it not childish to insist on putting out all other lights, in order to make sure that the Christ may shine? Is his glory so doubtful and obscure, that it is discernible only in the dark, and that the faint fires of God, eternal in the human soul, must be damped

\* See Justin Mart. Apol. II. cap. 13. Οὐκ ἀλλότριά ἐστι τὰ Πλάτωνος διδάγματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστι πάντῃ ὅμοια, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, Σταϊκῶν τε, καὶ ποιητῶν, καὶ συγγραφέων· ἕκαστος γὰρ τις ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικῆς θεοῦ λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ὁρῶν καλῶς ἐφθέξατο.

down, ere we can see the bright and morning star? If the elevation of Jesus is real, it is not changed by filling up the approaches to him with ranks of glorious minds and groups of holy lives, fitted, by the glow of the same spirit and fraternity of the same class, to own him as the Perfecter of their faith, and look up to him in his Kingly height as the crown of their pyramid of souls. That the "authority" of Christ over men should require his cold isolation from men, so that, in his particular characteristics as our guide, he should be extrinsic to our race,—is perfectly inconceivable to us. Why, God himself has no "authority" over us, but in virtue of attributes which he has made common to our nature with his own, and in which we are separated from Him in degree and not in kind. And where, after all, is the ultimate "authority" of our religion to be found? Who will show us the real seat of the "primitive Christianity" of which all disciples are in quest? Shall we take the first four centuries, and interpret the concurrent tones of their voices into the certain oracle of God? Not so, you say; for the writers of that period were full of the errors prevailing around them: and they themselves refer us to an anterior generation, as imparting legitimacy to the doctrines which they teach. Shall we go then to that earlier generation, and abide by the words of the Apostolic age? Scarcely this either, you will say: for the marks are too plain that there is no unerring certainty here: the apostles themselves were not without their differences: and even their unanimity could mistake, for they confessedly taught the near approach of the end of the world. They too still refer us upward, and take every thing from Christ. To Christ then let us go. Wherein resides the "authority" in him which we are to accept as "final?" Shall we say,—in his reported *words* wherever found;—his statements are conclusive, and exempt from doubt? Impossible! Who can affirm that he had, and that he uttered, no ideas imbibed from his age, and obsolete when that age was gone; that he grew up to manhood in the Galilean province, without a sentiment, an expectation, native to place and time; or that he disrobed himself of his whole natural mind from the instant of his baptism; that he did not discern evil spirits in the poor patients that came to him, and so misinterpret his own miracles; that he raised no hopes in

others of sitting on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel; of drinking with him of the fruit of the vine at his table in his kingdom; and of his own return to fulfil all these things "within that generation?" Will any one plainly say, with these things before him, that Jesus was infallible, and that in his spoken language we have a standard of doctrinal truth? And if error was possible, who will give us an *external* test by which we may know the region of its absence and of its presence? for, without this, to talk of his words being "a rule of faith," is a delusion or a pretence. But why this Heathenish craving for an "oracle," turning the Galilean hills into a Delphi, Jesus into a Pythoness, and degrading the gospels into Sibylline books? Did Christ ask for this blind, implicit trust? Did he wish his disciples to believe his word, because it was true,—or the truth, because it was his word? Nay, did not *he* also refer us to something higher, and hint at an authority needful to authorise his own? Thither then we must retreat, if indeed we would find "Primitive Christianity." Behind all the *communicated* beliefs of Jesus lie his *felt* beliefs, with the question, "what made them his?" Whence his holy trust in them? for in his soul, also, they had a justifying origin. He thought them, he loved them, he worshipped in them, he struggled under them, before he published them: by what mark did he know them to be divine? Does any one really suppose that he would refuse to believe them, unless his senses could have a physical demonstration, unless the Infinite Spirit would talk audibly with him in the vernacular tongue, and give him His word for them, and show off some proof-miracles to satisfy his doubts? And if it were found out that there was no breach of the Eternal Silence, no phantasms floating between the uplifted eye of the Nazarene and the quiet stars, would you say that it was all over with our faith, and its divine original clean gone? Surely not. It will not be questioned that the Inspiration of Jesus was *within* the soul: by the powers that dwelt there, he knew the thoughts to be divine and holy as they dropped on his meditations: and the authorising point of all his treasures of heavenly truth and grace dwelt in his Reason, Conscience, and Faith. Here then is the fountain of all, the primitive seat of inspiration, the true *religion of Christ*,—that which he *felt and followed*,



not that which he *spake and led*. And those are the most genuine disciples, who stand with him at the same spring; who are ready for the same trust; and can disengage themselves from tradition, pretence and fear, at the bidding of the same source of Inspiration.

The critical opinions of Theodore Parker on the origin and contents of the Hebrew and Christian records, we do not propose to discuss. Indeed they are so cursorily presented in his book, that to examine the grounds of them would be to travel far beyond the materials before us. His judgment on the historical evidence for the miracles has been the subject of comment in a former article. In that judgment we do not concur. But if there is any one who, for that judgment, chooses to denounce him as "no Christian;" who conceives that a literary verdict, referring the gospels to the second century instead of the first, outlaws a man from "the kingdom of God;" who can read this book, and suppose in his heart that here is a man whom Jesus would have driven from the company of disciples; we can only wish that the accuser's title to the name were as obvious as the accused's. Alas for this poor wrangling! To hear the boastful anger of our stout believers, one would suppose that to take up our faith on too easy terms, and to be drawn into discipleship less by logic than by love, were the very Sin against the Holy Ghost! Jesus thought it might not be too much to expect of his *enemies*, that, being eye-witnesses, they might "believe *his works*;" but of his friends it was the mark, that they would "believe *him*." But now-a-days, who are our "patent Christians," ever busy with indictments against all counterfeits? Why, men who think it supremely ridiculous to accept any thing or being as divine, unless visible certificates of character be written on earth, air, and water, and Heaven will pawn the laws of nature as personal securities.

We part with Theodore Parker in hope to meet again. He has, we are persuaded, a task, severe perhaps, but assuredly noble, to achieve in this world. The work we have reviewed is the confession, at the threshold of a high career, of a great Reforming soul, that has thus cleared itself of hindrance, and girded up itself for a faithful future. The slowness of success awaiting those who stand apart from the multitude will not dismay him. He knows the ways of Providence too well:—

"Institutions arise as they are needed, and fall when their work is done. Of these things nothing is fixed. Corporeal despotism is getting ended; will the spiritual tyranny last for ever? A will above our puny strength, marshals the race of men, using our freedom, virtue, folly, as instruments to one vast end,—the harmonious development of man. We see the art of God in the web of the spider, and the cell of a bee, but have not skill to discern it in the march of man. We repine at the slowness of the future in coming, or the swiftness of the past in fleeing away; we sigh for the fabled 'Millennium' to advance, or pray Time to restore us the Age of Gold. It avails nothing. We cannot hurry God, nor retard him. Old schools and new schools seem as men that stand on the shore of some Atlantic bay, and shout, to frighten back the tide, or urge it on. What boots their cry? Gently the sea swells under the moon, and, in the hour of God's appointment, the tranquil tide rolls in, to inlet and river, to lave the rocks, to bear on its bosom the ship of the merchant, the weeds of the sea. We complain, as our fathers; let us rather rejoice, for questions less weighty than these have in other ages been settled only with the point of the sword, and the thunder of cannon.

"If the opinions advanced in this discourse be correct, then Religion is above all institutions, and can never fail: they shall perish, but Religion endure; they shall wax old as a garment; they shall be changed, and the places that knew them shall know them no more for ever; but Religion is ever the same, and its years shall have no end."—P. 484.

ART. VII.—OLIVER CROMWELL'S LETTERS  
AND SPEECHES.

*Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches : with Elucidations.*

By THOMAS CARLYLE. In two volumes. London :  
Chapman and Hall. 1845.

THIS is a very original book—original in its conception, and not less so in its execution. We know of nothing exactly parallel to it, in our own or in any other language. In spite of some questionable and extravagant notions wrought up with the Elucidator's views, and the strange, outlandish diction which he persists in substituting for the pure and graceful English of his early style—the work, both in what it has reproduced, and in what it has added as commentary and illustration, is full of the deepest interest, and at heart, too, of an earnest wisdom : and though we doubt, whether it can ever become extensively popular, any one who will be at the trouble not merely of reading the book, but of carefully meditating it, will find himself amply repaid in the copious materials for reflection which it supplies—the pregnant hints, and rich suggestions, into which its deep underlying vein of thought everywhere breaks out—its startling distrust or bold denial of doctrines, all but universally received as axioms, which provokes the mind to independent action, and gives to it indirectly, through itself, a truer and heartier knowledge, than the most entire assent could have imbibed from without—leading it forth into high and solemn speculation on man's spiritual work and destiny in the Universe, profitable and ennobling at all times, but especially seasonable in the present day, from its resistance to the overpowering tendencies of popular feeling in an opposite direction.

In common with all who have studied, and who understand, the course and connection of events in our English history, Mr. Carlyle singles out, as of interest and importance far above all others, the memorable transactions of the 17th century ; and he has fixed his eye on the most remarkable personage who figures in the midst of them. From the disputes of that extraordinary time, as we took occasion to observe in a former Number of this

Journal—'all the questions most interesting to us at the present hour, and fraught with the most important consequences to our posterity, derive their origin; and as the questions themselves are not yet solved, the dispute must be considered as merely postponed, not terminated. The Revolution of 1688, which silenced them for a time, was a compromise rather than a settlement.'\* Our author has approached this great theme, from a point of view almost peculiar to himself, and very remote from that which is usually taken by the friends of Puritanism and public liberty. It was in reading the Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, many years ago—he tells us—and in 'endeavouring to find what their meaning was, and trying to believe it, that the Commonwealth, and Puritan Rebellion generally, first began to be conceivable to him.'† His mind has evidently been much exercised on this period of our history, particularly on the character of Cromwell; and in what estimation he holds that character—how nearly it realises his highest conception of human greatness—we had already learned from the place assigned to the Puritan chief in his Hero Worship. From extracts frequently introduced in the present volumes—apparently from an unpublished manuscript—we conclude that he has large materials for some more general work on the Puritan struggle, lying, as it were, in the rear of the book now given to the world, which is put forth perhaps as a sort of advanced guard, to secure and prepare the ground for a fuller display of his views on the whole subject hereafter.‡ We heartily wish it may be so; for a mind so earnest and original, with all its eccentricities, must evolve some new and curious results out of any inquiry connected with the moral and spiritual development of the human race.

Most of the prominent characters that we see ranged on opposite sides, in the grand quarrel of the 17th century, enjoy a reasonable chance of being fairly appreciated by posterity; for if their faults and infirmities are exaggerated by their foes, friends are not wanting to do justice to their virtues: and combining all the good affirmed of them by the former, with all the evil admitted by the latter, we get at a residuary judgment, not very far perhaps from

\* Prospective Review, No. I., Art. I., p. 13.

† Vol. II. p. 279.

‡ See Introduction. p. 4, and following.

the truth. But Cromwell—owing to the lofty isolation in which he stands amidst the strife of parties—has been deprived of this advantage. He has been exposed to the censures alike of Royalists and of Republicans. For nearly two centuries his name has been a by-word in all mouths for hypocrisy and profound craft. From Clarendon and Ludlow, among his contemporaries, down to Mrs. Macauley, Hallam, and Godwin, in more recent times, writers of directly opposite views have agreed with singular unanimity, till quite lately, to stigmatise him as a traitor to the cause which he had espoused, and to resolve his public conduct into a course of deep-laid and successful, but unprincipled, ambition. All have confessed his wonderful abilities; and not a few have admitted particular excellences in his character and government: but Mr. Carlyle has not hesitated to undertake his vindication throughout, asking for no concessions, but contending that, from first to last, he was an honest, right-meaning, high-souled, man,—who must be judged in the light of his own actions, and of the circumstances into which Providence had thrown him—who must be tried by the principles that pervaded, and bound together in strictest self-consistency, his whole inward and outward being.

We must give our readers some account of the mode in which Mr. Carlyle has executed his task. Original in all things, he has his own notions of the function of history; and these have influenced the character of his work. History, according to him, should be a reproduction, in correct and vivid lineaments, of so much of the mind and manners, of the transactions and purposes, of the past—as remains intelligible to our modern sympathies, and perpetuates itself by living continuity into present, actual, interests—every thing else being properly suffered to perish and fall into oblivion;—not a mere representation of vain hearsays, picturesquely grouped and shaded and coloured for the entertainment of an idle imagination—but a grand, emphatic, expression of the high will of providence, drawn out with earnestness and veracity for the instruction of coming generations. It is rather, therefore, a work of selection and enlightened interpretation, for the detection of deep and wide-stretching substrata of principle and tendency, lying far down under the disturbed and dislocated

surface of events—than a loose, indiscriminate record of all phenomena extant. A wise forgetfulness, he thinks, should enter as largely into the qualifications of a good historian, as a clear and faithful memory.\* Mr. Carlyle bitterly complains of the lazy, careless way in which our great historical collections—those of Rushworth, Whitlocke, Nalson, and Thurloe—have been edited—‘edited,’ says he, ‘as you edit wagonloads of broken bricks and dry mortar, simply by tumbling up the wagon! Not one of those monstrous old volumes has so much as an available Index.’—The French and Germans are certainly before us in this respect, and offer far greater assistances to the historical student. It is no merit to have read what is absolutely useless. Learning is not an end in itself, but only a means and an instrument: its worthiest office, is to wait intelligently on wisdom and truth.—Our author’s earnest mind is impatient of all pedantries. For mere collectors and antiquaries of every description—even for those of higher aim, who make the past, one great battle-field for the conflicts of political and philosophical theories—standing aloof from the realities of our common nature, without human insight or human sympathy (and under one or other of these characters a large proportion of historians must be classed), he discovers throughout his work an undisguised contempt. In his own style of quaint humour, he has personified the whole tribe under the name of Dryasdust, and sets up against him another personage, behind the scenes, but every now and then becoming audible from the unpublished manuscript before alluded to—who represent Anti-Dryasdust—the New Intelligence opposed to the Old Pedantry. The two are made to utter their sentiments in piquant contrast, on the same events—not uninstructionally—in various passages of the book. On the whole, Mr. Carlyle is hardly just to writers whose cast of mind and general object are different from his own. The diligent accumulators of scattered facts, and one-sided defenders of a particular theory, however deficient in critical judgment or enlargement of view, still aid the cause of truth, by increasing the stock of materials, out of which the genuine philosopher has freer choice of selection and com-

\* Substituting the word *historici*, we might apply here the language of Quintilian—‘Inter virtutes grammatici habebitur, aliqua nescire.’

bination, and can draw a more comprehensive result. We must be content to admit, that the service of knowledge requires great subdivision of duties, and asks for labourers of a higher and a lower kind. All are to be owned with some measure of respect and thankfulness, who in the task assigned them are faithful and industrious.

Of the author's own broad view of the historical relations of things, let us take the following specimen from his Introduction, entitled *Anti-Dryasdust*:—

"Has our friend forgotten that it is Destiny withal as well as 'Stupidity;' that such is the case more or less with Human History always? By very nature it is a labyrinth and chaos, this that we call Human History; an *abatis* of trees and brush-wood, a world-wide jungle, at once growing and dying. Under the green foliage and blossoming fruit-trees of to day, there lie, rotting slower or faster, the forests of all other Years and Days. Some have rotted fast, plants of animal growth, and are long since quite gone to inorganic mould; others are like the aloe, growths that last a thousand or three thousand years. You will find them in all stages of decay and preservation; down deep to the beginnings of the History of Man. Think where our Alphabetic Letters came from, where our Speech itself came from; the Cookeries we live by, the Masonries we lodge under! You will find fibrous roots of this day's occurrences among the dust of Cadmus and Trismegistus, of Tubalcain and Triptolemus; the tap-roots of them are with Father Adam himself, and the cinders of Eve's first fire! At bottom, there is no perfect History; there is none such conceivable. All past centuries have rotted down, and gone confusedly dumb and quiet, even as that Seventeenth is now threatening to do. Histories are *as* perfect as the Historian is wise, and is gifted with an eye and a soul! For the leafy blossoming Present Time springs from the whole Past, remembered and unrememberable, so confusedly as we say:—and truly the Art of History, the grand difference between a Dryasdust and a sacred Poet, is very much even this: to distinguish well what does still reach to the surface, and is alive and frondent for us, and what reaches no longer to the surface, but moulders safe under ground, never to send forth leaves or fruit for mankind any more: of the former we shall rejoice to hear; to hear of the latter will be an affliction to us; of the latter only Pedants and Dullards, and disastrous *malefactors* to the world, will find good to speak. By wise memory and by wise oblivion: it lies all there! Without oblivion, there is no remembrance possible. When both oblivion and memory are wise, when the general soul of man is clear, melodious, true, there may come a modern Iliad as memorial of the Past:



when both are foolish, and the general soul is over-clouded with confusions, with unvaricities and discords, there is a 'Rushworthian chaos.' Let Dryasdust be blamed, beaten with stripes if you will; but let it be with pity, with blame to Fate chiefly. Alas, when sacred Priests are arguing about 'black and white surplices;' and sacred Poets have long *professedly* deserted Truth, and gone a wool-gathering after 'Ideals' and such like, what can you expect of poor secular Pedants? The labyrinth of History must grow ever darker, more intricate and dismal; vacant cargoes of 'Ideals' will arrive yearly, to be cast into the oven; and noble Heroisms of fact, given up to Dryasdust, will be buried in a very disastrous manner!"—Vol. I. pp. 11—13.

In this passage, the peculiar features of Mr. Carlyle's genius are strongly expressed: they indicate the feelings that he has brought to his work, which derives its character—a character, distinguishing it from all other memorials of the same period—from the elevated position, out of which he looks abroad on his subject, and seeks to determine its position and bearing in the vast relationships of man's universal destination. Other writers survey it, as it were, from below—taking their stand on the ground of some party, religious or political, with which they are themselves identified. With them, it is simply a question between absolutism and constitutional government, between monarchy and republicanism—of independency against presbyterianism, or of both against episcopacy. But all such controversies in which earlier historians have found a limit to their inquiries, are, according to Mr. Carlyle, only transient phases—mere temporary forms—of the unconquerable, instinctive, impulse—deep-working in men's minds through all ages—sometimes dimly and silently, sometimes in the roar and blaze of revolution—to base their social relations on right and justice, and to obey unchecked the dictates of conscience in the high concerns of their spiritual and everlasting responsibilities. Right and truth are the end of man's existence—the great realities to be secured on earth; only pedants and sophists waste life in fruitless wrangling about the means.—Such is the substance of his theory.—We are by no means prepared to yield it an unqualified approval. In his mingled love of *fact*, and of reverence for the absolute and eternal, he seems to us far too recklessly, to cast aside all considerations of law, and form, and order, without which human affairs cannot

proceed in any certainty and peaceableness.—But such is the governing idea of his book. Such is the light in which it must be read. He interprets the great theme which it unfolds, *spiritually*—viewing it, not under limited and sectarian aspects, but, to borrow an epithet of his own, in its *world-wide* relations to the final destinies of human kind. His work is, in this sense, significant—a phenomenon, indicative of the time—in harmony with the great social movement that is gathering its energies for decisive action against whatever is at war with the undeniable claims of humanity, all over the world.

Mr. Carlyle's plan has been, to let his hero, as much as possible, tell his own story, by exhibiting in chronological order all 'authentic utterances of him' any longer accessible. The Letters, Official Papers, and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell—here collected and arranged for the first time—have been rendered intelligible to common readers, through the exemplary diligence of the Editor, who, by modernising the spelling, amending the punctuation, correcting obvious blunders of the printer or reporter, and occasionally inserting a word or two of his own, to help on a halting sense, (perhaps there is a little too much of this)—has rescued them from the state of sordid neglect in which they have been allowed to remain for nearly two centuries, buried amidst a mass of less important matter in our huge historical repositories. These documents are prefaced by a brief notice of Oliver's previous biographers, and by some account of his family, parentage, education and early life; and each is then introduced or accompanied by a condensed, but clear and forcible, summary of the circumstances under which it was written—enabling the reader most vividly to conceive the influences that must at the time have been acting powerfully on the mind of Cromwell himself. Mind and circumstance—their action and reaction—are powerfully set before us;—for the incidents wrought into these summaries are selected with judgment and skill, and grouped together with singular picturesqueness of effect. The author seizes with uncommon felicity on some one feature in a scene, or an event, which lets you at once—in a single view—by the mere *telling* of the light and shade—into the general meaning of the description. His slight topographical sketches are as effective and interesting in their way,

as his bold, rough outlines of character. All this is mixed up, it is true, with the incorrigible perversities of his style; but the reader must compound for a rich surplus of enjoyment, by letting these pass unquestioned: and at times, we cannot deny, the very absurdities of his humour add a graphic poignancy to his touch, which leaves an indelible impression on the mind—and come to us with a deep undertone of truth, which thrills strangely through his bursts of wild pathos and sublimity.

The most eminent of Cromwell's contemporaries are thrown on the canvass with a free and vigorous hand—not—it must be confessed—without a strong dash of Mr. Carlyle's *idiosyncrasy*, which prevents our accepting them as strictly faithful portraits, but still with so clear a bringing out of the prominent features, as to yield a pretty shrewd insight into the ground-work of the character. There is evident one-sidedness and exaggeration; setting out, however, from a basis of truth. He has disfigured his style by affixing to various names some depreciatory *sobriquet*, which he repeats again and again to utter weariness. Such combinations as *dull* Bulstrode, *wooden* Ludlow, *carion* Heath, *pudding-headed* Hodgson, might seem fit enough garniture for the declamations of a demagogue or revolutionary leader; we look for them in the harangues of O'Connell; and we remember that Mirabeau was renowned for his clever adaptation of them; but they are surely beneath the rational dignity of history, treated in the grave and earnest spirit, and estimated from the lofty vision, of Mr. Carlyle. Cromwell is his man of men—his hero: and every other character comes in for a share of censure and disparagement, as it diverges from that exclusive standard. Vane and Hampden do not escape; they are too scrupulous about means and measures, to please our author. The former is at best but 'a very pretty man'—'not a royal man'—'on the whole, rather a thin man:' and the martyr to public liberty on Chalgrove Field, had too 'lively sensibilities to "unspotted character" "safe courses," &c., &c.,' 'a very brave man, but formidably thick-quilted, and with pincer lips.\*' Intermingled with the historical illustration, are reflections by the *Elucidator*—deeply impregnated with his own strong individuality,

\* Vol. II. pp. 158 and 527.

often original, and almost always worth the trouble of thoughtful consideration. One of the most interesting features of the work, is this juxtaposition, as it were, of two remarkable minds—one, after the interval of two centuries, and in a very different moral atmosphere, interpreting the other—the recluse and meditative student of the 19th century, wide-read in literature, and nursed in the high speculations of German philosophy, looking out from his 'high lonely tower' with warm enthusiasm on the ancient battlefield of England, to explain and justify the movements of the man of action, who once reduced it under him by the might of his arm and the terror of his name.—What we least like in the Editor's execution of his task, is the constant interpolation of his own sentiments in the course of Cromwell's speeches—violently breaking off the natural connection of ideas, forestalling the reader's judgment, and—as if he were afraid of the result—not allowing the speech to produce its own impression. We acknowledge with admiration Mr. Carlyle's genius; but he uses largely the chartered license of his order.

We must, however, notice one capital excellence in his book—the scrupulous fidelity with which he has discharged the duties of editor and historian. No consciousness of genius has exempted him from the responsibilities of laborious research and minute accuracy. Where truth was concerned—where a fact had to be established—he has not deemed the fixing of a single date beneath his care. Nothing indeed is more remarkable in these volumes, than the union of hard, dry, scholarlike industry—such as Strype or Birch need not have been ashamed of—with a keen observant eye for all that is curious and striking in actual life, and a rich exuberance of poetical feeling, which—perhaps after some discussion of authorities or collation of dates, implying infinitely more toil than is displayed—flows over unexpectedly in a strain of impassioned enthusiasm or deep spiritual earnestness worthy of Novalis or Jean Paul. Discerning as with the vision of a seer the dim forms of the departed athwart the deepening twilight of the past—he takes his reader with him into these Tartarean shades—this vast palace of the dead—and brings up again long vanished scenes before his view, pauses with human reverence and sympathy before each name or event of note, expounds

its history, and with eloquent pathos soliloquises on the tale that it unfolds.

We give in confirmation of our foregoing remarks, this description of the battle of Dunbar in the autumn of 1650:—

“The night is wild and wet;—2nd of September means 12th by our calendar: the Harvest Moon wades deep among clouds of sleet and hail. Whoever has a heart for prayer, let him pray now, for the wrestle of death is at hand. Pray,—and withal keep his powder dry! And be ready for extremities and quit himself like a man!—Thus they pass the night; making that Dunbar Peninsula and Brock Rivulet long memorable to me. We English have some tents; the Scots have none. The hoarse sea moans bodeful, swinging low and heavy against these whinstone bays; the sea and the tempests are abroad, all else asleep but we—and there is One that rides on the wings of the wind.

“Towards three in the morning the Scotch foot, by order of a Major-General say some,\* extinguished their matches, all but two in a company; cower under the corn-shocks, seeking some imperfect shelter and sleep. Be wakeful, ye English; watch, and pray, and keep your powder dry. About four o'clock comes order to my pudding-headed Yorkshire friend, that his regiment must mount and march straightway; his and various other regiments march, pouring swiftly to the left to Brocks mouth House, to the pass over the Brock. With overpowering force let us storm the Scots' right wing there; beat that, and all is beaten. Major Hodgson riding along, heard, he says, ‘a Cornet praying in the night;’ a company of poor men, I think, making worship there, under the void Heaven, before battle joined: Major Hodgson, giving his charge to a brother Officer, turned aside to listen for a minute, and worship and pray along with them; haply his last prayer on this earth, as it might prove to be. But no: this Cornet prayed with such effusion as was wonderful; and imparted strength to my Yorkshire friend, who strengthened his men by telling them of it. And the Heavens, in their mercy, I think, have opened us a way of deliverance!—The Moon gleams out, hard and blue, riding among hail-clouds; and over St. Abb's Head, a streak of dawn is rising.

“And now is the hour when the attack should be, and no Lambert is yet here, he is ordering the line far to the right yet; and Oliver occasionally, in Hodgson's hearing, is impatient for him. The Scots too, on this wing, are awake; thinking to surprise us; there is their trumpet sounding, we heard it once; and Lambert, who was to lead the attack, is not here. The Lord General is impatient;

\* “Major-General Holburn, (he that escorted Cromwell into Edinburgh in 1648,) says Walker, p. 180.”

—behold Lambert at last! The trumpets peal, shattering with fierce clangour Night's silence; the cannons awaken along all the line; 'The Lord of Hosts! The Lord of Hosts!' On, my brave ones; on!

"The dispute 'on this right wing was hot and stiff, for three quarters of an hour.' Plenty of fire, from field-pieces, snap-hances, match-locks, entertains the Scotch main-battle across the Brock;—poor stiffened men, roused from the corn-shocks with their matches all out! But here on the right, their horse, 'with lancers in the front rank,' charge desperately; drive us back across the hollow of the Rivulet;—back a little; but the Lord gives us courage, and we storm home again, horse and foot, upon them, with a shock like 'tornado tempests; break them, beat them, drive them all adrift. Some fled towards Copperspath, but most across their own foot.' Their own poor foot, whose matches were hardly well alight yet! Poor men, it was a terrible awakening for them: field-pieces and charge of foot across the Brocksburn; and now here is their own horse in mad panic trampling them to death. Above three thousand killed upon the place: 'I never saw such a charge of foot and horse,' says one; nor did I. Oliver was still near to Yorkshire Hodgson when the shock succeeded; Hodgson heard him say, 'They run! I profess they run!' And over St. Abb's Head and the German Ocean just then bursts the first gleam of the level Sun upon us, 'and I heard Nob say, in the words of the Psalmist, "let God arise, let His enemies be scattered,"'—or in Rous's metre,—

'Let God arise, and scattered  
Let all his enemies be;  
And let all those that do him hate  
Before his presence flee!'

"Even so. The Scotch army is shivered to utter ruin; rushes in tumultuous wreck, hither, thither; to Belhaven, or in their distraction, even to Dunbar; the chase goes as far as Haddington, led by Hacker. 'The Lord General made a halt,' says Hodgson, 'and sang the Hundred and seventeenth Psalm,' till our horse could gather for the chase. Hundred and seventeenth Psalm, at the foot of the Doon Hill; there we uplift it, to the tune of Bangor, or some still higher score, and roll it strong and great against the sky."—Vol. II. pp. 38—40.

Having thus made our readers acquainted with the plan and form and execution of Mr. Carlyle's work, we proceed to a more important topic,—his view of the character and public conduct of Cromwell;—and to bring the subject more distinctly before us, we must crave permission to exhibit, as briefly as possible, the great outlines of his per-

sonal history, which lie somewhat confused and obscured amidst the multitudinous details of Mr. Carlyle's illustration.

Oliver Cromwell—to use his own words—‘was by birth a gentleman, living neither in any considerable height, nor yet in obscurity.’\* His family, which had long been settled in the fenny districts of the Eastern Counties, was ancient and respectable, connected by marriage with the Hampdens of Buckinghamshire, the Whalleys of Notts, and the Mashams of Otes in Essex—all names of note in English history—and is shown on good evidence, adduced by Mr. Carlyle from MSS. yet extant in the British Museum, to have been the same with that of Thomas Cromwell, Earl of Essex in Henry the VIIIth's time, through Richard Cromwell, the Great-grandfather of the Protector, who had been a right hand of the ‘Vicar-General’ in the suppression of Monasteries, and had acquired a goodly estate for himself out of their confiscated lands among the Fens. By his mother's side, who was a Steward or Stewart, (some genealogists have claimed kindred for her family with the royal Stuarts,) Oliver was descended from the brother of the last Popish Prior, and first Protestant Dean of Ely. The elder branch of his line, represented by his Grandfather and his Uncle, resided with knightly rank, and great renown for a sumptuous hospitality, at Hinchinbrook, on the banks of the Ouse, not far from Huntingdon. His Uncle magnificently entertained James the First on his progress from Scotland, and sate in Parliament for the county of Huntingdon. In the civil wars this elder branch espoused the side of the King; and becoming impoverished, sold the family seat, and gradually faded into insignificance. Robert Cromwell, the father of Oliver, being a younger brother, and possessed of but a moderate estate, appears to have improved his means by carrying on the business of malting and brewing in the town of Huntingdon. Here too he acted as a Justice of the Peace; and in early life served in one of the parliaments of Elizabeth.

\* Speech to the first Protectorate Parliament, September 12, 1654. Carlyle, II. p. 282. He was perhaps incited to this remark, by the misrepresentations of his enemies. In one of the Royalist Manifestoes, imputed to Clarendon, and dispersed among the people, he was described as ‘a base, mechanic, fellow.’



Oliver, the fifth of ten children, and an only son, was born at Huntingdon, April 25th, 1599. His education was that of most young persons of similar condition in those days. After going through the usual course of preliminary instruction in the Grammar-school of his native town, he was entered of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge—the day of his admission, April 23, 1616, by a singular coincidence, being the very day of Shakspeare's death. No authentic record is preserved of his behaviour or proficiency in study at the University. His tutor, Howlet, was probably of the Puritanical persuasion. It was customary for young men in that age, on quitting the University, to complete their education at one of the Inns of Court in London; and most of Oliver's biographers have stated undoubtingly, that he was for some time a student of Lincoln's Inn: but his name is not to be found in the books of that or of any other of the Inns of Court. Mr. Carlyle, therefore, thinks it probable, that he acquired privately in the chambers of some London practitioner, as much knowledge of law as he would need in fulfilling the duties of a country magistrate. When he was little more than twenty, he married Elizabeth, a daughter of Sir James Bouchier, a civic knight of considerable wealth, who had an estate at Falsted in Essex; and taking his bride home with him to his mother and sisters at Huntingdon, (his father had died some years previously,) settled down into a quiet domestic life, busied himself with farming and his magisterial duties, and had nine children born to him, before he was much known to the world.\* For ten years he dwelt at Huntingdon. In 1631, he transferred his residence to St. Ives, and embarked in larger undertakings as a farmer and grazier. Five years later, on the death of his Uncle, Sir Thomas Steward, who made him his principal heir, and whom he succeeded as a farmer of the tithes of Ely—he removed to that city, which continued to be his home till the breaking out of the war.

Such was the even, undistinguished, tenour of the first period of Oliver Cromwell's life, before the meeting of the Long Parliament in 1640. Within this period one or two

\* His youngest daughter and child, Frances—first married to Mr. Rich, a grandson of the Earl of Warwick, and afterwards to Sir John Russell—was born in 1638, nearly two years before the assembling of the Long Parliament.

occurrences deserve notice, as indicating the character and latent spirit of the man. While he lived at Huntingdon, we learn from his physician, 'who had often been sent for at midnight,' that he was visited with religious hypochondria.—'It is therefore in these years, undated by history,' says his biographer, 'that we must place Oliver's clear recognition of Calvinistic Christianity; what he, with unspeakable joy, would name his Conversion—his deliverance from the jaws of eternal death.'\*—He was returned as a burgess for the town of Huntingdon to the short but memorable Parliament of 1628-9, which framed the Petition of Right, carried the strong remonstrance against Buckingham, as the King's adviser, and—the Speaker Finch being forcibly held down in his chair—refused to adjourn, till it had passed three resolutions against Arminianism, Popery, and illegal Tonnage and Poundage. In all these transactions Oliver took an active part; and in his first speech to the House in February 1629, he stood up to protest against Bishop Neile's encouragement of the preaching of Popery.—To meet the religious wants of the time, imperfectly answered by the ordinary clergy—a large sum had been subscribed for the buying up of livings, and the establishment of Puritanical lecturers in different parts of the country. Cromwell entered warmly into this scheme. The first Letter of his on record, is addressed to one of the Subscribers in London, soliciting a continuance of funds for the maintenance of a lectureship in Huntingdonshire. The second Letter in the collection—addressed a year or two afterwards (1638) to his cousin Mrs. St. John—wife of the celebrated lawyer—turning wholly on his personal feelings, expresses still more decidedly, and with great simplicity and directness, the strong religious spirit which had taken possession of his mind.—In the same year—1638—we find Cromwell at the head of a great opposition to an undertaking, sanctioned by the King in Council, for the drainage of the Fens. He was not adverse to the scheme itself—for he and his father before him had always been great promoters of it—but only to the manner of its execution, which he thought involved a disregard of popular rights. Summoning a great meeting at Huntingdon, he effectually

\* Carlyle, I. p 76.

resisted its further progress, and acquired so extensive a popularity all through the Fen-country, that he was nicknamed 'Lord of the Fens.'

These few incidents, marking the first and tranquil half of Cromwell's career, discover clearly enough the great outlines of that genuine Puritan character, which received in him its fullest and grandest development. We see in them, sure evidence of intense religious earnestness, hatred of oppression, and fearlessness in the assertion of right. A love of justice, and a zeal for spiritual truth and liberty, are the two constituent elements of the Puritan life. If we except his brief parliamentary service in 1628-9—these elements had been hitherto nurtured and ripened in Cromwell's mind, in the exercise of the ordinary duties of a magistrate and country gentleman, and amidst the affections and sanctities of domestic life. But in the memorable interval of eleven years, from the dissolution in 1629, to the summoning of a new Parliament in 1640, he must have been keenly observant of the course of public affairs—especially in its bearing on the interests of civil freedom and Gospel truth. At home, he saw the King, surrounded by Laud and other High Church advisers, recklessly bent on governing without parliaments, and his kinsman, Hampden, tried and cast in the Exchequer Court for his refusal to pay the illegal ship-money. From abroad, tidings continually reached him of the deadly warfare, waged for thirty long years on the fields of Germany, between the friends and the foes, as he regarded them, of God's law. Wherever he turned his eye, he beheld the signs of approaching conflict between the powers of light and of darkness. On such prospects his earnest mind intently dwelt, not without deep and quiet faith in the final result—and gathered strength for action on a grander scene. He was returned for the town of Cambridge in the Short Parliament of 1640; and in the autumn of that year, again took his seat, as a representative for the same borough, in the Long Parliament. He entered this renowned assembly, a comparatively undistinguished personage, with some repute in his own neighbourhood for habits of business and public spirit, but possessed as yet of no parliamentary name—fully resolved, no doubt, to do grave and fearless duty as a member of the House, but little dreaming that

its sittings would be prolonged, till the Crown and the Church and the Lords had fallen beneath its high decrees, and that it would at length be violently dissolved by his own hand, to make room for a dominion centered in his own person, and sustained by the power of the sword.

We must now take a rapid survey of the steps by which Cromwell, rising higher and becoming stronger at each, passed through the successive stages of his extraordinary career—noticing particularly the indications of mind, which announce a continuous purpose animating him throughout. Up to the age of forty, we have known him as a respectable, upright, independent, country gentleman, busy with his farms and his tithes, and happy in the bosom of his family. The last eighteen years of his life are crowded with surprising adventures; and he comes before us in the commanding attitude of a warrior, statesman and hero.

At the commencement of the war, Cromwell very actively superintended the arming for the defence of Cambridgeshire. Throughout the kingdom, the adherents of the Parliament entered into Associations for mutual protection; and it is a proof of the superior energy of Cromwell's mind, that of these Associations, that for the Eastern Counties, in which he was a principal agent, alone maintained its efficiency and held together: all the rest fell through. It was a natural result, that he should be appointed Governor of the Isle of Ely. At a somewhat earlier period—we may remark by the way—we obtain incidental notice of thoughts that were working in his mind, from a short and dateless, but very significant, note to a friend, in which he expresses a wish to see the Reasons of the Scots for enforcing Uniformity in Religion.\* The Treaty with them was on the point of being debated in Parliament.—Oliver, with the rank of Captain, was engaged in the battle of Edgehill, Oct. 23, 1642. He was disappointed at the result; and some of his enemies†—on grounds of no weight, and at variance with all his subsequent conduct—have even impeached his personal bravery in the action. In fact, the Parliamentary troops, having been hastily gathered to-

\* Letter III. Carlyle, I. p. 148.

† Denzil Holles particularly, who bore him no good will.

gether, were as yet weak, ill-conditioned and inexperienced; and observation of the causes of their failure led him to reflections and a resolve, which had a marked effect on his own course, and gave a new character to the war. What these were, we shall best explain in his own forcible language. 'I was a person,' says he, in a Speech to his second Protectorate Parliament, April 13, 1657 \*—'who from my first employment, was suddenly preferred, and lifted up from lesser trusts to greater—from my first being a Captain of a Troop of Horse—and did labour as well as I could to discharge my trust; and God blessed me, as it pleased Him. And I did truly and plainly—and in a way of foolish simplicity, as it was judged by very great and wise men, and good men too—desire to make my instruments help me in that work. And I will deal plainly with you: I had a very worthy friend then, and he was a very noble person, and I know his memory is very grateful to all—Mr. John Hampden. At my first going out into this engagement, I saw our men were beaten at every hand. I did indeed; and desired him, that he would make some additions to my Lord Essex's army, of some new regiments; and I told him, I would be serviceable to him, in bringing such men in, as I thought had a spirit that would do something in the work. This is very true that I tell you; God knows, I lie not. "Your troops," said I, "are most of them old decayed serving-men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows; and," said I, "their troops are Gentlemen's sons, younger sons and persons of quality: do you think, that the spirits of such base and mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen, that have honour and courage and resolution in them?"—Truly I did represent to him in this manner conscientiously; and truly I did tell him:—"You must get men of a spirit,—and take it not ill what I say—I know you will not—of a spirit that is likely to go on as far as gentlemen will go; or else you will be beaten still." I told him so; I did truly. He was a wise and worthy person; and he did think, that I talked a good notion, but an impracticable one. Truly I told him I could do somewhat in it. I did so;—and truly I must needs say this to you,

\* Carlyle, II. p. 526-7.

—impute it to what you please—I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did; and from that day forward, I must say to you, they were never beaten, and wherever they were engaged against the enemy, they beat continually.’—We here get an insight into the remarkable union of cool reflective sagacity with moral fervour in Cromwell’s mind. His heart was in the cause, and he must have men about him, who felt it as he did. He soon obtained a Coloneley; and gradually purging his regiment of baser elements, filled up its ranks with ‘religious and godly’ men—the sons of reputable freeholders and tradesmen—who well deserved the name of ‘Ironsides,’ from the resistless prowess with which they bore down their enemies in every battle. With this change in the character of his soldiers, Cromwell’s unexampled career of victories began. In the bloody fight of Marston Moor, July 2, 1644, Cromwell’s regiment completely routed Prince Rupert’s horse. ‘God made them,’ says he, ‘as stubble to our swords. Give glory, all the glory, to God.’ A letter is preserved of Oliver’s, written two days afterwards, to his brother-in-law, Col. Valentine Walton, who had lost a son at the commencement of the action—which affords a most curious glimpse into the spirit of Puritanism—its strange, and to our feelings almost revolting, mixture of intense piety and the tenderest affection, with a warlike vindictiveness little short of ferocity. Yet the letter is full of solemn and pathetic beauty. We have not space to extract it; but beg the reader will not pass it by unnoticed.\*

Cromwell’s earnestness in the prosecution of the war, was not quite in harmony with the dilatory and cautious operations of the great Parliamentary Generals, Essex and Manchester. In his place in Parliament, he openly brought a charge against the latter,—and the result was the passing of the celebrated Self-denying Ordinance, by which all members of either House were required to lay down their commands in the army—and the new modelling of the army itself. The army was now composed of other materials, and brought under new influences. Men who scrupled taking the Covenant, were admitted to serve; and Independency acquired a predominant influence in

\* Carlyle, I. p. 195.

its ranks. Immediately, a great change took place in the conduct of the war. Cromwell, though Fairfax held the rank and title of Commander-in-Chief, really directed it, pushed it with vigour, and by a series of decisive actions brought it speedily to a close.—As this revolution had so great an influence on Cromwell's own fortunes, the question naturally arises, how far he was sincere in promoting the Self-denying Ordinance, by which properly he ought to have been deprived of his military functions. The overt facts were simply these.—After the passing of that measure, he came duly to Windsor from his engagements in the West, to resign his command to Fairfax; but before he could return to his duties in Parliament, he was met by an Order from the Committee of both Kingdoms to retain it, since his services were deemed essential to the public safety. The term of dispensation from the Ordinance was repeatedly prolonged to him, till he came at length to be viewed as a necessary adjunct to the army, and Fairfax and the officers petitioned Parliament, that he might be appointed Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Horse. The real spring in action at the bottom of the whole affair, was the growing jealousy between the Presbyterian and Independent parties, and their different view of the public interest. Cromwell was deeply implicated with the latter, and, like them, had determined, that the great end of the war should not be thrown away in compromise. Their spirit was up. They were resolved to take the game into their own hands, and get rid of men who were not as much in earnest as themselves. At this juncture of affairs, some vehement expressions are said to have escaped from Cromwell, which his enemies have not failed to recollect against him—that 'there would never be a good time in England, till we had done with the Lords,'—and still more, that 'if he met the King in battle, he would fire his pistol at him, as at any other man.'—The probability is, that the very framers of the Self-denying Ordinance looked to Cromwell's continuance in the army as a thing both possible and desirable; and that he himself 'let the matter in silence take its own course.'\*

\* Carlyle, I. p. 208, who refers to Godwin's Hist. of the Commonwealth, I. p. 405.



The great victory at Naseby, June 14, 1645, which brought to light the whole extent of the king's duplicity—the suppression of the *Clubmen*, a kind of concealed Royalists, in the West—the capture of Bristol, with the surrender of Prince Rupert—the reduction of Winchester—the storming and taking of Basing House, and of other places in the western and southern counties, in the autumn of the same year—the King's flight from Oxford to the Scots' army before Newark, with the submission of Oxford and all other places to the Parliament soon afterwards—decisive events that followed each other with startling rapidity—bore witness to the clear and sustained purpose, and vigilant ubiquity, of a master spirit, and brought the first Civil War to an issue in the summer of 1646. In his letters to the Speaker respecting these military transactions, Cromwell seems never to lose sight of the religious question which was at the root of the whole controversy—at first with the Prelatists, and then with the Presbyterians; and betrays on all occasions his warm sympathy with the principles of the Independents. In his dispatch after the battle of Naseby, he commends 'honest men' (meaning those who entertained such principles) to the favourable consideration of Parliament, and begs they may not be 'discouraged:' and adds emphatically—'He that ventures his life for the liberty of his country, I wish he trust in God for the liberty of his conscience, and you for the liberty he fights for.'\* After the taking of Bristol, he writes to Lenthal with great approval of the spirit of the faithful in that city. 'Presbyterians, Independents, all have here the same spirit of faith and prayer; the same presence and answer; they agree here, have no names of difference; pity it is, it should be otherwise anywhere! All that believe, have the real unity, which is most glorious; because inward and spiritual, in the Body, and to the Head.† For being united in forms, commonly called Uniformity, every Christian will for peace' sake study and do, as far as Conscience will permit. And for brethren, in things of the mind, we look for no compulsion, but that of light and reason.'‡

\* Letter XIII. Carlyle, I. p. 215.

† 'Head' means *Christ*; 'Body,' the true Church of Christ.

‡ Letter XV. Carlyle, I. p. 230.

In the interval of about two years between the first and the second Civil Wars—the divergent tendencies of the Presbyterian and Independent parties became more decided and irreconcilable. Independency was overpoweringly strong in the army—the principal officers as well as the men being generally of that persuasion:—in Parliament, though its members had been recruited since the close of the first war, by the accession of many Independents—amongst them, Blake, Ireton, Ludlow, Algernon Sidney, and Hutchinson—the Presbyterians still possessed a great preponderance. Army and Parliament were therefore now at open variance. Cromwell was exceedingly active in the interest of the army; and the Manifesto on its behalf, signed by the officers with Fairfax at their head, and addressed to the Mayor and Corporation of London—in which they pray for a discharge of their arrears, a reparation of the wrong done to their character and motives, and, in particular, for a final settlement of the nation, on the basis of liberty of conscience,—is considered by Mr. Carlyle, on good internal evidence, to be Cromwell's own composition. Eleven Presbyterian members of the House were on the same occasion petitioned against by the army, and compelled to retire. The language of the Manifesto is firm and manly, but, at the same time, moderate and respectful.—Cromwell busied himself in various ways to bring about an union of all parties, for securing the great object of the war.\* Failing in their attempts to come to an understanding with the Parliament, the Independents, keeping the same object of liberty of conscience in view, entered into negotiations with the King. His Majesty having been surrendered by the Scots, had been placed by the Parliament under Presbyterian custody at Holmby House in Northamptonshire. From Holmby he was carried off, in the well-known expedition of Cornet Joyce, and put in charge of the army, and from that time to his death, virtually remained in their hands. Active treaties were now going on between the Army and the King; and terms were more than once offered him, less rigid than those insisted on by the Presbyterians—in which the chief points demanded, were—the due assembling of

\* See an account of different Meetings convened by him in Westminster for this purpose, in Ludlow l. p. 238, who of course puts an unfavourable construction on Cromwell's motives.

Parliaments, a more equal representation of the people, and liberty of conscience. Mr. Hallam—no prejudiced or hasty judge—thinks, that the first intentions of Cromwell and Ireton towards the King were not unfavourable, and, so far as their determination not to lose the object of the war allowed, sincere.\* It is remarkable, that in the conferences at Westminster about this time, of which Ludlow gives us an account, Cromwell could never be induced to commit himself against the principle of Monarchy—one of the first circumstances that drew upon him the suspicion and dislike of the Commonwealth's-men. The great intercourse of Cromwell and Ireton with the King, and his honourable reception of them and their families, excited universal remark, and scandalised their enemies in the House.† Cromwell complained to Ludlow of the jealousy and suspicion that were entertained of him; and the latter evidently thought, he had some design of making favourable terms for himself and his friends, with the King.‡ But that infatuated prince, blind to his real position, was playing a double game. His evasive answers, his proved duplicity, his passionate haughtiness, whenever he thought he could safely display it—and his renewed intrigues and negotiations with the Presbyterian party—convinced the Independents, that he was unworthy of trust, made them regard their previous treaties with him as a sinful dereliction of principle, and accelerated his own doom.§

And so the second Civil War broke out in the summer of 1648. It was a war mainly of Presbyterian Royalists, seconded by a party of the Scots under the Duke of Hamilton,—to rescue the King from the hands that now held him in bondage. Cromwell had the chief conduct of the war. By a series of vigorous enterprises, all compressed within the autumn of this year, he crushed the rising in Wales, defeated Hamilton in Lancashire, and having marched into Scotland to compose matters there, had returned into the north of England, and sat down before Pontefract Castle, early in November. These extraordinary successes

\* *Constit. Hist.* II. p. 283, with the important extract from Mrs. Hutchinson's *Memoirs*, note, p. 284.

† Guizot's *History of the English Revolution*. Hazlitt's Transl. p. 348.

‡ Ludlow's *Memoirs*, I. p. 246.

§ See the account, from a party present, of a remarkable Prayer Meeting of the Officers at Windsor, Carlyle, I. pp. 312—15.

—with the religious enthusiasm peculiar to his own mind and to the spirit of the times—he owned as visible sanctions of God to the cause in which he was embarked. How he reasoned, at this time, on the treaty still pending with the King at Newport, and on the right of Parliament to unqualified obedience—we learn from a very remarkable letter to his hesitating friend, Col. Robert Hammond, Governor of the Isle of Wight, who had charge of the King's person there.\* One passage in it is full of meaning: ‘Authorities and powers are the ordinance of God. This or that species is of human institution, and limited, some with larger, others with stricter bands, each one according to its constitution. I do not therefore think the Authorities may do *anything*, and yet such obedience be due. All agree that there are cases in which it is lawful to resist.’—‘*The query is, whether our's be such a case? This ingenuously is the true question.*’† Soon after the date of this letter, Col. Pride's celebrated Purge of the House from its Presbyterian elements, took place. Cromwell's relation to this transaction is not without its significance. The first exclusion of forty-one members occurred on Dec. 6, 1648. On the evening of that very day Cromwell came up to town, leaving Lambert to prosecute the siege of Pontefract. On the morrow, he was thanked by the House; and though they had sent out to demand their excluded members, no satisfactory answer was returned, and the *purging* went on, till above a hundred were deprived of their seats, and a more unanimous remainder of very decided purpose was left—The sequel is well known, and soon told. A High Court of Justice was constituted for the trial of Charles Stuart. Cromwell attended all its sessions but one; and in the signatures to the Death Warrant, his name comes third. The execution of the King early in 1649, put an end to the second Civil War.—Whatever opinion we may be inclined to pass on the absolute character of this stern measure—there can be no doubt, that many concurred in it, from highly conscientious—not to say, deeply religious,—motives. Among these, we should reckon such men as Bradshaw and Hutchinson. It may be taken as indirect evidence of Cromwell's own conviction of the rectitude of

\* Letter LV. Carlyle, I. p. 390.

† The Italics are our own.

this judicial act, that only two days after the King's execution, we find him writing in the coolest and most unperturbed manner about his son's marriage-settlement—without the slightest allusion to an event that filled Europe with consternation—as if nothing extraordinary had happened.\*

By this catastrophe, Cromwell became the servant of the Commonwealth, and continued such for the next four years of his life. In this important epoch of his history, the points which prominently arrest attention, as indicative of his character and influencing his fortunes—are his stern, imperious crushing of the Levellers—his reduction of Ireland—his victories over the Scots, who had taken up arms in the cause of young Charles, their covenanted King—and his conferences with his friends and officers about settling the form of government.—Few parts of his life have exposed him to more censure, than his terrific dealing with rebellious Ireland. If we cannot justify, we may at least understand, his conduct in that affair, by looking at it in the Puritan point of view. Ireland was the strong-hold of Papistry; Ireland had furnished most dangerous and noxious aid to the cause of the Malignants; Ireland had oppressed and persecuted the people of God. Oliver, therefore, descended on its coasts with the feeling, that he was a scourge of impiety in the hand of God. The image of ancient Hebrew warriors, exterminating idolaters from the earth, rose up before him—and texts of holy writ floated in upon his memory—to nerve his purpose and silence his natural compassion—the heat of devotion and the fierceness of warlike rage mingling awfully in his roused and excited soul. The case of Ireland had always greatly interested him. Twice in his life, he had offered considerable sums from his own estate, and once foregone large arrears that were due to him, to maintain the war for the deliverance of the Protestants there.† His unbroken course of victory in these Irish and Scotch wars, confirmed him in the enthusiastic persuasion, that he was upholding the cause of Divine truth and right. In every victory he saw the hand, and heard the approving voice, of God. The effect of this on his own mind, with the elation of manner that accom-

\* Letter LVI. Carlyle, I. p. 409.

† Carlyle, I. pp. 164, 302.

panied it, was perceptible to his friends on his triumphant return to London after the 'crowning mercy' of Worcester. Hugh Peters shrewdly remarked to a friend on the road, that Cromwell would make himself King.\*

Cromwell was now the first man in the nation, and, as head of the army, could determine the course of its affairs. His mind was much exercised on the settlement of the nation, and his impatience of the Parliament, reduced in numbers and generally unpopular, became every day more manifest. Whitlocke has recorded a dialogue in which Cromwell conferred with him about the expediency of assuming the title of King. In a discussion at the Speaker's, where divers officers and lawyers were assembled, the former were for a Commonwealth, the latter pleaded for Monarchy: Cromwell, at the close, expressed himself cautiously in favour of a 'Settlement with somewhat of Monarchical power in it.'†

A Bill had long been before the Parliament for a new Representative, and the consequent dissolution of its own power. Having been tardily proceeded with, the measure was again stimulated into activity by Cromwell. But the Army and the Parliament could not agree upon preliminaries; and it was therefore understood that it should lie over, till these were decided upon. Some members of the House, anxious for a settlement, did not keep their word; for, while Cromwell and others were engaged in conference, at his own residence—in full dependence on the understanding that had been come to—they were all at once informed, that the House was proceeding rapidly with the Bill, and about to pass it into law. This was Cromwell's justification for going down to the House with a file of musketeers, and violently dissolving it. He afterwards said—according to one account,‡ not at all inconsistent with his character—that he did not intend this when he entered the House, but felt the spirit of God so strong upon him, that he could no longer hearken to carnal counsels. In one of his Speeches to the second Protectorate Parliament, he puts his objection to the Long Parliament on more definite grounds—its irresponsible

\* Ludlow, II. p. 447.

† Whitlocke, Memorials, pp. 491, 523.

‡ Echard, quoted by Godwin, III. 456. Carlyle, II. p. 181.

arbitrariness, and usurpation of all functions of the State—and the substitution of its Committees in place of the Courts at Westminster.\*

The decisive step had been now taken. Cromwell was henceforth visibly, as well as really, placed at the summit of affairs.

The Parliament being destroyed, the Supreme power remained with the Army; and Cromwell governed the nation, as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. In his own name, and with the advice of his Council of Officers, he summoned a sort of Convention Parliament (Barbone's or the Little Parliament), designated by Mr. Carlyle, a Meeting of Puritan Notables, in whom the Sovereign authority was to be ostensibly lodged. They did not however answer his purpose. Their zeal in legal and ecclesiastical reforms, brought down on them the hatred of the lawyers and benefited clergy; and after some understanding with Cromwell (which it is absurd scepticism to doubt) that such a measure would be acceptable to him, the Speaker with a minority of the House, taking advantage of the absence of the more ardent reformers, proceeded to Whitehall, and surrendered their powers to Cromwell. In a few days, appeared the Instrument of Government, by which Oliver was constituted Lord Protector of the Commonwealth, though the sovereignty still remained in principle with Parliament.

Of the two forms of government over which Oliver presided, during the five last years of his life—the first constituted by the Instrument, Dec. 16, 1653, with an elective chief appointed for life at its head, was republican; the second, which was established in the summer of 1657, by the Humble Petition and Advice—though without the title of King, which had been much under discussion, and which the lawyers urged, and the soldiers, for the most part, forbade, him to accept—was to all intents and purposes monarchical.† In the interval between these two Inaugurations—finding his first Protectorate Parliament unmanageable, and royalist conspiracies breaking out in all quarters—he reduced the country, during the years 1655-6, under military law, placing his Major-Generals over the ten districts into which he divided the whole of

\* Speech XII. Carlyle, II. pp. 554—8.

† Hallam, II. p. 351.



England—with power almost satrapal, to maintain order, to put down insurrections, punish delinquents, and decimate the property of royalists.—On the extraordinary transactions of the concluding years of Cromwell's life, his Speeches and Official Papers throw a strong light; and afford perhaps the best clue to his real character and motives. The mind of the man, indeed, stands out clear and naked, amidst the confusion and obscurity in which his language is often involved. Great and noble thoughts break through it perpetually. In these authentic records, we perceive his unabated attachment to liberty of conscience and a spiritual Christianity—his zeal for the protection of the Protestant interest—and his ambition to put himself at its head, and to be looked up to as its guardian. We discover in them also no unequivocal traces of his aspiring to a Kingly power, if not to the Kingly title, but with a lingering, old English, attachment to the hereditary forms of the Constitution, if they could any how be wrought into the general structure and working of his own projects. But it is equally evident, that he would let no reverence for forms, however sacred, stand in the way of his ends. His treatment of his Protectorate Parliaments was harsh and arbitrary in the extreme. He was resolved to rule, and he let them know it. He deprived Whitlocke and Widdrington of the Great Seal, because they refused to submit to an ordinance of his Council for the reform of Chancery, without confirmation by Parliament. Obnoxious and unruly persons he did not hesitate to ship off to the plantations. To 'Barbadoes a man' had become quite a phrase in his time.—Such was the spirit of his government. The difficulties of his position, encircled by enemies on every side, at home and abroad, obliged him to persist in it till his death. When he died, his government fell to pieces; and the Stuart returned: with what result, we need not add.

In looking back on this marvellous history, we find the source of its unparalleled phenomena in the fact, that the best religion of the times—the most vital in its principle, the most brotherly in its feeling, and the most effective on the outward life—was, by a rare coincidence, centered in the Army:—and thus the two elements, of material force, and spiritual conviction, which, from the very birth of

Christianity, had been in almost perpetual conflict, were for a time cemented in the closest amity, and bore with their united strength on a common object. This was to some extent a natural consequence of the religious wars that sprang out of the great movement of the Reformation; but the observable peculiarity of the alliance, and the uncommon strength of its effects, in England—we must ascribe to the overpowering individuality of Cromwell's mind, and to the circumstance already adverted to, of his having determined, at an early period of the war, to form a regiment of 'godly persons,' and given an example, after which the whole Army was gradually modelled. A parallel case, but of far inferior influence, may be adduced, in the religious spirit with which the Swedish Adolphus animated his troops.\*—To the more civilised, some would say the more effeminate, mind of the nineteenth century, the idea that men, children of the same soil, should imbrue their hands in each other's blood, from a religious and Christian motive, seems hardly conceivable: but no one can read the authentic documents of that time, without being fully convinced, that such was the fact. It is quite impossible to understand our civil wars, till we are thoroughly penetrated with the feeling, that with the most earnest men on both sides of the quarrel, religion was the uppermost consideration, to which questions of simple politics, though intimately allied, were still secondary. With the Cavaliers, it was the Church even more than the Crown: with the Puritans, it was the Gospel far above all human laws. Clarendon and Cromwell furnish apposite examples of the contrasted tendencies. The former declared, that not even to save himself, his wife, or his children, from the lingering death of famine, would he consent to 'the lessening of any part of the function of a bishop, or the taking away of the smallest prebendary in the Church:†' and the latter, in one of his

\* The whole secret of Cromwell's success, and the key to Mr. Carlyle's reading of his character, is contained in this one sentence of Milton:—'Sufficit hoc unicum singularis et prope divinæ virtutis indicium, tantam in eo viguisse sive animi vim atque ingenii, sive disciplinæ non ad militarem modo, sed ad Christianam potiùs normam et sanctimoniam institutæ, ut omnes ad sua castra tanquam ad optimum non militaris duntaxat scientiæ, sed religionis ac pietatis gymnasium, vel jam bonos et fortes undique attraheret, vel tales, ipsius maximè exemplo, efficeret.'—*Defensio Secunda*, etc. *Prose Works* by Fletcher, p. 728.

† Quoted from his *Correspondence* by Hallam, II. p. 284.

speeches to Parliament, spoke of the civil liberty and interest of the nation, as 'next best' indeed, but yet 'subordinate, to the more peculiar interest of God.'\* Mr. Carlyle, intimately familiar with both events, has noticed several points both of contrast and of analogy between the English Revolution of the 17th, and the French of the 19th, century. But the circumstance just mentioned constitutes their most important distinction. In England, there was an earnest effort in both parties to carry out into action a positive religious conviction; for the fervour of the old Reformers was not yet extinct:—in France, where luxury, corruption of morals, and a cold, intellectual philosophy, had dried up all the sources of spiritual enthusiasm—the zeal for liberty of conscience was at best but a negation—the destruction of a hated priesthood and a loathed superstition, and at last, ripening into intolerance, the prohibition of Christianity itself.

Cromwell is an impersonation, on a grand scale, of the Spirit of Puritanism. The root of his whole character was deep, enthusiastic, religious conviction; the main-spring of his actions—at least in the early part of his career—a firm persuasion, that public and private well-being was to be found in strict conformity to the law of God. Other motives of a more worldly character afterwards grew upon and deformed this primitive stock of principle; and the peculiar embarrassments of his position, combined with the impetuosity of his temperament, often involved him in tortuous, unjustifiable and violent courses.—Unquestionably he loved power, and sought it at times with a desperate vehemence:—yet a careful perusal of his Letters and Speeches has left on our minds a strong impression of a general rectitude of purpose and singleness of aim—to be estimated of course from his Puritan view of life—pursued through his whole career, and never abandoned, even amidst the perplexities and distractions of his closing years. His moral and intellectual endowments appear to have been finely balanced and in admirable harmony. His domestic affections, warm, pure, and tender, were proportionate to the ardour and nobleness of his patriotic zeal; and the sanctity of his home gave a pledge for his incorrupt fidelity in every public charge. To a clear and

\* Carlyle, II. p. 498.

comprehensive understanding, which discerned, as by intuition, the opportunities of the most complicated affairs—he added a will of unequalled energy and decision. The boldness of his conceptions was only surpassed by his sagacity in the selection of the fittest instruments for their execution. His fiery courage was kept in check by his cool vigilance and shrewd caution. With a stern sense of justice, and indomitable determination to carry his own ends, he was from temperament habitually merciful and compassionate. Gifted with a wonderful talent for affairs, and capable of intense application, he gathered round him, by the elective affinity of a commanding mind, the most diversified aptitudes and resources, and through force of will made them work together to his own ends.—Thus richly dowered by nature, he was called out into action by the necessities of the age, in the full ripeness of all his powers. Events revealed the man. He did not seek out circumstances; but they sought out him. On his first entering the field, overflowing with religious enthusiasm and burning with patriotism—he exhibits the most complete union of the saint and the warrior that the world ever saw. Puritanism—like Feudalism—has a chivalry of its own. Her Oliver of Marston Moor and Naseby was a true knight, without fear and without reproach—devoted to the holiest of causes, that of justice and God's truth—not, as drawn by idle poets, roaming through visionary forests in quest of profitless adventures, but sternly grappling on the bloody battle-field of reality, with the palpable monsters of tyranny and falsehood, worthy to be honoured and celebrated through all ages by the brave and the good.

The charge which has been put forth against Cromwell with most plausibility, and by nearly all parties, is that of dissimulation—of his having constantly pursued personal ends under the cover of religion and the public interest. To do him justice—we must recollect, that he who has a work to accomplish amidst the strife, and violence, and uncertainty, of a revolutionary time, cannot fairly be tried by the same rules as would be applicable on the clear and level stage of a tranquil civilization. Two facts come out prominently on a survey of his career:—first, his acquisition of sovereign power and a vast external influence and

dignity, by methods utterly at variance with every idea of constitutional government and recognised law, and often in bold defiance of the national will; secondly, his constant asseveration in all his Letters and Speeches, confirmed, it cannot be denied, by the overt tendency of his most conspicuous acts, that he took this course to secure the great object of the war, and to settle the nation on a basis of equal recognition for all Christian parties.—Now, in which of these facts do we find the final end and aim of the man's endeavour; and in which, merely the instruments for realising it? Did he profess religious designs, only to acquire power? or did he seize, improve, and augment the power which circumstances threw into his hands, to lay a broad and enduring foundation for religious truth and liberty?—On the resolution of this question, must depend our general estimate of his character. We do not think it possible to doubt, that Cromwell embarked in the war, with the honest, fervent purpose of reforming his country according to the Puritan idea of right. In action, he was governed by circumstances; and his views opened upon him, as he advanced: but there is evidence, in the latest expressions of his mind, that his first purpose was never relinquished—that, however obscured for a moment in the stormy turbulence of the times, it never went out. Like all the religious spirits of the age, he had a strong sense of immediate dependence on Providence, and waited much on the issue of events, to decide his course:—and this circumstance, with the reserve and vigilant caution, which a constant dealing with duplicity and headstrong passion in all parties, compelled him to use, has undoubtedly thrown an air of dissimulation over some parts of his conduct. He has to share the charge with some of the best of his contemporaries. The younger Vane, perhaps the purest-minded man of his time, designedly overreached the Scots in the discussions about the Covenant, by the ambiguity of a phrase.

The means resorted to by Cromwell for attaining his ends, were such as can only be vindicated on the assumption, that the ends themselves were indispensable, and that no other means were available. Inured to the discipline of an army, and accustomed to seize his object by a bold, decisive, stroke, he acted as a military chief may always

be expected to act, who finds himself carried by the course of revolutionary change to the highest pinnacle of power, and enabled, by the force at his disposal, to put his cherished designs into execution. The weakness and unpopularity of the Parliament, the chaos of parties, and the absence of any recognised head to subdue the strife, to repel external foes, and to settle the national peace—all seemed to justify a step of unprecedented daring, and the grasp at an authority which every one else had relinquished; while the marvellous success which had crowned his arms in an unbroken chain of victory from Marston Moor to Worcester, came to his enthusiastic mind with all the impress of a direct approval from heaven, urging him by these visible tokens to go on and complete the work. We fully believe, that he uttered his own sincere conviction, when he declared, in one of his Speeches, that 'he had had, as he conceived, a clear call to the stations he had acted in, through all those affairs.'\* All these feelings were vehemently at work within him, becoming more turbid, more commixed with grosser elements, as he was drawn deeper into the vortex of adventurous usurpation—mingling at last into a very strong, but perhaps almost unconscious, tide of self-willedness and ambition.—On the whole, however, there appear to us proofs so conclusive of Cromwell's essential fidelity to his original principles and purpose, through his many and rapid changes of fortune, that we cannot withhold from him the admiration that is ever due to earnest and prevailing enthusiasm in a noble cause, nor hesitate to rank him among the few truly heroic characters of human history.

It is another question, and one less easy to solve—whether, admitting his sincerity, we can regard him, on broader grounds, as having taken the true view of his duty as a patriot and a Christian. The justification of any revolution, however pure in its motives, and righteous in its object, must in a great measure be sought from its chances of eventual success; and successful it can rarely, if ever, be, and only by the most violent methods—when it is undertaken against the general feeling of the community. Cromwell's rule was the creation of force, and it was maintained by the sword. Royalists and republicans, presbyterians

\* Speech, April 21, 1657. Carlyle, II. p. 548.

and sectaries, were fiercely opposed to it. Insurrections constantly breaking out on all sides, disclosed the fires that were smouldering under the surface of affairs; and successive parliaments could not be restrained, by the most arbitrary and imperious treatment, from giving utterance to the discontent that widely prevailed. Nor did five years of painful, vigilant, effort issue, after all, in a permanent result. Everything most opposite to Puritanism, came back with an intense re-action after his death.—With these facts before us, it seems difficult to vindicate the usurpation of Cromwell, on any principle that would not legitimatise the assumption by the strongest, at all times, of the supreme disposal of human affairs. Whether it would have been possible for Cromwell, on returning from Worcester, at the close of the war, in the full pride and power of victory—feared and revered by all parties which then lay submissive at his feet—to have secured the great ends of justice and Christian freedom by a settlement, fitted to harmonise the conflicting elements of society, in which his personal distinction and advantage should have had a less ostensible share—it is, of course, with our necessarily imperfect knowledge of the actual state of parties, very difficult to say; but such an attempt, made with sincerity and earnestness, would certainly have left him a fairer name with posterity, and neither the result nor the example could have been less friendly to the final interests of just government and liberty.\*

Carried away by the strong interest of Cromwell's character and history, we have left ourselves but little space for noticing some views entertained by Mr. Carlyle, in our judgment false, or at least greatly exaggerated, which belong to his general cast of thought, visible in all his productions, but remarkably conspicuous in the present work.—We allude, in the first place, to his exclusive sympathy with mere force of will, as the proper element of human

\* Some of the lawyers suggested, in a conference about this time, that the young duke of Gloucester, the late King's third son, as yet uncorrupted by the principles of his family, might be placed on the throne, as the head of a new dynasty, with ample securities for civil and religious freedom—which Cromwell's personal weight and influence could have enforced—and with a strong probability of reconciling to the government, the great bulk of the royalists.—See Whitlocke, p. 492.



greatness, without due regard for the necessary corrective of high conscientiousness and refined moral sentiment. For scrupulous men—for men who anxiously weigh the means towards a desired end—his language usually betrays unbounded contempt. Where this hesitation conceals selfishness and cowardice, we could heartily join with him; but he makes no clear distinction, and includes Hampden and Whitlocke, Vane and Lenthal, Bradshaw and Clement Walker, in one sweeping, indiscriminate censure. Indeed, it is difficult to make out Mr. Carlyle's idea of society, civil or religious. Reverence for the ordinary constitutional securities of liberty, he derides as mere pedantry. Apparently, he would have his true hero dispose of every thing by his own sovereign *fiat*, setting the will of others, all existing laws, all ancient constitutions, completely at defiance—men everywhere to fall down, and worship, and believe in him—till the hero himself or his representative becomes at length a formula and a sham, when a new revolution must break out, and a new hero-worship supersede the old.\* To prevent a recurrence of such disorganising necessities, and to secure the tranquil, continuous development of social progress—has been the aim of the meditations and endeavours of all wise and humane politicians for the last two centuries; and to treat their suggestions—imperfect and tentative as they must at present unavoidably be—as idle theories, seems to us, we must confess, to be throwing away all the fruits of our lengthened European experience, only to go back to the coarsest rudiments of Asiatic despotism.

We cannot pass over, in the second place, Mr. Carlyle's vague, undistinguishing, condemnation of the present reluctance of society to apply a harsh and bloody treatment to the cure of moral and political ills—of its increasing aversion from war and capital punishments—of what he calls, very contemptuously, 'the rose-water plan of surgery.' He has expressed his ideas on this subject very strongly, not to say offensively, in his introductory remarks to Cromwell's letters on the Irish campaign.† In these, as in most of his observations, there is a large element of

\* Carlyle's *Cromwell*, I. p. 403.

† Vol. I. pp. 451—56.

justice and truth; he has discerned, clearly enough, the prevalent cant and formalism which seizes upon all questions, and repeats, parrot-like, a set of phrases without earnestness and conviction: but his language wants discrimination; it rather seems forced out from him by strong general impulses, than calmly dictated by precise, distinct, ideas;—so that he counteracts the obvious exaggerations of the popular sentiment, by exaggeration not less absurd in the opposite direction.—The tendencies which he censures, and, in no small degree, the practical irresolution accompanying them, are the natural effect of an advancing civilisation and the increase of knowledge. In ages less cultivated and refined, when men lie nearer to their primitive condition—they act more from instinct and less from reason;—their impulses to action are less balanced and qualified;—their views are narrower;—they see only one course before them:—and their whole energy is poured into it. But the growth of industry and the arts of peace—literature, philosophy—more refined and extended social intercourse—necessarily open the heart to wider sympathies, make it less prone to passion and violence, more gentle, tender, and compassionate—and by placing all questions that arise, not in one single aspect, but in various lights, before the mind, and inspiring a consideration for the different views of individuals, involve by natural consequence some feebleness and vacillation in action, so long as opinion is only shaping itself into conviction, and no strong decided purpose has as yet taken possession of the general mind. That there are evils incident to this, as to every state of society, is most true; but it is surely a more rational course, to suggest a remedy for such evils, than to declaim against tendencies, which are in themselves inevitable, and on the whole beneficial.

Individual minds have less power at the present day, than organised masses; and to carry a great social object, recourse can no longer be had to the arm of flesh—to the mailed glove and steel blade of a Cromwell, or to the intellectual autocracy of a Knox and a Calvin—but to the slower and more circuitous process of persuasion and moral influence. Both these circumstances have had effect in bringing about the state of things which is the object of Mr. Carlyle's antipathy and contempt. The ideas of enlight-

ened men drop like fruitful seeds into the bosom of society, gather round them congenial elements, spring up, multiply themselves, and spread over vast tracts of human thought and action. In the associations of which they are the nucleus, there is often, doubtless, much folly and much fanaticism, much talk that comes to nothing, much idle self-display ;—on platforms, in committees, in tract-distributions, much lamentable waste of available energy. But the question recurs, whether this, after all, be not the only method by which the ideas of the wisest and best can be brought down from their spheres of remote and lofty influence, and gradually wrought into the general heart of humanity. Cant, where gross selfishness is absent (and there is much cant which is not purely selfish) is the worship of a name or a phrase—taking up a cause, without clear understanding or thorough conviction. It is one of the many signs of that incurable restlessness of the human mind, which once broke out in action and spent itself in martial conflict, but which has now, fortunately for the world, taken a more harmless direction. Absurd and mischievous as it is, it is still an indication of progress. Where there is much speculation and activity, there must, in the present state of education, be an abundant crop of Cants. There are no Cants in Turkey and Spain. Among the most stirring literary influences of the time, are the writings of Thomas Carlyle. We are by no means certain that Carlylism itself, in the hands of some, who can ape its extravagance, without imbibing its genius, may not become one of the many Cants of the world.

There is one other idea pervading the work before us, which we must not omit to notice—the strange insinuation, again and again repeated, that since the days of Puritanism, there has been no sincere Christianity in England, scarcely any belief in a God.\* Were we to take the author at his word, we might suppose that no prayer ever more went up from a human heart to heaven—that worship was actually extinct, wrapped around with the cere-cloths of usage, cold and silent, in the midst of us—a mere mummy in the chambers of the dead. If this be not the banter of a wanton humour—that half-conscious exaggeration of a general fact in which Mr. Carlyle loves

\* Among many other passages dispersed through the book, see Vol. I. p. 76.

to indulge—the statement is too absurd to require refutation. There is, beyond all question, abundance of hypocrisy and false profession—much cant, hollowness, and formalism, in the religious life of the present day; and for its existence it would not be at all difficult to account: but under it, close bosomed in the deep recesses of private life, there is no small residuum of spiritual earnestness, no feeble sympathy with all that is everlastingly true and beautiful in the mind and work of Christ, disjoined moreover in some degree, and daily disjoining itself more, from the harsh dogmatic tone which disfigured the best expression of Puritanism.—We deeply reverence the Puritans; we owe them unspeakable obligations; viewed in reference to their times, and the honest convictions of the men undertaking it, we hold their work to have been truly noble and heroic: but it is sheer prejudice and perversity to affirm, that in many of the popular movements of the present century—originating and nourished in deep religious feeling—for the abolition of slavery, for the reform of the penal code, for the attainment of equal religious rights, for the emancipation of industry, and for the general improvement and elevation of the humbler classes of society—there is not as true and consistent a manifestation of the spirit of Christianity, as in any of the discussions that engaged the Assembly of Divines, or in the struggle with push of pike and discharge of culverin, whether Episcopacy, or Presbyterianism, or Independency, should bear sway in the land.

Much of the religious indifference complained of in the present day, appears to us to result, not from any decline of interest in religion itself, but from a juster appreciation of its spirit, from a breaking up of the old sectarian distinctions, from yearnings after freer and more brotherly communion between man and man, and a consequent disregard of many of the forms and the dogmas which have hitherto been the chief bonds of religious association. Through this process of intermediate dissolution, the religious world must pass on to a purer and better state. While old things decay, new agencies will spring up, and forms and usages more adapted to the present condition of society will unfold themselves. Faith is not, and never has been, dead; it is only putting on a new

body, and acquiring a more articulate voice. In the meantime, it does appear to us the part of true wisdom and true heroism—not to ransack the past for objects of a passionate idolatry, distrustful and complaining of the men and things immediately about us, in the fond hope, that some new revelation will be vouchsafed from heaven to engage once more our waiting reverence and affections—but rather to take up the yet living elements of Christian faith, which have their roots in the immortal and divine of man, and go with them into the actual world of human suffering and sin, and work them out into practical results—sure that in that earnest conflict with reality, they will yield new light and power for the guidance of our onward course.

Before we conclude, we must return with a very few words to Cromwell once more. We have expressed our doubts of the abstract righteousness of the course by which he achieved his usurpation; but having gone so far, we cannot but regret, that he did not live to complete his work. The odium and infamy incurred by the first aggressive step, would have been forgotten in the tranquil sense of security attendant on final success; and future generations would have looked back on an act required, as they would then have thought, by the necessities of the times, not only without disapproval, but with a grateful acknowledgment of the blessings derived from it in renovated institutions and in a just government. That such blessings would have resulted from the realization of Oliver's views, we have little doubt. For ourselves, we should have preferred almost any event to the restoration of the Stuarts, and the re-establishment of the Church and the Universities in their old bigotted ascendancy. The Revolution of 1688 was a poor compensation for benefits, of which the hope was held out by the Commonwealth, and cut off for centuries by the Protector's death. It was the direct aim of his policy, to bring the religious and educational institutions of the country into harmony with the wants and feelings of the great mass of its inhabitants—to make them national rather than sectarian—to open the fountain of spiritual life, and let its waters freely, widely, circulate. The very class whose interests are supposed to be identified with the actual state of things, would have most largely

benefited by the change. Our aristocracy would have had more numerous points of contact and sympathy with the people; would have drunk of the same moral spirit; have lived in the same light; and been better qualified for the discharge of their appropriate duties. We look on the present condition of our Church and our Universities as the hidden root of one half of the disorders under which we are suffering. Changes affecting our outward and material condition—our industry and political organisation—will be of little avail for permanent tranquillity, so long as a large portion of the moral heart of society is unsound and the acknowledged sources of national light are obstructed with the darkest prejudice. We are among those who wish to preserve our ancient aristocracy, as a salutary counter-balance, in a civilisation so full of life and power, so richly organised, as our own—to the pretensions of mere wealth and the efforts of rough adventurous talent. And if they only understood their position, as the natural leaders of a generous and enlightened people—relieved from the necessity of ordinary toil and surrounded with the means and appliances of the highest civilisation, that they might benefit the world, by cultivating the noblest branches of human knowledge, and undertaking the most exalted and responsible duties—never upon this earth had an aristocracy so glorious a career before it as that of England at the present day.

But there must be something extraordinarily perverse and defective in the training of our great seats of learning—something benumbing in the influence of our territorial church, when we find a race of such high physical development, so kind and courteous in their natural feeling, so brave, manly, and spirited, as the English aristocracy—lagging, as a class, in the rear of the national intelligence, checked in the naturally good impulses of their hearts by narrow antipathies and superstitious fears, corrupted by the selfishness which monopoly inevitably generates, opposing with blind and suicidal folly the just and resistless demands of the talent and industry of the country, and, in the very face of famine, speculating—not from inhumanity, but in the simplicity of ignorance—on the possibility of appeasing the calls of starving millions by a decoction of bones or an infusion of curry-powder.—The reforms of Cromwell

would have prevented so complete a seclusion from popular interests and sympathies as this. And the work which he began, must be taken up again, and carried through—with the aid, it may be hoped, of more light and more experience—ere England can attain the inward peace and harmony, that is needed to bring out the entire strength of her vast industrial, mental, and spiritual resources. Mr. Carlyle's book will contribute to awaken attention to this important subject. We thank him most heartily for the courage and honesty with which he has executed his task : and though we have not scrupled to express our dissent from him freely on some points, yet there is so much that is noble and just in his sentiments, so warm a love of what is pure and simple and true, such a hatred of meanness and hypocrisy, such a reverence for the eternally excellent—that the solid good of his work immeasurably outweighs its partial error and extravagance, and will add its strong momentum to the impulse that is bearing all things onward to a better futurity.